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U.S. TRANSFER TAXATION OF NONRESIDENT ALIENS:
TOO MUCH OR TOO LITTLE?
CYNTHIA BLUM*
1. INTRODUCTION

In the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988
(the "1988 Act"), Congress made major changes in the rules for
imposing estate and gift taxes on transfers of U.S.-situs
property by nonresident aliens. Congress eliminated the
separate, -lower estate tax rate schedule that had applied for
nonresident alien decedents (ranging from 6% to 30%).
Instead, estates of nonresident aliens were made subject to the
same rate schedule that applies to U.S. citizens, ranging from
26% on transfers between $60,000 and $80,000 to a maximum
of 55%. In addition, Congress for the first time granted a

marital deduction to estates of nonresident aliens, subject to
the same restrictions applied to estates of U.S. citizens.
Congress continued the unified credit for nonresident estates
at a level sufficient to exempt only the first $60,000 of the
taxable estate.
The report of the Ways and Means Committee justified the
dramatic increase in the rate schedule1 for nonresident alien
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1 One commentator described these 1988 changes as "[a] radical increase
in U.S. federal estate tax rates.., which doubled and, in some cases, tripled
these taxes." Nathan Boidman, Taxation at Death: Current Issues and
Developments (pt. I), 2 TAX NOTES INT'L 578, 578 (1990) [hereinafter

Boidman I]. See, e.g., U.S. Trade Relationshipswith the Soviet Union and
(469)
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decedents as achieving greater equity in the treatment of U.S.
Some commentators have
and foreign decedents.!
Somewhat
characterized the changes as "discriminatory.'
paradoxically, others have suggested that the estate tax on
foreigners should be repealed because it is so infrequently
applied.' This Article will evaluate the 1988 changes in the
context of the entire structure of estate and gift taxation for
nonresident aliens, including the operation of the rules in
practice. By contrast, it does not appear that Congress
undertook5 a comprehensive review of the estate and gift

Eastern Europe, the Implications of 'Europe 1992" on American Direct
Investment, and ForeignInvestment in the United States: HearingsBefore
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 57, 63 (1990)
[hereinafter 1990 Hearings](statement of Robert F. Hudson, Jr., Chairman,
Tax Section, The Florida Bar, noting that the 1988 Act "doubl[ed] U.S.
estate tax rates of foreigners"); William W. Bell & David B. Shoemaker,
TAMRA IncreasesEstate Tax Rates of NonresidentAliens, 6 J. PARTNERSHIP
TAX'N 79, 87 (1989) [hereinafter Bell & Shoemaker, TAMRA] (calling the
increase "monumental"); Nathan Boidman & Jeffrey D. Scheine, Corporate
Ownership of United States Homes - Imputed Income or Benefit?, 18 TAX
MGMT. INT'L J. 180 n.2 (1989) [hereinafter Boidman & Scheine, Corporate
Ownership] (chart comparing old and new rates).
2 H.R. REP. No. 795, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 594 (1988) [hereinafter 1988
HousE REPORT].
' Hudson described the treatment of foreign investors as "discriminatory
[but] cloaked in the language of parity." 1990 Hearings, supranote 1, at 57
(Hudson testimony). Hudson argued that "there has not been even a
theoretical justification given for the estate tax differential created by the
1976 and 1988 legislative changes." Id. at 65. See also Bell & Shoemaker,
TAMRA, supra note 1, at 87-89 (criticizing the 1988 rate increase). Bell &
Shoemaker suggest that Congress "fail[ed] to consider the interests of the
[nonresident alien] simply because he has no vote." Id. at 87. See also
Steven A. Musher, Foreign Investment in U.S. Real Estate--The Impact of
the Revenue ReconciliationAct of 1989 and ForeignTax Equity Act of 1990,
19 TAX MGMT. INTL J. 279, 293-94 (1990) (arguing that current estate tax
rules for foreigners, combined with a capital gains tax on 10%-or-more
foreign shareholders, would achieve "[theoretical [plarity" but "[piractical
[p]rejudice").
4 See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, BACKGROUND AND ISSUES
RELATING TO THE TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
84 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 JCT REPORT]. See infra notes 28 & 143 and
accompanying text.
'Bell & Shoemaker state that the rate increase was approved by the
Ways and Means Committee without hearings, and that it was added to the
Senate bill as a floor amendment. Bell & Shoemaker, TAMRA, supra note
1, at 87 n.35, 88. The 1988 changes in the marital deduction for transfers
to noncitizen spouses are said to have been "offered to offset" the revenue
loss of an unrelated provision, allowing "drought-stricken farmers" a one-
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taxation of nonresident aliens in making the 1988 changes.'
This Article concludes that arguments for repeal of the
estate tax on nonresident alien estates should be rejected. It
further suggests that the unified credit and marital deduction
rules for such estates should be liberalized. In addition, the
United States should clearly assert jurisdiction to tax U.S.
assets held through a partnership, although it cannot reach
assets held through a foreign corporation. Finally, arguments
to reinstate the pre-1988 rates and to limit the estate tax for
nonresidents to the amount of appreciation in property should
be rejected unless Congress wishes to put the goal of
encouraging investment in the United States ahead of the goal
of equity.
2. REvIEW OF PRESENT LAW AND ITS DEVELOPMENT
The federal estate and gift tax provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code (the "I.R.C.") contain some special rules
applicable to transfers by nonresidents who are not citizens
(hereinafter "nonresident aliens").
(The estate of a
nonresident alien decedent is sometimes hereinafter referred
to as a "nonresident estate.")"

year income deferral. John Foley, Exotic Widows' Tax: New Estate Tax
Rules for Alien Spouses, 2 TAx NOTES INT'L 124, 126 & n.20 (1990) (citing
statement of Sen. Baucus, 135 CoNG. REC. S15,444 (1988)). Foley states

this "was judged [to be] 'least onerous' on the American taxpayer." Id. at
126 & n.21 (quoting an unidentified committee staff member).
* See William W. Bell & David B. Shoemaker, ForeignDirectInvestment
in U.S. Real Estate: The Screws 7lghten, 8 J. PARTNERSHIP TAX'N 258, 267
(1991) [hereinafter Bell & Shoemaker, ForeignInvestment]. They argue that
unfavorable treatment of nontreaty foreign investors in the United States
has arisen "through inadvertence, and in particular from a failure to
understand the relationship between the NRAs income and estate tax

situations." Id.; see also Bell & Shoemaker, TAMRA, supra note 1, at 82,
88-89 (noting that rates should not have been increased without establishing
enforcement mechanisms for partnership interests).
' For this purpose, residency has been interpreted to mean "domicile."

Treas. Reg. § 20.0-1(bXl) to (2) (as amended in 1980). For discussion of this
interpretation, see, e.g., 5 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL

TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS

134.2.1, at 134-3 to 134-5 (2d

ed. 1993); Sarah G. Austrian & Willys H. Schneider, Tax Aspects of Foreign
Investment in U.S. Real Estate, 45 TAX LAW. 385,429-30 (1992); Sanford H.
Goldberg, Critical Tax Concepts in International Estate Planning, in
INTERNATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING-PRINCIPLES AND STRATEGIES 19, 28-29
(Kozusko & Schoenblum eds., 1991) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL ESTATE
PLANNING]; Gerard John Mene, Estate Planningfor NonresidentAliens, 59
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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2.1. Tax Base
In the case of nonresident alien transferors, the U.S.

federal estate and gift tax applies only with respect to property
situated within the United States' at the time of the
transfer,9 and the gift tax is inapplicable to transfers of
intangible property.1 0

Stock is considered situated in the

United States if and only if it is stock in a domestic
corporation."

There is considerable uncertainty 12 regarding

TAXES 617, 619-20 (1981).

" See Treas. Reg. § 20.2104-1(a)(1) to (2) (as amended in 1974); BITTKER
& LOKKEN, supra note 7, 134.2.3, at 134-7 to 134-15.
'See I.R.C. §§ 2501(a), 2511(a), 2101(a), 2103 (1993). All section
references hereinafter, unless otherwise noted, are to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended in 1993. For the rules applicable to the
generation-skipping tax, see I.R.C. §§ 2663(2), 2652(a)(1); Prop. Teas. Reg.
§ 26.2663-2,57 Fed. Reg. 61,353 (1992); Notice of ProposedRulemaking,PS.
73-88, reprintedin 27 HIGHLIGHTS & DOCUMENTS 4831, 4834 (1992). For a
discussion of these regulations, see Richard L. Doernberg & Jeffrey N.
Pennell, Application of the Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax in an
InternationalSetting, 6 TAX NOTES INTL 723 (1993); David S. Zimble, How
the Proposed Regulations Apply the Generation-SkippingTransfer Tax to
Foreigners,58 TAX NOTES 1793 (1993).
"*See I.R.C. § 2501(a)(2). It is not certain whether a partnership
interest is classified as intangible property for this purpose. See Don W.
Llewellyn & Richard L. Umbrecht, Selecting and Capitalizinga ForeignOwned Entity for Conductinga U.S. Business (pt.I), 21 TAX MGMT. INT'L J.
231, 255 & n.231 (1992) [hereinafter Llewellyn & Umbrecht I); see also
Robert F. Hudson, Jr., Post-1989Tax Planningfor ForeignDirectInvestment
in the United States: The Era of the Non-Corporate Vehicle?, in
INTERNATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING, supra note 7, at 219 [hereinafter
Hudson, Post-1989] (stating that partnership interest is intangible); Stafford
Smiley, Dispositions of U.S. PartnershipInterests by NonresidentAliens, 8
J. PARTNERSHIP TAXIN 133, 142-43 (1991).
" See I.R.C. § 2104(a); Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2104-1(a)(5), 20.2105-1(f) (as
amended in 1974); BITrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 7, 134.2.3, at 134-10 to
134-11.
'" See Bell & Shoemaker, TAMRA, supra note 1, at 80 ("unclear");
Goldberg, supranote 7, at 40-42 (discussing six possible positions); Hudson,
Post-1989, supra note 10, at 220-26; Nina Krauthamer, Income and Estate
Planningfor the Nonresident Alien Investor, 5 J. TAX'N OF INVESTMENTS
251,265-66 (1988) ("unclear"); TAX SECTION, THE FLORIDABAR, Explanation
of Proposed Revisions to U.S. Estate and Gift Taxation of Nondomiciled
Aliens, reprinted in 11 HIGHLIGHTS & DOCUMENTS 910, 911 & n.6 (1988)
[hereinafter FLORIDA BAR] ("uncertain"); see also Austrian & Schneider,
supra note 7, at 429. The IRS is said to be "studying the issue." Musher,
supranote 3, at 290 n.42; see also IRS Semiannual Agenda of Regulations,
58 Fed. Reg. 24,811, 24,861 (1993) (stating that as of Jan. 31, 1993, there
was a regulation project addressing this issue with the "[niext [a]ction
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss4/1
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the situs rule for partnership interests.'
The United States has estate tax treaties in effect with
sixteen countries and a combined or separate gift tax treaty
with eight of these countries. 4 These treaties limit sourcebased taxation and require the country of residence to prevent
double taxation of property permitted to be taxed by the source
country by granting a credit or an exemption.'
2.2. The MaritalDeductionAnd Other Deductions
The estate of a nonresident alien is allowed the deductions
accorded by I.R.C. sections 2053 and 2054 for expenses,
indebtedness, taxes, and losses. However, the estate is
allowed only that proportion of the deductions which the value
of the gross estate situated in the United States bears to the
value of the entire gross estate, which must be disclosed on the
return.'
Under the 1988 Act (as modified in 1989 and
1990),"7 nonresident aliens for the first time became entitled

[ulndetermined").
"' The authorities that may be relevant to this issue include: Treasury
Department's Technical Explanation of U.S. Model Estate and Gift Tax
Treaty of Nov. 20, 1980, reprinted in 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 210 at pp.
10,565 to 10,566; Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U.S. 1 (1928); Sanchez v.
Bowers, 70 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1934); Treas. Reg. § 20.2104-1(a)(4) (as
amended in 1974); Rev. Rul. 55-701, 1955-2 C.B. 836 (applying the U.S-U.K.
estate tax treaty). For discussion, see, e.g., Hudson, Post-1989,supra note
10, at 219-26; Llewellyn & Umbrecht I, supra note 10, at 254-55; Smiley,
supra note 10, at 143-44.
, 4 See Andre Fogarasi et al., CurrentStatus of U.S. Tax Treaties, 22 TAX
MGMT. INT'L J. 506, 506-07 (1993); D. Chase Troxell, Aliens-Estate, Gift
and Generation-SkippingTaxation,201-4th Tax Mgmt. (BNA) at A-16 to A18, A-26 to A-30. Source taxation is subject to greater limitations under the
seven treaties that came into effect in the 1970s or 1980s than under the
earlier treaties. See id. at A-28, A-29; see also Henry Gordon Oliver II,
Estate and Gift Tax Planningfor Nonresidents, 12 INT'L TAX J. 299, 3 10-11
(1986).
" For the credit method, see Austrian & Schneider, supranote 7, at 429
& n. 243 (citing Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Dec. 3,
1980, U.S.-F.R.G., art. 11, T.I.A.S. No. 11,082); see also Musher, supra note
3, at 291 n.48. For an explanation of the exemption method, see Convention
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, June 21, 1982, U.S.-Aus., art. 9, para.
5, 34 U.S.T. 3603, 3612; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation,
Nov. 24, 1978, U.S.-Fr., art. 12, para. 2(a), 32 U.S.T. 1935.
" See I.R.C. § 2106(a)(1),(b); see also Goldberg, supra note 7, at 43-46;
Llewellyn & Umbrecht I, supra note 10, at 255.
See Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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to claim the estate and gift tax marital deduction, subject to
special new restrictions in the case of a transfer to an alien
spouse."8 The same restrictions also became applicable to
such transfers made by U.S. citizens.
2.3. The Rate Schedule And The Unified Credit
The estate tax rate schedule for nonresident estates has
undergone changes over the past three decades. Before the
1966 Act, the estate and gift tax rate schedules for nonresident
aliens were the same as for citizens.1" A separate, lower
estate tax rate schedule was established for nonresident
estates in 1966.20 The schedule was modified in 1976,21 and
647, § 5033(c), 102 Stat. 3670, 3672 (adding new I.R.C. § 2106(a)(3));
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239,
§ 7815(d)(2)-(3), 103 Stat. 2414, 2415 (amending I.R.C. §§ 2106(a)(3),
2523(a)); see also Notice of ProposedRulemaking, P.S. 102-88, reprintedin
28 HIGHLIGHTS & DOCUMENTS 37, 39 (1993) [hereinafter Notice of
Rulemaking]; see also Monte A. Jackel, Interspousal Transfers Involving
ForeignersAfter the 1989 Act, 19 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 111, 112-13 (1990);
Betsy B. McCall, The Estate Tax MaritalDeductionfor NonresidentAliensPlanningOpportunities, 7 TAX NOTES INT'L 749 (1993).
"' See I.R.C. §§ 2056(d), 2056A, 2523(a) and (i), 2106(a)(3); Notice of
Rulemaking, supra note 17, at 37 et seq.; see also H.R. REP. No. 1104, vol.II,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 113-15 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT];
1988 HOUSE REPORT, supranote 2, at 592-93. For discussion, see, e.g., Glen
A. Adams, The Limited Marital Deduction for Transfers to Noncitizen
Spouses-Is It Fair?,42 FLA. L. REV. 749, 759-66 (1990) (discussing 1989
and 1990 revisions); Thomas St.. G. Bissell, The Surviving Spouse Who Is
Not a U.S. Citizen: TAMRA's New MaritalDeduction Rules, 18 TAX MGMT.
INT'L J. 79 (1989); Jackel, supra note 17; Lloyd L. Plaine & Douglas L.
Siegler, The Federal Gift and Estate Tax MaritalDeduction for Non-United
States Citizen Recipient Spouses, in INTERNATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING,
supra note 7, at 333-439.
"' For the gift tax schedule (ranging up to 57.75%), see I.R.C. §§ 2501(a),
2502(a), prior to amendment by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94455, § 2001(b)(1),(d)(2), 90 Stat. 1846, 1849, 1854. For the estate tax
schedule (ranging up to 77%), see I.R.C. § 2101(a) prior to amendment by
Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-809, § 108(a), 80 Stat.
1571; I.R.C. § 2001, prior to amendment by the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001(aXl),(d)(1), 90 Stat. 1846-47,1854.
20 See Pub. L. No. 89-809, § 108(a), 80 Stat. 1571 (indicating the range
of rates from 5% to 25%).
" See I.R.C. § 2101(d), prior to its repeal by Pub. L. No. 100-647,
§ 5032(c), 102 Stat. 3669, 3669. The rates ranged from 6% for amounts not
over $100,000 to 30% for amounts over $2 million, a small increase from
prior law. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, H.R. Doc. No. 10612, 529-
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was finally eliminated in 1988." Thus, currently the estate
and gift tax rate schedule is the same for nonresident aliens
and citizens. The schedule ranges from 18% on the first
$10,000 of taxable transfers to 55% on transfers over $3
million.2" In addition, there is a 5% surcharge on very large
estates, which is designed to recapture the benefits of the
lower brackets and the unified credit.24
By contrast, nonresident aliens have never enjoyed the
same specific exemption or unified credit accorded to
citizens."
Currently, the unified credit for citizens is

30 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter 1976 JCT REPORT].
" See Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 5032(c), 102 Stat. 3669, repealing I.R.C.

§ 2101(d).

"' See I.R.C. § 2001(cX1). The 55% and 53%rates had been scheduled to
expire, but were reinstated by the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993. See
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13208(a),
(bXl), 107 Stat. 312.
,"The surcharge applies, in the case of estates of citizens, to the portion
of the taxable estate in the range of $10,000,000 to $21,040,000. See I.R.C.
§ 2001(c)(2), as amended by Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13208(b)(2), 107 Stat. 312.
This range generally does not extend as high for nonresident estates. See
infra note 319.
"Prior to the 1966 Act, nonresident aliens were allowed a specific
exemption of $2,000 for estate tax purposes (compared to $60,000 for U.S.
citizens). See Removal of Tax Barriers to ForeignInvestment in the United
States: Hearings on H.R. 5916 Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 Hearings];H.R.
REP. No. 1450, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1966-2 C.B. 965, 1001
[hereinafter 1966 HOUSE REPORT]; see also Stanford G. Ross, United States
Taxation ofAliens andForeignCorporations: The ForeignInvestors Tax Act
of 1966 and Related Developments, 22 TAX L. REV. 277, 356 (1967).
Nonresident aliens were allowed no gift tax specific exemption (compared
to $30,000 for citizens). See 1976 JCT REPORT, supra note 21, at 532. In
the 1966 Act, the estate tax specific exemption for nonresident estates was
increased to $30,000. I.R.C. § 2106(a)(3) (prior to repeal by Pub. L. No. 94455, § 2001(c)(1XF), 90 Stat. 1846, 1852); see also Ross, supra, at 357. In
1976, nonresident aliens were granted a unified credit, for estate tax
purposes only, of $3,600 (equivalent to an exemption of $60,000). See I.R.C.
§ 2102(c) (prior to amendment by Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 5032(bXl), 102
Stat. 3669, 3669); I.R.C. § 2505(a); 1976 JCT REPORT, supranote 21, at 532;
H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 HousE
REPORT]. This compared to a credit for U.S. citizens that was equivalent to
an exemptionof $175,000. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001(a)(2),(d)(1), 90 Stat.
1846, 1848, 1854. See generally 1990 Hearings,supra note 1, at 61 (Hudson
testimony).
Hudson argues that because the "broad liberalizations
introducedby the 1976 legislation were restricted to U.S. persons," the "U.S.
estate and gift tax laws" became "discriminatory against foreigners." Id.
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$192,800,26 while that for nonresident aliens is $13,000,
except as otherwise provided by treaty."'
3. THE PRACTICAL IMPACT OF THE PRESENT LAW
3.1. Introduction
A variety of legal means permit foreigners to make U.S.
investments without being subject to U.S. estate and gift

taxation. In addition, it seems likely that in many cases, U.S.
gift or estate tax liability of foreigners is not enforced. In fact,
it has frequently been suggested that the U.S. estate and gift
tax regime is so easily avoided by foreigners that it merely

represents a "trap for the unwary."8

This suggestion is

consistent with IRS statistics which show that only 161

nonresident estates filed U.S. estate tax returns for 1986, and
only $62 million of U.S. assets (includible in the gross estate)
were reported on these returns."

',See I.R.C. § 2010(a); H.R. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 154-55
(1981) [hereinafter 1981 HoUSE REPORT].
" See I.R.C. § 2102(c)(1),(3)(A). This is equivalent to an exemption of
$60,000 as under prior law. The credit is available only for estate tax
purposes. See 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 18, at .116; see also
I.R.C. § 2505(a).
"' For example, the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation stated
recently:
Some may argue that regardless of the theoretical basis for
applying the estate and gift tax to nonresident aliens, in practice
the tax is very difficult to enforce ....

Indeed, in view of the

possibilities for exempting what is effectively U.S. property from
the tax, some may argue that it is little more than a trap for the
unwary.
1990 JCT REPORT, supra note 4, at 84. The staff notes the exemptions for
bank deposits and portfolio debt and the fact that "other U.S. property may
sometimes be rendered exempt by being held through a foreign corporation."
Id. For similar comments, see FLORIDA BAR, supra note 12, at 910 (estate
and gift taxes for nonresidents "can become a classic trap for unwary"); 1990
Hearings,supra note 1, at 63 (Hudson testimony, referring to TAMRA rates
as " 'trap for the unwary"'). See also TASK FORCE ON TRANSFER TAX
RESTRUCTURING, ABA SECTION OF TAXATION, Report on Transfer Tax

Restructuring,reprintedin 41 TAX LAW. 395, 419 (1988) [hereinafter ABA
TASK FORCE) (expressing "concer[n] about the ineffectiveness of the transfer
taxes [for nonresident aliens], the ease of avoidance through incorporation,
and the lack of consistency between the gift and estate tax situs rules").
2
Dewitt Long, NonresidentAlien Estates, 1986, SOI BULLETIN, Spring
1992, at 51, 54, 58 (1992). Long reports the following distribution of returns
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss4/1
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3.2. Legal Means Of Avoidance
U.S. citizens have a number of legal means at their
disposal to make "substantial transfers of wealth" without
incurring U.S. estate or gift tax liability. 0 These include:
the use of each spouse's unified credit and the $10,000 annual
per donee gift tax exclusion; the use of lifetime gifts to
effectively exempt the amount of gift tax from transfer
taxation; "lavish"payments of "support; transfers of "economic
advice ... and managerial ability"; removal of subsequent

appreciation from transfer taxation by the use of trusts; and
keeping the incidents of ownership of a life insurance policy
out of the hands of the decedent or his estate.3 ' Some
commentators have emphasized the importance of favorable
valuation techniques as a means of avoidance."
In the case of a nonresident alien, many of the same means
of legal avoidance are available. The most notable differences
are that, absent a treaty, the unified credit is limited to
$13,000, it cannot be used to offset the gift tax, and giftsplitting ' is not allowed.
At the same time, a number of additional legal means exist
by which foreigners can avoid U.S. estate and gift tax liability
with respect to U.S. investments. These tax avoidance
opportunities have been widely discussed, and are apparently

based upon the domicile of the decedent: Canada 51, United Kingdom 12,
West Germany 11, Venezuela 8, Mexico 7, Puerto Rico 7, Switzerland 6,
Australia, Belgium, Ecuador, and Hong Kong 4 each, France and Italy 3
each, and all other countries 37. Id. at 58. For 1982, 169 returns were
filed, reporting U.S. assets of $47 million. Daniel F. Skelly & James R.
Hobbs, Statistics of Income Studies of InternationalIncome and Taxes, SOI
BULLETIN, Fall 1986, at 1, 15 (1986).
" Charles 0. Galvin, To Bury the Estate Tax, Not To PraiseIt, 52 TAX

NOTES 1413, 1415-17 (1991).

'Id. at 1415-17.
"3See Henry J. Aaron & Alicia H. Munnell, Reassessing the Role for
Wealth Transfer Taxes, 45 NAT'L TAX J. 119, 135-37 (1992); see also Joseph
M. Dodge, Redoing the Estate and Gift Taxes Along Easy-to-Value Lines, 43
TAX L. REv. 241, 244, 254-60, 294-98 (1988) (discussing "minority interest
discounts", "buy-sell agreement[s]" and private annuities). According to
Aaron & Munnell, "$123 billion of wealth [was] slated to be transferred
across generations in 1986", but only $36 billion was reported "on estate tax
returns." Aaron & Munnell, supra, at 134.
33 I.R.C. § 2513(a)(1); see -TroxelI, supra note 14, at A-19; Plaine &
Siegler, supra note 18, at 400. But cf. Bissell, supra note 18, at 84.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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widely used. However, such tax avoidance opportunities are
perhaps less widely used where the U.S. estate tax liability is
fully creditable against estate taxation in the decedents
country of residence."4
3.2.1. Avoidance Techniques
First, the I.R.C. provides an exemption from U.S. estate
taxation for U.S. bank deposits, certain portfolio debt
obligations,"5 and the proceeds of insurance on the life of a
nonresident alien." Second, a nonresident alien can reduce
the includible value of U.S. real estate, or other U.S.-situs
property, for estate tax purposes by borrowing against the
property on a nonrecourse basis and keeping the proceeds
outside the United States, or by borrowing on a recourse basis
within a partnership. 7 Third, the more recent U.S. estate
tax treaties exempt from tax any intangible, such as stock in
a U.S. corporation or a U.S. patent. "
This exemption
permits an investor to avoid the U.S. estate tax with respect
to U.S. real estate or other U.S. business assets by placing
such assets in a U.S. holding company."9

"' See Musher, supra note 3, at 291 & n.48.

,r I.R.C. § 2105(b).
"I.R.C. § 2105(a) (amount receivable treated as property without the
United States).
' Nonrecourse debt is treated as reducing the value of the property by
which it is secured. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-7 (as amended in 1963);
Goldberg, supra note 7, at 45 & nn.86 & 87; Oliver II, supranote 14, at 309;
Nathan Boidman, Cross-Border Death Taxes:
Current Issues and
Developments (pt.II), 2 TAX NOTES INT'L 702, 703-04 (1990) [hereinafter
Boidman II]. Borrowing within a partnership reduces the value of the
partnership interest and may thus avoid the need for apportioning the debt
to the worldwide estate. See Bell & Shoemaker, ForeignInvestment, supra
note 6, at 264-65.
See Troxell, supra note 14, at A-28 to A-29 (the seven most recent
treaties limit source-based taxation to real property, business assets
connected with a permanent establishment and, in one case, certain other
tangible personal property).
" See Musher, supra note 3, at 291 n.52 (noting possible use of U.S.
holding company for U.S. real estate in case of decedent covered by U.S.F.R.G. estate tax treaty, art. 9); Don W. Llewellyn & Richard L. Umbrecht,
Selecting and Capitalizinga Foreign-OwnedEntity for Conductinga United
States Business (pt.II), 21 TAx MGMT. INTIL J. 312, 334 (1992) [hereinafter
Llewellyn & Umbrecht II] (interposition of foreign holding company
unnecessary).
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Fourth, there is a statutory exemption from U.S. gift
taxation for any intangible. At a cost of a carryover basis, a
foreign investor may avoid U.S. transfer taxation by
transferring intangibles (including stock in a U.S. holding
company and perhaps including any partnership interest)
before death, even if death is imminent.4 °
Fifth, and perhaps most important, a nonresident alien
may avoid U.S. estate taxation by placing any asset in a
foreign holding company.4 ' Tax advisors continue to suggest
the use of a foreign holding company, often to serve as the
parent company to a U.S. subsidiary, especially given the 1988
estate tax rate increases." The possibility that the IRS could

"' See, e.g., Hudson, Post-1989, supranote 10, at 222; Boidman II, supra
note 37, at 704; Llewellyn & Umbrecht I, supra note 10, at 255; Oliver If,
supra note 14, at 301, 308. For gifts made within three-year period ending
at death, see I.R.C. § 2035(a),(b),(d), discussed in BORIS I. BITTKER & ELIAS
CLARK, FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFT TAxATION 195-202 (6th ed. 1990)
[hereinafter BITTKER & CLARK]. The inclusion rule of I.R.C. § 2035(c) does
not apply because no gift tax is owing on a nonresident alien's transfer of an
intangible.
41
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON PROMOTING INCREASED FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN UNITED STATES CORPORATE SECURITIES AND INCREASED
FOREIGN FINANCING (April 27, 1964) [hereinafter FOWLER REPORT] at 24.
The report stated that: "Under existing U.S. tax law, a foreigner willing to
go through the expense and trouble of establishing a personal holding
company, incorporated abroad ... can already legally avoid estate taxes."
See 1966 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 25, at 1000; S. REP. No. 1707, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprintedin 1966-2 C.B. 1055, 1097 (stating that the
look-through rule of I.R.C. § 2107 is necessary "to prevent [an expatriate]
from avoiding U.S. tax on his estate by transferring assets with a U.S. situs
to a foreign corporation in exchange for its stock").
4 See eg., Llewellyn & Umbrecht I, supra note 10, at 234-35; Llewellyn
& Umbrecht II, supra note 39, at 313-14; Musher, supranote 3, at 279, 28788, 290-94; Oliver II, supra note 14, at 309 (warning of potential problem
under section 2038); Austrian & Schneider, supra note 7, at 430-31;
Krauthamer, supra note 12, at 269-71; Robert F. Hudson, Jr., Post-1988 Tax
Planningfor ForeignDirectInvestment in the United States, 18 TAX MGMT.
INT'L J. 3, 4-5 (1989) [hereinafter Hudson, Post-1988]; Bell & Shoemaker,
TAMRA, supra note 1, at 79 (recommending use of corporate structure for
U.S real estate); see also FLORIDA BAR, supranote 12, at 911 ("well-advised
alien" owning U.S. condo would place in foreign holding company); Mene,
supra note 7, at 627-29; Harvey P. Dale, Effectively Connected Income, 42

Tax L. Rev. 689, 714 (1987) ("well-advised foreign investors will hold U.S.
real estate in foreign corporate solution" to achieve advantage under
FIRPTA and to "eliminat[e] U.S. estate taxes"); Galvin, supra note 30, at
1417; David R. Tillinghast, StructuringForeignInvestments in U.S. Real
Estate After the Tax Amendments of 1986, 1987, and 1988, in 19TH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 93, 100 (PLI 1989).
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successfully ignore the ownership of U.S. assets by the foreign
holding company, under judicially developed principles" or
sections 2036 or 2038 of the Code," appears quite small.
3.2.2. The Burden Of Using The CorporateForm
Use of the foreign holding company device entails
"increased initial and ongoing costs" and "more costly and
burdensome filing and compliance procedures,"45 particularly
if the holding company has a U.S. subsidiary." In addition,
the use of a foreign holding company may create more
burdensome income tax consequences in the investor's home
country,"" including the possibility that the U.S. corporate

' See Monte A. Jackel, Taxing U.S Assets Held by a Foreign Holding
Company-The Return of Swan and Fillman, 19 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 263,
263-64 (1990) (suggesting that the IRS has recently attacked such structures
using the cases of Estate of Swan v. Comm'r, 247 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1957),
and Fillman v. U.S., 355 F.2d 632 (Cl. Ct. 1966)). Jackel concludes that
"absent special and unusual facts" such a structure should provide
protection from U.S. estate tax. Jackel, supra, at 267; see Goldberg, supra
note 7, at 38 ("use of foreign holding companies ... has withstood many
audits"); BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 7, 134.2.3, 134-10 to 134-11
(stock in foreign corporation has foreign situs except "in cases of sham (e.g.,
a deathbed transfer of the shares of a domestic corporation to a foreign
personal holding company)"); Ross, supra note 25, at 359 & n.350
("avoidance technique will ordinarily be successful"); Mene, supranote 7, at
629 ("burden is on the IRS to show that decedent claimed to be ... the
beneficial owner of the underlying assets"). See also Bruce N. Lemons et al.,
UsingForeign CorporationsTo Avoid U.S. Estate Tax on U.S. ResidencesWith a CanadianEmphasis, 52 TAX NoTEs 947, 949-50 (1991) (discussed
infra note 53).
" Lemons states that "[slome estate tax examiners have apparently
contended that the principles of section 2038(a)(1)" dealing with revocable
transfers "should apply" based upon the opinion in Estate of Swan v.
Comm'r, 247 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1957). Lemons, supra note 43, at 951-52.
Lemons rejects this view. Id.; see Jackel, supra note 43, at 264-65. For
discussion of the potential applicability of I.R.C. § 2036(a), see Lemons,
supra note 43, at 953-54; Jackel, supranote 43, at 265-66.
"Boidman II, supra note 37, at 703; see FLORIDA BAR, supra note 12, at
910 ("inordinate expense is necessary to plan and implement the measures
to legally minimize the impact of these taxes").
"' See Bell & Shoemaker, TAMRA, supra note 1, at 85. This structure
is often recommended to avoid the branch tax. See, e.g., Hudson, Post-1989,
supra note 10, at 249-50; Austrian & Schneider, supra note 7, at 431; Bell
& Shoemaker, TAMRA, supra note 1, at 83-84.
' See Boidman & Scheine, Corporate Ownership, supra note 1, at 181,
185 (discussing Canadian tax practices).
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tax may not be creditable against a home country tax.4 An
egregious49 example is the Canadian income tax treatment of
a Canadian holding company that owns a U.S. vacation
home.50
In addition, following the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the U.S.
income tax consequences of using the corporate form have
often been less beneficial than in the case of direct
ownership. 5 This was in part because, after the 1986 Act,
the corporate rate of 34%52 exceeded the top individual rate
See Bell & Shoemaker, ForeignInvestment, supranote 6, at 266-67; see
also Hudson, Post-1989, supra note 10, at 218.
"' See 1990 Hearings, supra note 1, at 67 (Hudson testimony). This
structure is used for "[miany" of the "over 500,000" Canadian-owned U.S.
vacation homes. Lemons, supra note 43, at 947; see also Boidman &
Scheine, CorporateOwnership, supra note 1, at 180. Of the 51 nonresident
estate tax returns filed by Canadian decedents for 1986, all but nine of these
returns showed U.S. gross estate of under $250,000; on average 42.5% of the
U.S. gross estate consisted of real estate or mortgages. Long, supranote 29,
at 58.
" The shareholderis treated as "receiv[ing] ataxable shareholder benefit
under the Canadian Income Tax," unless measures are taken to qualify the
corporation as a "single purpose corporation." However, taking these
measures may jeopardize the shareholder's exemption from U.S. estate tax.
See supra notes 43-44; Lemons, supra note 43, at 947-54; Nathan Boidman,
FundamentalProblemsfor the Cross-BorderTax Advisor, 90 TNI 6-63, Dec.
1, 1989, available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNI File.
" For the importance of the income tax changes of the 1980s in this
context, see 1990 Hearings, supra note 1, at 61-64 (Hudson testimony);
Musher, supra note 3, at 292-93 (explaining how, prior to 1987, foreign
investors could use an Antilles corporation with an election under I.R.C.
§ 897(i) to achieve a single tax at the 20% individual capital gains rate on
sales of U.S. real estate); see also Bell & Shoemaker, TAMRA, supra note 1,
at 83-85, 88; W. Donald Knight, Jr. & Richard L. Doernberg, Structuring
Foreign Investment in U.S. Real Estate, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN U.S.
48

REAL ESTATE: A COMPREHENSIvE GUIDE 281, 282-83, 290-91 (Timothy E.
Powers ed. 1990); Tillinghast, supra note 42, at 95-100. The relevant
changes included, in addition to the rate change: (1) enactment of FIRPTA
in 1980; see, e.g., Austrian & Schneider, supra note 7, at 400-07; Llewellyn
& Umbrecht I, supra note 10, at 239-41; Musher, supra note 3, at 292-93;
(2) repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, see Bell & Shoemaker, TAMBA,
supra note 1, at 83; (3) imposition of the branch tax in 1986, see, e.g.,
Llewellyn & Umbrecht I, supra note 10, at 241-46; Austrian & Schneider,
supra note 7, at 409-16; and (4) enactment of the earnings stripping
limitations in 1989, see, e.g., Austrian & Schneider, supra note 7, at 423-26;
Don W. Llewellyn & Richard L. Umbrecht, Selecting and Capitalizinga
Foreign-Owned Entity for Conducting a U.S. Business (pt. III), 21 TAX
MGMT. INTL J. 372, 373-77 (1992) [hereinafter Llewellyn & Umbrecht III].
r S corporation status is unavailable if there is a nonresident alien
shareholder. I.R.C. § 1361(bX1XC).
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of 28% (31% pursuant to the 1990 Act).5" However, under the
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 (the "1993 Act"), the
federal income tax rate structure is more favorable to
corporate ownership, particularly for income ranging from
$355,000 to $10 million, where the corporate rate is 34% and
the individual rate for ordinary income is 39.6%."'
On the other hand, the corporate structure continues to
have a disadvantage"' in that it creates the potential for a
second level of U.S. income tax in the form of a 30%
withholding tax on dividends or a 30% branch tax.57 This
second level of tax, if not reduced or avoided by treaty" or
" See Bell & Shoemaker, TAMRA, supra note 1, at 84; Hudson, Post1989, supra note 10, at 217-18.
"State and local corporate taxes may perhaps add an additional "4 to
8" percentage points. See Tillinghast, supra note 42, at 94; see also Knight
& Doernberg, supranote 51, at 285-86 (combined federal and state corporate
rate may be 38 to 42 percent). State or local taxes may or may not apply to
income from individually owned assets. See Tillinghast, supra note 42, at
94 ("depending on the location, there may be no local tax"); Doernberg &
Knight, supra note 51, at 286 (local taxes may add 3 to 5 percentage points).
" See Pub. L. No. 103-66, §§ 13201(a)-(b), 13221(a), 107 Stat. 312, 458-59
(1993) (amending I.R.C. §§ 1 and 11). A new 36% rate applies to income of
an unmarried individual in excess of $115,000 ($70,000 for a married
individual filing separately); a 39.6% rate applies to income in excess of
$250,000 ($125,000 for a married individual filing separately). Id. A
nonresident alien individual who is married is ordinarily required to file
separately. I.R.C. § 6013(a)(1). As under prior law, corporate income
between $335,000 and $10 million is taxed at a rate of 34%. Under the 1993
Act, a new 35% rate applies to income of corporations in excess of $10
million; a 3% surtax applies to income in the range of $15 million to $18.33
million to recapture the benefit of the 34% rate. Pub. L. No. 103-66,
§ 13221(a), supra(amending I.R.C. § 11); Michael S. Long & Been B. Malitz,
Tax Changes, Structural Shifts and Future Tax Receipts: The Case of
Closely Held Firms, at 12-13 and Table 9, March 17, 1993 (preliminary
working paper on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of
InternationalBusiness Law).
5 See Hudson, Post-1989, supra note 10, at 217-18; Llewellyn &
Umbrecht II, supra note 39, at 314. Cf. Scott R. Schmedel, S Corporations
Ponder Status and Clinton Tax Proposals,WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1993, at B2
("most S-corporation owners should retain S status for many long-term
reasons"). Schmedel also notes that an S corporation "may get savings on
state as well as federal income taxes," and avoid the accumulated earnings
tax and IRS attacks on the reasonableness of compensation. Id.
57 See I.R.C. §§ 871(a)(1), 881(a)(1), 1441(a), 884(a)-(b).
"' The withholding rate on dividends paid by a U.S. subsidiary to its
foreign parent is often reduced by treaty to 5%. See Llewellyn & Umbrecht
II, supra note 39, at 323; see also Musher, supranote 3, at 290. Branch tax
is eliminated by many treaties and applied at reduced rates under others.
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otherwise, often would more than offset the benefit of the
favorable corporate rate schedule unless corporate earnings
are realized and then accumulated5 for lengthy periods."0
In addition to treaties, there are some techniques for
avoiding double U.S. taxation of corporate income. Earnings
of a foreign holding company, or its U.S. subsidiary, escape
corporate taxation if they are paid out (even to a shareholder)
in the form of interest6 ' or salary,
Moreover, interest

See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(g)(3)-(4) (1992); Austrian & Schneider, supranote
7, at 415 & nn.154-56; Llewellyn & Umbrecht II, supra note 39, at 325;
Llewellyn & Umbrecht III, supra note 51, at 380. For treaty-shopping
limitation, see I.R.C. § 884(e)(1); see also Hudson, Post-1989, supra note 10,
at 249; Llewellyn & Umbrecht II, supra note 39, at 325-27. In some cases,
a second-tier withholding tax is substituted for the branch tax. I.R.C.
§§ 884(e)(3), 861(a)(2)(B). See Austrian & Schneider, supra note 7, at 415
& n.155; Llewellyn & Umbrecht III, supra note 51, at 380.
" Cf. Schmedel, supra note 56, at B2 (S corporation should not revoke
status unless, inter alia, it "plans to reinvest most of its earnings in
growth."); Long & Malitz, supra note 55, at 13 (analysis showing that when
income is in range of $355,000 to $10 million "[flirms paying less than 21%
dividends will gain from C Corporation taxation"). Long & Malitz concluded
that "[f]or the firm needing to retain funds the change in relative rates
definitely encourages a move back to corporate taxation." Id.
' For example, assume that a nonresident alien individual invests $1000
in a directly-held U.S. business, which earns an annual pre-tax return of
10%. If the earnings are reinvested each year (and ignoring any foreign tax
effects), the amount accumulated after the end of"n" years, assuming a U.S.
individual tax rate of 39.6%, will be: 1000[1+.10(.604)]. If the business is
held in a U.S. subsidiary of a foreign corporation, and the earnings are
accumulated in the subsidiary until year "n", and then distributed as
dividends to the foreign parent, the amount to be received (after U.S. tax)
in year "n" (assuming a tax-free return of the original investment, a
corporate rate of .34, and a dividend withholding rate of .30) is
1000[1+.10(.66)] n (.70) + 300. Cf. DAVID J. SHAKOW, THE TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND THEIR SHAREHOLDERS 21-23 (1991) (comparing results

of direct ownership and corporate ownership with earnings accumulation).
If n=20 years, the accumulation in the case of direct ownership would
be $3,231.43. The accumulation in the case of the corporate structure would
be $2,813.29, or 13% less. If n=50 years, then the accumulation in the case
of direct ownership would be $18,770.94; the accumulation in case of the
corporate structure would be $17,398.51, or 7.3% less. If the pre-tax rate of
return is 20%, and n=20 years, the accumulation in the case of direct
ownership would be $9,785.04, and the accumulation in the corporate form
would be $8,656.54, or 11.5% less; if n=50 years, the accumulation in the
case of direct ownership would be $299,506.40; the accumulation in the case
of corporate ownership would be $344,982.62, or 15% more.
" See Llewellyn & Umbrecht I, supra note 10, at 234; Llewellyn &
Umbrecht III, supra note 51, at 372-73, 377; see also Austrian & Schneider,
supra
note
at 425-26;
Knight
& Doernberg,
supra note 51, at 291, 300-03.
Published
by Penn
Law:7,Legal
Scholarship
Repository,
2014

[Vol. 14:4

U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.

payments to a foreign recipient are subject to a reduced or zero
rate of withholding tax under most treaties;

8

if the recipient

is a related person, however, the earning stripping rules may
limit the amount of the corporate interest deduction.8 ' These

results may be quite advantageous."
A second level of tax may also be avoided if the earnings of
a foreign holding company are reinvested in its U.S. business
until the business is completely terminated66 or if earnings

of a U.S. subsidiary are accumulated until the stock in the
subsidiary is disposed of by sale or liquidation." This may,
Knight & Doernberg note that home country taxes on dividends and interest
should be taken into account. Id. at 300. Austrian & Schneider point out
that where "interest received by the lending foreign parent is taxed at a
higher rate in the lender's home country than the applicable U.S. rate...
leveraging might not be beneficial." Austrian & Schneider, supra, at 423
n.206.
" If the salary is for services performed abroad, no U.S. tax will be
imposed upon the nonresident alien employee-shareholder either. See
Llewellyn & Umbrecht I, supra note 10, at 234.
6" See Llewellyn & Umbrecht III, supra note 51, at 323-24; see also
Austrian & Scheider, supranote 7, at 390 n.10. For treaty-shopping issues,
see Knight & Doernberg, supra note 51, at 301-05.
6, These limitations apply only when the debt-to-equity ratio exceeds 1.5
to 1 and only to the extent that net interest expense exceeds 50% of the
payor's adjusted taxable income. See I.R.C. § 163(j)(1)(A),(2)(A)-(B);
discussion in Austrian & Schneider, supra note 7, at 423-25; Llewellyn &
Umbrecht III, supra note 51, at 373-77. The 1993 Act extends these
limitations to debt guaranteed by a related person. Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13228(a), 107 Stat. 312,494 (1993).
6' See Hudson, Post-1988, supra note 42, at 12; Llewellyn & Umbrecht
I, supra note 10, at 234; Llewellyn & Umbrecht II, supra note 39, at 314.
66 The sale ,of the holding company's stock by the foreign shareholder
would not be subject to U.S. tax. Yet, "buyers are often wary of buying
foreign stock for non-tax reasons and may insist on a discounted price to
reflect the inherent FIRPTA tax liability inside the corporation." Musher,
supra note 3, at 292. If, instead, the foreign holding company's assets are
sold and the company is liquidated, the branch tax does not apply. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.884-2T (as amended in 1992), discussed in Musher, supra
note 3, at 293 n.79; Llewellyn & Umbrecht I, supra note 10, at 246; Hudson,
Post-1988, supra note 42, at 9-10.
' Apart from FIRPTA, no U.S. tax applies to a disposition of stock in a
U.S. subsidiary by a foreign holding company. See I.R.C. §§ 865(a),(g)(1),
864(c)(4), 881(a); Musher, supra note 3, at 293; Hudson, Post-1989, supra
note 10, at 253; Hudson, Post-1988, supra note 42, at 9. But cf. Knight &
Doernberg, supra note 51, at 294 (earnings and profits of U.S. subsidiary
could on liquidation carry over to foreign parent, causing dividends paid by
it to be "subject to U.S. tax") (citing I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(2)(C), 897(c)(1)(B)(ii)(I)).
If the U.S. subsidiary has been a United States real property holding
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss4/1
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however, involve complex planning where separate parcels of
U.S. real estate are to be disposed of at different times."8
Unless barred by treaty, a legislative proposal introduced in
1992 as House Bill 52709 would have imposed a tax on
capital gains from the disposition of stock in a U.S.
corporation 0 held by a 10%-or-more foreign shareholder. In
the case of a foreign parent, these capital gains would have
been taxable at a rate of 34%.1 It is still possible that this
proposal may be enacted.
A further disadvantage of the coiporate form is that the
step-up in basis provided to assets held by a decedent at death

corporation at any time in the preceding five-year period, the foreign
holding company is taxable on the disposition of stock in the subsidiary,
unless the disposition is pursuant to the subsidiary's liquidation following
a taxable sale of all the subsidiary's U.S. real property interests. See I.R.C.
§ 897(c)(1)(A)(ii), (B); Musher, supra note 3, at 293 & n.70.
"BSee Bell & Shoemaker, TAMRA, supra note 1, at 84-85 & n.24;
Austrian & Schneider, supra note 7, at 431-32. The advantages of
consolidation and of using I.R.C. § 453 may be lost. See Bell & Shoemaker,
TAMRA, supra, at 84-85.
"' See H.R. 5270, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 301(a) (1992) (adding I.R.C.
§ 899). Under the bill, the new tax is not to be applied if to do so would be
contrary to any treaty already in effect, provided that any foreign entity
claiming a treaty benefit is a qualified resident of the treaty country. H.R.
5270, § 302 (amending I.R.C. § 894). However, where a treaty prevents
application of the tax on gains, the bill treats the gain that would be
taxable, apart from the treaty, from either a liquidating distribution or
redemption made by the U.S. corporation as a dividend to the extent of
earnings and profits attributable to the stock. H.R. 5270, § 301(a) (adding
I.R.C. § 899(e)); see also H.R. 5270, § 302(a) (treaty benefits denied to
foreign entities that are not qualified residents).
Thus, a foreign parent that was a qualified resident of a country with
a treaty barring the capital gains tax would avoid tax on a sale of stock in
a U.S. subsidiary if the stock is not a USRPI. If, instead, the U.S.
subsidiary sold its assets and was liquidated, the foreign parent would incur
the dividend withholding tax to the extent of the subsidiary's earnings and
profits including those created on the sale. If the investment was held
directly by a foreign corporation that was a qualified resident of a country
with a treaty barring the branch tax, the second level of tax could,
apparently, be avoided if the foreign corporation sold its assets and was
liquidated.
" The proposal would also have resulted in imposition of the 30% branch
tax on reinvested earnings upon termination of a branch. See JOINT
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, EXPLANATION OF H.R. 5270, THE FOREIGN INCOME
TAX RATIONALIZATION AND SIMPLIFICATION ACT OF 1992 JCS-11-92 (May 29,

1992), reprintedin 25 HIGHLIGHTS & DOCUMENTS 2774 (1992) [hereinafter
1992 JCT REPORT].
71 See Musher, supra note 3, at 290 & n.36.
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does not apply to assets held by a corporation."' Thus, to the
extent that profit from U.S. assets takes the form of unrealized
appreciation, the corporate form results in an eventual
corporate tax at a rate of up to 35%, whereas direct ownership
results in complete forgiveness of the income tax if death
precedes the sale of the assets." The use of a foreign holding
company may also result in complications if the alien
shareholder is or later becomes a resident for U.S. income tax
purposes, for example, under the 183-day test."4 Additional
U.S. or foreign tax problems may arise when existing
individual ownership is shifted to corporate ownership.75
Thus, in some cases,7 foreigners may find that the use of
a foreign holding company to avoid U.S. estate tax liability
results in less advantageous income tax treatment. This is
considerably less likely after the 1993 Act changes in the
income tax rate structure. However, it would become much
more likely with the enactment of a capital gains tax on
foreign shareholders as provided by House Bill 5270. 7 Prior
Hudson, Post-1988, supra note 42, at 12; see also Bell & Shoemaker,
TAMRA, supranote 1, at 86-87 & nn.32-33; Knight & Doernberg, supranote
51, at 285-86 (explaining that after the General Utilitiesrepeal, a step-up
for the shares in the foreign corporation is "less meaningful").
71 Cf. Schmedel, supra note 56, at B2 (S corporation should not consider
revoking election unless "it lacks appreciated assets, including... goodwill
...
that are subject to double taxation when regular corporations are
72

sold.").
7' See Mene, supra note 7, at 628 (application of 35% excise tax); I.R.C.
§§ 367(a), 551(a), 951(a), 1291(a); see also COMMITTEE ON TAXATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS, The Effect of Changes in the Type of United
States Tax Jurisdiction Over Individuals and Corporations: Residence,
Source and Doing Business, 46 THE REC. OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF N.Y. 914,924 (1991) [hereinafter COMMITTEE ON TAXATION OF INTL
TRANSACTIONS].
76 See I.R.C. § 897(e)(1),(j); Treas. Reg. § 1.897-6T(a)(1) (1988); FLORIDA
BAR, supra note 12, at 911 (qualification under I.R.C. § 351 may be blocked
by I.R.C. § 897). However, an election under I.R.C. § 897(i) may make I.R.C.
§ 351 nonrecognition treatment available. See Llewellyn & Umbrecht II,
supra note 39, at 330-31; see also Boidman II, supra note 37, at 706;
Boidman & Scheine, CorporateOwnership, supra note 1, at 181 n.5.
76 For discussion of the circumstances in which use of the corporate form
is or is not desirable under pre-1993 Act law, see Llewellyn & Umbrecht I,
supra note 10, at 234; Llewellyn & Umbrecht II, supra note 39, at 314;
Knight & Doernberg, supra note 51, at 285-88.
" See Musher, supra note 3, at 287-90, 293-94; see also id. at 294
(arguing that if this tax is imposed, the U.S. estate tax on U.S. real estate
holdings of a nonresident alien decedent should be reassessed); 1990
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to the 1993 Act, some commentators on U.S. estate-planning
for foreigners have emphasized techniques that avoid the use
of the corporate form, such as a limited partnership,"8 a
limited liability company,"9 a "split-interest" partnership
structure, s0 or a trust."' Others have advised that investors
provide for U.S. estate tax liability by obtaining insurance."2
But this advice may be rejected by foreigners who fear estate
tax exposure" or who find advantages to the corporate form
regardless of the U.S. tax cost, such as avoidance of filing a
U.S. individual income tax return, limited liability, and
anonymity," which may be an overriding concern for
residents of developing countries.8"

Hearings,supra note 1, at 64 (Hudson testimony).
"s See Hudson, Post-1989, supra note 10, at 220-26; see also Robert F.
Hudson, Jr., Direct Ownership of U.S. Real Estate Through Proprietorships,
Partnershipsand Trusts, and MinimizingEstate and Gift Taxes on Directly
Held Assets, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 1988, at 309
(PLI 1988) [hereinafter Hudson, Direct Ownership].But see 1990 Hearings,
supra note 1, at 64 (Hudson testimony that noncorporate structure
"generally leaves [foreign investor] at risk for U.S. estate taxes").
" See Lee A. Sheppard, The Dark Side of Limited Liability Companies,
55 TAX NOTES 1441, 144143 (1992) (suggesting that foreigners may be
attracted to this form because of "limited liability" and resemblance to "their
own GmBHs and SARLs," but noting uncertainties); see also Tillinghast,
supra note 42, at 119 ("the status... for estate tax purposes is not clear").
" See Hudson, Post-1989, supra note 10, at 227-38; see also Robert F.
Hudson, Jr. et al., Use of Split-InterestPartnershipsfor ForeignInvestment
in U.S. Real Estate, 17 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 275 (1988); see also Boidman II,
supra note 37, at 704 (noting possible loss of basis in United States and
Canada for amount paid by parent); Musher, supra note 3, at 291 n.52.
81 Hudson, Post-1989, supra note 10, at 218, 23841; Hudson, Post-1988,
supra note 42, at 17-18; see also Tillinghast, supra note 42, at 119-20;
Austrian & Schneider, supra note 7, at 426, 431 n.248.
" See Knight & Doernberg, supra note 51, at 289. The insurance
proceeds would be exempt in the United States. Id.
s, See, e.g., Bell & Shoemaker, TAMRA, supra note 1, at 79 (stating that
"estate tax risk of an NRA's making a significant investment in U.S. real
estate through a partnership has become prohibitive").
s' Musher, supra note 3, at 293 n.69 (noting that "home country
considerations" should also be taken into account); Austrian & Schneider,
supranote 7, at 431; Hudson, Post-1988,supra note 42, at 12; Hudson, Post1989, supranote 10, at 218; see also Knight & Doernberg, supra note 51, at
284; FLORIDA BAR, supra note 12, at 911; Bell & Shoemaker, Foreign
Investment, supra note 6, at 269 ("an NRA's desire for anonymity is often
viewed as a major justification for enduring the expense and complexity of
a corporate structure").
ss Such investors may fear harsh treatment of overseas investments by
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By contrast, there is no U.S. income tax disadvantage to
using a foreign holding company to hold portfolio stock
interests in U.S. corporations."8 As in the case of direct
ownership of the portfolio interests by the nonresident alien
individual, the only U.S. tax 7 would be the U.S. withholding
tax on dividends."8 No capital gains tax would be imposed on
disposition of portfolio interests"9 even under House Bill
5270. Similar results may be achieved by foreigners who
invest in U.S. companies through a mutual fund organized in
the form of a foreign corporation. 0
3.3. Noncompliance With The U.S. Estate And Gift Taxes
The potential difficulties of applying U.S. transfer taxes to
foreigners have long been known to Congress. Thus, in 1966,
when Congress repealed the rule imposing a gift tax on the
transfer of intangible property by a nonresident alien donor
engaged in a U.S. trade or business, the House Committee

their own governments. Bell & Shoemaker, ForeignInvestment, supranote
6, at 269-70.
"' See 1990 Hearings, supra note 1, at 64 (Hudson testimony that
investments "in U.S. equity and debt securities ... can easily be arranged
through a foreign holding company."); id. at 61 (stating that it is "relatively
easy to arrange portfolio investments by foreigners so as to avoid U.S. estate
and gift tax").
7 The holding company is not subject to a branch profits tax since there
is no U.S. business. See 1990 Hearings, supra note 1, at 64 (Hudson
testimony). Dividends paid by the holding company would be from foreign
sources, and thus not taxable. See I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(2)(B), 871(a)(1). The
personal holding company tax would not apply. See I.R.C. § 542(c)(7).
Likewise, the accumulated earnings tax would not apply. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.532-1(c) (1959); see also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX
PROJECT:. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION,

164-65 (1987) [hereinafter A.L.I.].
88 Moreover, if the foreign corporation is a resident in the same country
as the individual investor, it would be entitled to the same treaty benefits,
if any, or possibly greater benefits (as a corporate parent). See supra note
58.
s' See supra note 67; I.R.C. § 897(c)(3).
°See

COMMENTS

OF SECTION OF TAXATION,

L.A. COUNTY

BAR

ASSOCIATION, reprinted in 26 HIGHLIGHTS "& DOCUMENTS 3266 (1992)
[hereinafter L.A. BAR] (this structure used to "avoid exposure to U.S. estate
taxes" and to provide "for shareholder liquidity"). The foreign corporation
must avoid having its principal office in the United States. See I.R.C.
§ 864(b)(2)(A)(ii); Treas. Reg. § 1.864-2(c)(2)(iii) (as amended in 1975); see
also L.A. BAR, supra, at 3266.
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Report explained: "[i]n practice this rule has proved to be
impossible to enforce, since there is no practical way for the
Internal Revenue Service to find out when these gifts are
made. Moreover, it does not occur to many nonresident aliens
that these transfers are subject to U.S. gift tax.""'
3.3.1. Impediments To Voluntary Compliance
If a foreigner's investment in the United States is small,
and particularly if it consists of assets held for personal use,
the foreigner may lack adequate tax advice which would
92
inform him of the need to file U.S. gift or estate tax returns.
Moreover, an absence of clear guidance regarding the
application of the U.S. estate tax to nonresidents may
contribute to aggressive reporting positions."3 For example,
a nonresident estate holding an interest in a partnership with
U.S. assets may claim a foreign situs for that interest and fail
to report it. 9 4 There is also uncertainty regarding commonly
' 1966 HOUsE REPORT, supra note 25, at 1002.
, For example, one commentator has noted that in many cases Canadian
couples who made a "pre-TAMRA" purchase of a U.S. vacation home as
jointly held property may not have contemplated the U.S. gift and estate tax
consequences and that in many cases taxes may be past due with respect to
transfers upon the creation of the joint tenancy or upon the death of the
first or second to die. See Lawrence F. Gilberti, Pre-TAMRA Purchases of
U.S. Realty by CanadianCouples: Unpaid U.S. Tax Liabilities (pt.1), 20
TAX MGMT. INVL J. 451 (1991) [hereinafter Gilberti I]; Lawrence F. Gilberti,
Pre-TAMRA Purchasesof U.S. Realty by CanadianCouples: Unpaid U.S.
Tax Liabilities (pt. II), 20 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 514 (1991) [hereinafter
Gilberti Ill. Gilberti states that the failure to pay tax is due "in some cases
[to] oversight, in others the receipt of bad tax advice ... , and in others
clearly malice aforethought.... ." Gilberti I, supra, at 452.
" See Hudson, Direct Ownership, supranote 78, at 314 (stating that "the
lack of IRS clarification on a number of the uncertain issues in the area and
the generally perceived laxity of IRS enforcement probably serves to
encourage" noncompliance).
' This may be based upon one of various plausible theories proposed in
the tax literature, see supra notes 12-13, such as the theory based upon Rev.
Rul. 55-701, see supranote 13, that the partnership is not engaged in a U.S.
trade or business. See Bell & Shoemaker, TAMRA, supra note 1, at 80-82.
They note that "most well-informed practitioners advise their NRA clients
that investing in U.S. real property through a partnership ... will subject
the investment to U.S. estate taxation." Id. at 82. They conclude, however,
that "W[the lack of clear authority," other than Rev. Rul. 55-701, supra note
13, "leaves an opening to ethically sanction the exclusion of partnership
interests ... [and] [o]ne suspects that, more often than not, the result is
that no U.S. estate tax return is filed at all." Id. at 81-2.
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occurring issues such as (1) whether a partnership interest is
an intangible asset for gift tax purposes, 5 and (2) the situs
of tangible personal property."
Aggressive tax reporting may also be fostered by a
perception that the IRS will not vigorously enforce the estate
tax on nonresident estates.9 7 This perception may arise from
the fact that the IRS has not been issuing much guidance in
this area."8
Although the IRS issued a ruling in 1991
specifying the U.S. income tax consequences for a nonresident
alien on the disposition of a partnership interest,9 9 it has not
provided guidance regarding the treatment of a partnership
interest for gift and estate tax purposes. In fact, since 1982
the IRS has issued only one Revenue Ruling relating to
transfer taxation of nonresident aliens." ° There may also be
a perception that even vigorous enforcement efforts by the IRS
may be largely ineffective.'

" See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
6 See, e.g., Delaney v. Murchie, 177 F.2d 444 (1st Cir. 1949) (jewelry and
personal effects of individual who stopped in the United States while
traveling from Canada to Nassau), discussed in Troxell, supra note 14, at
A-24.
"' See Hudson, Direct Ownership, supra note 78, at 314. Hudson
suggests that some foreigners have the "expectation that the U.S. estate and
gift taxes will not, in fact, ever be enforced (since less is heard about the
IRS endeavoring to assure proper compliance in this area)."
""The IRS has, however, recently issued proposed regulations dealing
with the 1988 Act estate and gift tax provisions, including the provisions
relating to the marital deduction and joint ownership of property when the
surviving spouse is a noncitizen and the provisions changing the rate
schedule for nonresident estates. See Notice of Rulemaking, supra note 17.
In addition, the IRS has issued proposed regulations under the generationskipping tax, including regulations dealing with the treatment of transfers
by nonresident aliens. See supra note 9.
9 See Rev. Rul. 91-32, 1991-1 C.B. 107,'discussed in William W. Bell &
David B. Shoemaker, Revenue Ruling 91-32: Right Result for the Wrong
Reasons, 9 J. PARTNERSHIP TAX'N 80 (1992).
'" See Troxell, supra note 14, at C-1 (bibliography), C&A-1. The two
most recent Revenue Rulings in this area are: Rev. Rul. 82-193, 1982-2 C.B.
219 (dealing with situs of reversionary interests in a trust holding
certificates of deposit) and Rev. Rul. 90-101, 1990-2 C.B. 315 (dealing with
proportional credit under treaties).
101 See Hudson, Direct Ownership, supra note 78, at 314 (stating that "in
a limited number of cases," foreigners may have "an expectation that
transfers of otherwise U.S. estate taxable interests may be made offshore
without knowledge of the IRS (even if the IRS were endeavoring to be more
diligent in their compliance efforts in this area)"); see also infranotes 105-16
9

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss4/1

1994]

NONRESIDENT ALIEN TAXATION

The risk of personal liability.. would seem to be a very
powerful stimulus to voluntary compliance in the case of an
independent U.S. fiduciary. However, the stimulus would be
much less for a foreign fiduciary or perhaps even for a U.S.
fiduciary who is also a beneficiary."'
3.3.2. IRS DetectionAnd Enforcement

Some means do exist for the IRS to detect and to enforce
estate and gift taxation of transfers by nonresident aliens. In
many cases, however, transactions may fall outside the reach
of the IRS's enforcement tools.

Required income tax filingst with respect to incomeproducing property or business assets held individually or in
a partnership l s may alert the IRS to a transfer of property
at death. If, however, a nonresident alien owns non-income
producing real property (e.g., raw land or a vacation home),
directly or through a partnership, there may be no required
income tax filings,'06 except as required by regulations that

and accompanying text.
See Gilberti I, supra note 92, at 459-60; Gilberti II, supra note 92, at
526-27. The executor will become personally liable under 31 U.S.C.
§ 3713(a)(1XB),(b) "if the executor pays from the estate's assets debts of
inferior priority before satisfying those due the United States." Gilberti I,
supra note 92, at 460. This assumes that the executor "had some notice of
the outstanding tax liability." Gilberti II, supra note 92, at 527. The IRS
may "assess and collect any such liability of a fiduciary" pursuant to I.R.C.
§ 6901(a)(1)(B). Gilberti I, supra note 92, at 460.
*"In some cases, there may be no U.S. fiduciary although the estate
includes U.S. situs assets. This may be because property passes by right of
survivorship or through a trust, or because the estate is probated entirely
in a foreign country.
164 The new regulations under I.R.C. § 874, penalizing a failure to file a
timely income tax return by denying allowance of deductions, provide an
incentive for such filing. Treas. Reg. § 1.874-1(a) to (b) (as amended in
1990); see also Bell & Shoemaker, ForeignInvestment, supra note 6, at 263
(the regulations "encourage estate tax compliance by forcing the NRA to file
U.S. income tax returns during his lifetime").
16
But cf.Bell & Shoemaker, TAMRA, supra note 1, at 82 (noting that
'unlike the passage of title to a direct interest in U.S. real property," a
partnership interest "istypically not evidenced by a recorded conveyance or
recorded evidence of probate").
1" See id. ("If the partnership is not engaged in a U.S. trade or business,
the lack of U.S. reporting requirements during the NRA's lifetime makes it
entirely possible that the IRS would not even have known of the NRA's
existence.").
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might be issued under I.R.C. section 6039C."° One possible
avenue for detection arises when a title insurance company
checks for estate tax liens upon the transfer of the property by
the heirs to an unrelated party." s Another is an exchange
of information pursuant to a treaty, but this avenue may be
more useful for policing transfers by U.S. citizens.
A nonresident alien's transfer at death of stock 09 in a
U.S. corporation becomes subject to IRS scrutiny if the
corporation, its transfer agent, or a custodian of the stock
fulfills the requirement under the regulations that it obtain a
transfer certificate prior to making any transfer."0 It is not
clear, however, how this requirement would be enforced if the
stock were held by a foreign bank or brokerage firm as a
nominee."'
Collection by the IRS of unpaid estate taxes is facilitated by
the presence of a U.S. fiduciary, a U.S. beneficiary,"' or

'" The IRS has not exercised its authority under this provision to
require annual information reporting by foreign individuals not engaged in
a U.S. trade or business who hold direct investments in U.S. real property
interests worth at least $50,000. See Hudson, Direct Ownership, supranote
78, at 359.
...
See Gilberti II, supra note 92, at 528.
10 Corporate stocks and bonds constituted 45% of the U.S. assets
reported on nonresident estate tax returns for 1986. Long, supra note 29,
at 53, fig. B.
See Treas. Reg. § 20.6325-1(a) (as amended in 1982). An exception is
made if there is a U.S.-appointed fiduciary. Id.;- see also Treas. Reg.
§§ 20.6325-1(b)(1) to (3) (as amended in 1982); Treas. Reg. § 20.6001-1(d) (as
amended in 1972). For further discussion of these rules, see Rev. Rul. 55160, 1955-1 C.B. 464; Bruce Zagaris, How Foreigners Should Hold U.S.
Bank Deposits and Money Market Funds, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 1989, at 29, 44-46 (PLI ed., 1989).
. Cf Allaire U. Karzon, InternationalTax Evasion: Spawned in the
United States and Nurtured by Secrecy Havens, 16 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
757, 769-73 (1983) (discussing use by U.S. corporations of "address method"
to determine applicability of reduced treaty income tax withholding rates for
dividends). Karzon notes that U.S. payors "can and do rely on the address
of record of... foreign nominees" without inquiring into the address of the
beneficial owners of the stock. Id. at 771. At the same time, "Switzerland
and Belgium . .. appear to be the only treaty countries that effectively
require their financial institutions acting as nominees" to collect any
additional tax due. Id. at 773.
11 For personal liability of fiduciary, see supra note 102. For liability of
beneficiary, see I.R.C. § 6324(a)(2), discussed in Gilberti II, supra note 92,
at 526. Gilberti notes that the beneficiaries may also be subject to
transferee liability in equity. Id. at 525-26.
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assets remaining in the United States."l
In other cases,
collection of unpaid estate taxes seems unlikely. Generally,
the IRS could not expect a foreign court to assist in the
enforcement of a tax claim in the foreign country." 4 Estate
tax treaties generally would not be helpful either."5 In fact,
one distinguished practitioner has written that he has "settled
estate tax cases favorably, primarily on the ground of lack of
enforceability of a judgment.""'
3.4. UnfavorableEffects Of PresentLaw
3.4.1. Unfairness
The fact that only a relatively small number of foreigners
investing in the United States incur and pay U.S. gift or estate
taxes casts doubt on the fairness of the taxes. It is unfair that
some foreign investors avoid the taxes by takilig aggressive or
clearly erroneous positions that are not detected, while others
either simply pay the taxes, or incur the inconvenience and
extra tax and other costs associated with various legal
avoidance techniques."'
113

See I.R.C. § 6324(aX)

(estate tax is "a lien upon the gross estate of

the decedent for 10 years after the date of death"); Gilberti II, supra note 92,
at 528. In the case of probate assets, the lien is apparently not discharged
by a sale for adequate consideration. See id. at 528 & n.85.
'" See Troxell, supra note 14, at A-31 to A-32; see also U.S v. Harden,
63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) i 9768 (Can. 1963) (dismissing U.S. government's
appeal to enforce collection of U.S. taxes in Canadian courts); AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME
TAXATION II - PROPOSALS OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE ON UNITED
STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES 121-24 (1992) [hereinafter A.L.I. TREATIES]
(stating that "[tiraditional objections to enforcement of tax claims are based
on concerns relating to extraterritorial enforcement, lack of reciprocity, and
both substantive and procedural due process"); Goldberg, supra note 7, at
60-61 (citing Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of British
Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161 (9th Cir. 1979)).
1
See Goldberg, supra note 7, at 62 (estate tax treaties rarely "have
effective enforcement provisions").
116 Id at 62 & n.152.
17 A recent commentary voiced the complaint that the current system
penalizes the "honest and well-informed NRA" while providing a "de facto
amnesty for dishonest NRAs who simply do not file estate tax returns." Bell
& Shoemaker, TAMRA, supra note 1, at 87-89; id. at 82-83 ("Ill-informed or
intentionally tax-evading NRAs who invest in U.S. real estate through
partnerships will continue to illicitly escape U.S. estate taxation" while
"well-informed and honest NRAs [must] endur[e] the income tax

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.

[Vol. 14:4

In addition, it is unfair that those foreigners who do pay a
tax and who cannot credit it fully against their home country
tax likely will have failed to obtain sophisticated legal
advice" 8 due to the small size of their U.S. investments.
Alternatively, they may have consciously forgone legal
avoidance techniques because of home country tax
considerations, because the small size or the nature of their
U.S. investments made such techniques too inconvenient or
expensive, or because they find such tax planning distasteful.
3.4.2. DistortionOf BehaviorAnd DisrespectFor The Law
The current system for gift and estate taxation of
foreigners distorts their behavior by encouraging the use of
complicated corporate structures and the seeking out of
sophisticated tax advice to avoid the tax. The costs of
avoidance may be quite significant in relation to the revenue
collected. 19 Moreover, Congress' toleration of the fact that
many foreigners investing in the United States escape the U.S.
gift and estate taxes by legal or illegal means calls into
question the seriousness of Congress' purpose in imposing the
tax 20 and may lead to "disrespect" 2 ' for the law."2

disadvantages of corporate investment structures in order to legitimately
avoid U.S. estate taxation.).
118 Ross found Congress' decision in 1966 to retain the estate tax on
foreigners with respect to intangibles "puzzling", stating that: "[P]ortfolio
investors abroad can readily avoid United States estate taxes by use of a
holding company... The estate tax will probably be paid by very few
aliens, in most cases by those who blunder into its provisions." Ross, supra
note 25, at 359-60. Cf. Aaron & Munnell, supra note 32, at 138 (arguing
that, in general "wealth transfer taxes ... are penalties imposed on those
who neglect to plan ahead or who retain unskilled estate planners").
"' Cf. Aaron & Munnell, supra note 32, at 138 (arguing that the
"compliance costs of the transfer tax system [in general] must amount to a
sizable fraction of the total yield of $6 billion"). They note that "[flor the
most part... tax avoidance consists of hiring skilled legal talent to arrange
property rights in appropriate ways." Id at 137.
2
'A similar argument was made in favor of providing a statutory
exemption for portfolio interest received by foreigners rather than requiring
U.S. issuers to utilize Netherlands Antilles finance subsidiaries. See STAFF
OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., DEFICIT REDUCTION
ACT OF 1984: EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS APPROVED BY THE COMMITTEE

ON MARCH 21, 1984 420 (Comm. Print 1984). The report stated that "iftaxfree access to the Eurobond market is important, such access should be
direct." Id.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss4/1
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3.4.3. Comparison To Taxation Of U.S. Citizens
It is worth noting that the defects that inhere in the U.S.
estate tax on nonresidents are also present, though perhaps to
a lesser extent, in the estate taxation of U.S. citizens and
residents. 2 For example, Aaron & Munnell have criticized
"the estate and gift taxes-in the United States [because they]
raise little
revenue... impose large excess burdens [and] are
" 12 4
unfair.

The fact that these defects are shared does not make them
any less serious. It may suggest, however, that estate tax
reform should not be adopted piecemeal for nonresident
estates only.
3.4.4. Trade-off
The defects of U.S. transfer taxation of nonresident aliens
may be somewhat mitigated by the fact that many foreigners
who avoid U.S. estate taxation by use of a corporate structure
do so only at a cost of higher fees and other expenses, as well
as potentially less favorable income tax consequences.
Although the current rules may be a "trap for the unwary,"
at least those who fail to use a corporate structure and who
pay U.S. estate taxes do not suffer the potential income tax
disadvantages of that structure. However, for some foreigners
121 Cf. Aaron & Munnell, supra note 32, at 133. They explain that "[fif
the mechanisms [for avoiding transfer taxes] are inexpensive, the result

may only be disrespect for the taxing authority", but if not, "then the ratio
of excess burdens to revenues generated may be quite large." Id.
12 Ross has stated that "[t]here is something basically undesirable about
a taxlaw which is not susceptible of evenhanded and consistent application,
and which encourages taxpayers to adopt avoidance techniques as a
standard method of operation." Ross, supra note 25, at 360; see also FOWLER
REPORT, supra note 41, at 24 (stating that the fact that "U.S. estate taxes

are avoidable through complicated and expensive procedures, while for other
foreign investors they are likely to result in a considerable tax penalty...
is an unsound situation which... significantly worsens the overall image
of this country as a desirable place to invest").
122 See Aaron

& Munnell, supra note 32, at 132-39 (For quotations from

these pages, see supra notes 32, 118, 119, 121, and text accompanying infra

note 124.); Dodge, supra note 32, at 252 ("principal argument for repealing
the federal transfer taxes is that the attendant administrative and

transaction costs approach or exceed the revenue yield"); Galvin, supra note
30 (recommending repeal); infra note 345 and accompanying text.
124 Aaron & Munnell, supra note 32, at 138.
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who can obtain treaty benefits or who reduce their tax liability
by accumulating earnings or by leveraging, the income tax
consequences of the corporate structure may not be less
favorable than those associated with direct ownership. Such
a result is even more likely after the revision of the corporate
and individual income tax rates in 1993. On the other hand,
there is always the possibility of future rate changes and of
enactment of a capital gains tax on foreign shareholders, as
under House Bill 5270.
The fact that legal avoidance of U.S. estate taxation may
involve a trade-off in the form of a greater income tax burden
may also temper disrespect for the law. The tempering of
disrespect for the law may, however, only occur if Congress
has deliberately established this trade-off. This does not
appear to be the case."
Thus, in 1954, when Congress amended I.R.C. section
2104(b) to treat stock in a foreign corporation as having a
foreign situs despite location of the stock certificates in the
United States, or when Congress in 1966 implicitly tolerated
the use of foreign holding companies,12 the income tax
consequences of the corporate form would not have been
considered as burdensome as they are after the 1980s income
tax changes. Nor has Congress made clear an intention to
impose a U.S. estate tax when a noncorporate structure (e.g.,
a partnership) is being used. 2 7
Finally, the existence, at least in some situations, of the
trade-off means that the current estate tax rules for

See Bell & Shoemaker, TAMRA, supra note 1, at 88 (inferring from
the 1988 estate tax increase that "Congress does not fully appreciate the
relationship between the NRNs income tax position and his estate tax
position," i.e., that "TAMRA forces the NRA into a corporate investment
structure without recognizing that [the Tax Reform Act of 1986] made [it]
intolerable from the NRA's income tax perspective.").
11' The 1954 change was justified as "conform[ing] to the tax conventions
the United States has entered into with many countries and remov[ing] any
deterrent to the use of United States bank and trust companies as
depositories." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 126 (1954); H.R. REP.
No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1954); for the 1966 legislative history, see
supra note 41.
117 In addition, there is no additional income tax burden when portfolio
stock investments in U.S. companies are held in a foreign holding company
(and, in fact, Congress assured this by amending I.R.C. § 542(c)(7) in 1966).
See Mene, supra note 7, at 628 & n.135.
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nonresidents may indirectly raise revenue in the form of
higher income taxes from those legally avoiding the tax. This
makes it less likely that the costs of avoiding the tax exceed
the total revenues collected as a result of its existence.
Moreover, the existence of the trade-off might put pressure on
other countries to negotiate favorable income or estate tax
treaty provisions with the United States for the benefit of their
residents.
The existence of this trade-off intensifies feelings about the
estate tax and its future status. For some nonresident aliens
who avoid U.S. estate taxation through the use of a holding
company, particularly nontreaty investors, the estate tax is not
merely a small nuisance. 2
For the United States, it may
not be meaningless as a revenue raiser, despite the fact that
it raises little direct revenue. In contrast, to the extent that
income tax changes are enacted which reduce the relative
income tax disadvantage of the corporate form, such as those
passed in 1993, the justification for the estate tax on
foreigners and also the opposition to it will decrease.
The question becomes whether the estate tax on foreigners
should be retained and, if retained, how might it be improved.
4. CHOICES FACING CONGRESS

4.1. BroadeningThe Application Of The Estate Tax
In order to eliminate the inequity, the encouragement of
sophisticated tax planning, and the disrespect for the law that
is engendered by the current estate tax on foreigners, it would
be necessary to close the loophole allowing foreigners to escape
U.S. estate taxation by utilizing foreign holding
companies."' This would necessitate the adoption of a rule

18

See, e.g., Bell & Shoemaker, ForeignInvestment, supra note 6, at 267

(arguing that "[t]o individual investors from nontreaty countries..., U.S.
policymakers have hung out a giant 'Not Welcome' sign"); 1990 Hearings,
supra note 1, at 64 (Hudson testimony, arguing that "a foreign investor
desiring to purchase U.S. real estate or other direct interest in a U.S.
business enterprise is faced with an array of U.S. income tax and estate and
gift tax hurdles that substantially inhibit the desirability of investing in the
United States").
2
1 1 But cf 1990 JCT REPORT, supra note 4, at 84 (suggesting the
possibility of replacing the current rules with "a more mechanically
enforceable system, designed to collect approximately the same amount as
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which would require looking-through the assets of a foreign
corporation controlled by a nonresident alien decedent. Even
assuming that Congress does not want to allow an easy escape
route from the estate tax,"s adoption of such a look-through
rule does not seem advisable.
First, the likelihood of broad enforcement of such a rule
seems remote.'' If a nonresident alien dies owning no U.S.
assets other than those held through a foreign holding
company, there would seem to be no way for the IRS to become
aware of his death and his indirect U.S. holdings, except in
highly publicized situations such as the death of Robert
Maxwell or when the annual filing of a Form 5472 is required
pursuant to I.R.C. sections 6038A(b) or 6038C(a)(1).3 2 The
holding company might be organized in a "tax haven" country
with which the United States has no treaty or other
information-exchange agreement. Although such a lookthrough rule already applies under I.R.C. section 2107 to
estates of expatriates found to have had a tax avoidance
motive for recently abandoning U.S. citizenship, it is not clear
whether this rule is effectively enforced.""

the estate and gift tax would collect if imposed on a broader base than that
under present law").
1 For the view that Congress wished to provide such an escape route
without the need to repeal the tax, see Bell & Shoemaker, TAMRA, supra
note 1, at 88; see also Mene, supra note 7, at 632 (arguing that "[tlhe 1966
Act reduced the entire system.., to a facade"). Congress' objective was to
"avoid the appearance that the United States was a tax haven, while
acknowledging that any alien who was willing to pay for some tax advice
should be able to substantially reduce" his transfer tax burden. Id.; Ross,
supra note 25, at 360 (noting that in the 1966 Act, Congress was "[claught
in the dilemma of not wishing to impose tracing rules to prevent tax
avoidance and thereby discourage foreign investment, and yet not wanting
to look too favorably disposed to aliens").
131 See Ross, supra note 25, at 360 n.351 (stating that "[it is not clear
that [tracing] rules could be effectively enforced in the context of aliens").
131 In any year in which a domestic corporation that is 25% foreignowned, or a foreign corporation engagedin a U.S. trade or business, has any
reportable transactions with a related party, a Form 5472 must be filed,
which would identify any foreign individual owning at least 25% of the
stock, actually or constructively, including through a foreign holding
company. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6038A-2(a)(1), (b)(1),(2),(f)(1)(1991); 1.6038A1(c)(1),(2) (1991).
1 33
See COMMITTEE ON TAXATION OF INTL TRANSACTIONS, supra note 74,

at 917 (stating that "the current provisions as to expatriates... are difficult
to police").
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Moreover, if Congress were to enact a look-through rule, it
would conflict with all but one of the sixteen existing estate
tax treaties entered into by the United States,14 as well as
with the OECD Model Double Taxation Convention.' 5 A
unilateral override of such treaties, although effective for
domestic law purposes, would damage our relationships with
our treaty partners and our ability to negotiate future
treaties.'
In addition, if the means for imposing the U.S.
estate tax was to override an estate tax treaty, our partner
under such a treaty would almost certainly be unwilling to
cooperate in providing information necessary for enforcement,
absent renegotiation of the treaty.
The chances for
renegotiating this aspect of treaties,3 7 particularly with
'
Post-1970 treaties entered into by the United States do not permit
taxation of intangible property by other than the country of residence.
Troxell, supra note 14, at A-28. Pre-1970 treaties entered into by the
United States treat corporate stock as having a situs where the corporation
is incorporated. Id. at A-29. However, the treaty with Australia provides
no specific situs rule for stock. Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation, May 14, 1953, U.S.-Austl., art. III, para. 1-2, 5 U.S.T. 93, 95, 97.
See also Troxell, supra note 14, at A-29.

',' OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION
CONVENTION ON ESTATES AND INHERITANCES AND ON GIFTS, (1983)

[hereinafter OECD MODEL].
The Model Convention permits the
nonresidence country to impose its estate or gift tax only on "immovable
property" situated therein or "movable property ... which is the business
property of a permanent establishment situated" therein. Id. arts. 5-7, at
27-28.
3

" See, e.g., Richard L. Doernberg, Legislative Override of Income Tax

Treaties: The Branch Profits Tax and Congressional Arrogation of
Authority, 42 TAX LAW. 173, 200-02, 207-08 (1989).
" The commentary to the OECD Model Convention explains that
permitting source-based taxation of securities would have "involved
sacrifices only by the States" that do not, by internal law, seek to tax
securities on the basis of situs. OECD MODEL, supra note 135, at 67. The
commentary also states that 'the balance of concessions would not be equal
if different treatment were accorded to registered shares and bearer shares,"
because in some states registration is required and in others bearer
certificates are common. Id.
The Commentary states further that the country of residence "is best,
and sometimes the only one, equipped to" monitor donative transfers of
securities, particularly "bearer securities", which are generally used in
Continental Europe. The Commentary points out that even if registration
is required, "shares owned by foreigners are very often registered.., in the
name of nominees." Id. at 67. Finally, the Commentary suggests taxation
based upon the domicile of the transferor is "more practical from the point
of view of the taxpayer" because it avoids "dispersal of liability to tax
amongst
[several]
States," Repository,
where the2014
securities may "originat[el" but "with
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European countries
where bearer shares are prevalent, 13 8
1 39
may be slim.
Finally, even if a look-through rule were adopted for
transfers at death, taxpayers could still rely, except in cases of
sudden death, on the exclusion from gift tax for transfers of
intangibles unless this loophole were also closed.
The
enforcement of a rule imposing a gift tax upon transfers of
securities, with a look-through rule for foreign holding
companies, may be even more difficult than the enforcement
of a look-through rule for transfers at death. 40 Thus, it
seems unrealistic to expect that the major loophole in the U.S.
estate taxation of foreign investors can be effectively
closed.'4 1
4.2. PossibleRepeal Of The Tax
The existence of this unclosable loophole in the U.S. estate
taxation of foreign investors"4 might suggest the desirability
of the tax's repeal."
Whether this is advisable depends
which" the decedent "may be entirely unconnected." Id. at 67-68.
18 See supra note 137; 1965 Hearings, supra note 25, at 64 (statement
of Treasury). The Treasury predicted that "fi]f other countries begin to
utilize registered shares more frequently, it may be expected that they
might wish to retain their estate taxes on intangibles since the likelihood
of collecting the tax would be far greater." Id.
" However, 8 out of 24 OECD countries have entered reservations to
this aspect of the OECD Model, although it is not clear that any
contemplated adoption of a "look-through" approach. In particular, New
Zealand reserved "its right to tax shares in companies incorporated in New
Zealand or registered in a branch register in New Zealand." The United
Kingdom "wish[ed] to reserve the right to taxregistered shares in companies
incorporated in its territory." OECD MODEL, supra note 135, at 73-74.
140 See supra text accompanying note 91.
141 See generallyMene, supranote 7, at 632 (noting that the rationale for
the limited U.S. estate taxation of foreigners "can be found in a combination
of historical legal precedent, notions of territoriality, international law,
comity, foreign policy, economics, and a sovereign's taxing power").
1" If the estate tax for U.S. citizens and residents were repealed, as
proposed by Galvin, supra note 30, this would likely result in repeal of the
estate tax for foreigners as well. This article, however, assumes that the
U.S. estate tax will continue to apply to citizens and residents.
4
" See 1990 JCT REPORT, supra note 4, at 84 (suggesting that "the effect
of current law could be achieved more simply by exempting nonresident
alien decedents' estates"); FOWLER REPORT, supra note 41, at 24
(recommending repeal of the tax as applied to intangibles); Ross, supra note
25, at 359, 360 (calling Congress' rejection of recommendation "puzzling"
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss4/1
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upon the soundness of the justifications for the imposition of
the tax and whether these justifications are undermined by the
existence of the loophole.
4.2.1. JustificationsFor The Estate Tax On Nonresidents
a. Introduction
The estate tax,'" like other taxes, is a means of raising
revenue. Although the amount to be raised is necessarily
small,'" the importance of the revenue is enhanced by the

and arguing that "[ilt might have been desirable for the United States,
which has long been one of the leading advocates of a free flow of capital
internationally, to remove estate taxes on nonresident aliens"). Ross also
suggests that there are "substantial arguments" for repeal based upon
asocial policy and proper nexus for tax." Id. See FLORIDA BAR, supra note
12, at 912 (recommending repeal of the tax as applied to intangibles); 1990
Hearings,supranote 1, at 65 (Hudson testimony, recommending "[c]reation
of a new pass-through corporate vehicle... affording estate tax protection");
see also Galvin, supranote 30, at 1413, 1418-19 (recommending repeal of the
estate tax for all decedents); Gerald P. Moran, Estate and Gift Taxation:
The Case for Repeal, 13 TAX NOTES 339, 343 (1981) (arguing that "the
federal transfer tax has been repealed sub silentio"); cf. COMMITTEE ON
TAXATION OF INT'L TRANSACTIONS, supra note 74, at 918 (noting that one

alternative to the current income and estate tax rules relating to expatriates
would be "to except gifts or inheritances from expatriates from the
provisions of section 102").

144
See generally OECD, TAXATION OF NET WEALTH, CAPITAL TRANSFERS
AND CAPITAL GAINS OF INDIVIDUALS (1988) at 15-22 [hereinafter OECD NET

WEALTH] (discussing rationale for annual wealth taxes, death taxes and
capital gains taxes).
"' See BITTKER & CLARK, supra note 40, at 1-2; Michael J. Graetz, To
Praisethe Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259 (1983). Revenues
from estate and gift taxes amounted to $7.78 billion in 1988, "or only a little
over eight-tenths of 1 percent" of total federal tax revenues. BITTKER &
CLARK, supra note 40, at 1. Moreover, "[olutright confiscation" of gross
estates in excess of $1 million would have yielded "less than 10 percent of
total federal revenues." Id. at 2; Another commentator has estimated that
"$150 billion pass at death each year" and that his proposal to impose a tax
of 100% on property passing at death, with six exemptions, would raise
about $25-$30 billion annually. Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited
Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 72, 91 (1990). Aaron & Munnell state that
"[n]o developed industrial country derives significant revenues from wealth
transfer taxes." Aaron & Munnell, supra note 32, at 133. This is consistent
with the fact that "the wealth of decedents in any one year is not a large
percentage of GDP." Id.; see also OECD NET WEALTH, supra note 144, at
27-28 (charts showing revenues in OECD countries); Moran, supra note 143,
at 341 (such taxes now produce "less-than-significant revenues").
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likelihood of continuing budget shortfalls."'
One traditional justification for the tax has been its role in
"break[ing] up large concentrations of wealth."'47 This may
be viewed as important, inter alia, to "protecting elective
representative government."' s This rationale has been
criticized, however, on the grounds that (1) the tax is not well
suited to the function'49 and may or may not be
effective,15 0 and that (2) the function of the tax should not be
1

sAscher, supra note 145, at 92 ("[A] country with a government that
insists on consistently spending substantially more than it takes in ought
to consider seriously any proposal with reasonable prospects for raising any
significant amount of revenue."); see also id. at 73 & n.15; Willard H.
Pedrick, Oh, To Die Down Under! Abolition of Death and Gift Duties in
Australia, 35 TAX LAW. 113, 127 (1981) (stating that death taxes "raise
significant amounts... for budgets hard pressed to cover the costs of social
programs designed to ameliorate the plight of those unfortunates who have
no wealth and little income"). But see Graetz, supra note 145, at 270
(stating "we must look elsewhere than the production of revenues if we are
to justify strengthening, rather than eliminating, the estate tax"); OECD
NET WEALTH, supra note 144, at 20-21 (noting that the "contribution of...
wealth transfer taxes to revenue is invariably very small and revenue yield
is unlikely to be the dominant consideration in their introduction or
retention").
147 S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (1981) [hereinafter 1981
SENATE REPORT]. The report uses this as justification for expansion of the
unified credit so as "to provide estate and gift tax relief to smaller estates."
Id
1
" Ascher, supra note 145, at 93-96; see also Aaron & Munnell, supra
note 32, at 121 ("[Glreat concentration of wealth holdings can produce
adverse social or political outcomes.").
'"See Aaron & Munnell, supra note 32, at 138 (arguing that an
inheritance tax would do more to "encourage the dispersion of large
estates"); see also OECD NET WEALTH, supranote 144, at 79-81 (discussing
possible advantages of inheritance tax over estate tax); Dodge, supra note
32, at 249 (The estate and gift taxes do "little ... to encourage the
dispersion of wealth among various individuals ... [a~nd there is nothing
... that bears on the acquisition by a recipient of wealth from multiple
sources.").
15 See Graetz, supra note 145, at 271 ("[Tlhe estate tax has done very
little to dilute the greatest concentrations of wealth."); see also BITTKER &
CLARK, supra note 40, at 6 ("[J]udgments about" effectiveness "must rest on
fragmentary and anecdotal reports."); Moran, supra note 143, at 340
(Federal transfer taxes have been a "colossal failure" in 'effect[ing] wealth
redistribution."). But cf Pedrick, supra note 146, at 126 ("[D]eath and gift
duties have, to some extent, impeded growth of hereditary fortunes.");
OECD NET WEALTH, supra note 144, at 17 (Capital transfer tax, if "levied
at high rates and vigorously enforced," will "ensure that in the long-run
large accumulations of wealth are broken up."). Bittker & Clark cite
examples "of enormous estates that were hard hit by death taxes." BITTKER
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viewed so narrowly. 5 1
Rather, some supporters emphasize the tax's broader role
as at least potentially "contributing an important element of
progressivity to the federal tax system, " "' s thereby
promoting fairness 5 3 and the "equalization of inherited
wealth."'" Some argue that the tax is particularly suited to
measuring "ability to pay" because its burden falls on the
5
beneficiaries, for whom an inheritance is a "windfall."
Some view the tax as compensating to some extent for the
failure to impose a current income tax on unrealized
appreciation and its exemption from income tax at death, 5 '
& CLARK, supra note 40, at 7. However, they note that the 'taxable estate'
... may be only a small fraction of the wealth that passes from one
generation to another." Id.
151 Graetz, supra note 145, at 271. Graetz argues that "[tihe narrowing
of the estate tax base that accompanies political acceptance of this myth
necessarily defeats the contribution of this tax to the progressivity of the
federal tax system." Id,
...See Graetz, supra note 145, at 271. Graetz wrote in 1983 that 'the
estate and gift taxes ... contributed nearly one-third as much to the
progressivity of our tax structure as did rates in excess of the average
individual income tax" for 1970; however, for 1980, the figure was reduced
to 12%, and the 1981 estate tax changes were expected to reduce it further.
Id. at 272-73; see Harry L. Gutman, FederalWealth Transfer Taxes After the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, 35 NAT'L TAX J. 253, 261-62 (1982).
15 See Graetz, supra note 145, at 278 ("There is quite a strong case to be
made for the fairness of substantial and progressive taxes on bequests.");
BITTKER & CLARK, supranote 40, at 6 (Some argue that because "estate and
gift taxes are paid only by the super-rich" they can be justified on the
grounds of "fairness and the desirability of taxing in accordance with ability
to pay."); Pedrick, supra note 146, at 126-27 (Death taxes "represent an
application of the ability to pay principle of taxation by requiring that large
aggregations of wealth contribute to the cost of governance.").
'" BITTKER & CLARK, supra note 40, at 6; see Ascher, supra note 145, at
88 (noting that treatment of "accumulated wealth at death is... a critical
determinant of the degree of equality of opportunity succeeding generations
will enjoy"); OECD NET WEALTH, supra note 144, at 17 (noting that wealth
transfer taxes "may contribute importantly to vertical equity as in most
countries inheritance is a major source of inequality in the distribution of

wealth").
'" BITTKER & CLARK, supra note 40, at 6; see also Ascher, supra note
145, at 93; OECD NET WEALTH, supra note 144, at 17 (explaining that
capital transfer tax "may be more acceptable [than annual wealth tax]
because of the feeling that an inheritance is unrelated to the efforts of the
heir").
1
" BITTKER & CLARK, supra note 40, at 10 ("[1It seems likely that, as
long as the income tax laws continue to leave the door open to substantial
accumulations, the estate and gift taxes will have a task to perform.");
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as well as for other gaps in the income taxation of income from
capital.'
Moreover, wealth "may well provide utility above
and beyond the ability to consume," such as "power or social
standing" 5 ' or "security."1 5
Finally, it has been argued

that an estate tax is less likely than an income tax to interfere
with incentives to work or to save.'o
The justification for the gift tax depends upon the existence
of an estate tax. Given an estate tax, a gift tax is necessary
primarily to prevent lifetime gifts from being used to avoid
imposition of an estate tax.''

Gutman, supra note 152, at 257-60 (noting that after ERTA only 15% "of the
unrealized appreciation in estates of decedents dying will be subject to any
tax at all"). However, Professor Galvin cites the unequal income tax
treatment of realized and unrealized appreciation as a reason to replace the
estate tax with a rule of constructive realization. Galvin, supra note 30, at
1417 & n.29.
1" See Aaron & Munnell, supra note 32, at 120-21, 138.
1
"IM at 121.
"' OECD NET WEALTH, supra note 144, at 16 (explaining that capital
provides "advantages confer[ring] additional taxable capacity," i.e., "an
income independent of the health of the owner and attainable without any
current sacrifice of leisure ... [and] independence, security, and the
opportunity for advantageous purchase or for a spending spree").
16 See Graetz, supranote 145, at 280 (noting that some economists have
observed that "deathtime taxes on capital, such as estate taxes, are likely
to have smaller disincentive effects than lifetime income taxes"). Graetz
finds the evidence "inconclusive" as to whether estate taxation has a
significant "adverse impact... on capital formation." Id. at 278, 283. See
OECD NET WEALTH, supra note 144, at 18 ("A death duty... may have less
of a disincentive effect on the supply of labour or work effort than an
equivalent addition to [the] income tax."); id. at 19 (discussing potentially
contradictory effects on savings); Ascher, supra note 145, at 100-02
(discussing the effect on the incentive to work of his proposal to "curtail
inheritance" by providing a tax of 100% above the amount of certain
exemptions). Ascher states that "[w]hatever the disincentive effects of an
increase in taxes at death, the authorities re all but unanimous that such
effects are smaller than those of an increase in the income tax." I&. at 102
& n.180; see also id. at 102-10 (discussing whether his proposal would cause
shift from savings to consumption).
161 BITTKER & CLARK, supra note 40, at 12-13; see OECD NET WEALTH,
supra note 144, at 78 (noting that the gift tax was justified by OECD
members as "a measure to support the death duty"). In addition, the gift
tax "discourages, or compensates for, loss of income tax revenue from
transfer of income-producing assets from one owner to another in lower
income tax brackets." ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 28, at 396.
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b. Applicability Of Justifications To Nonresident Estates
The justification for situs-based jurisdiction over foreigners
under the estate tax is that the accumulation and retention of
wealth within a country's borders is facilitated by governmentprovided services and protection, and government support of
the infrastructure and economy. Thus, it is fair for the situs
country to make a claim to a portion of that wealth. 62 This
claim may be strongest for assets permanently situated in the
country, such as real estate. The fact that a holding company,
or a partnership, has been interposed between U.S. real estate
or business assets and the nonresident alien does not weaken
that claim.'6
The primary role of the estate tax in achieving a
progressive distribution of the tax burden, with regard to
ability to pay, is quite consistent with a source-based, as well
as a residence-based, imposition of tax. In light of this, the
imposition of a U.S. estate tax on foreigners with U.S. assets,
including those assets held through holding companies, maybe
viewed as important in achieving equity with U.S.

investors.'"
It is less obvious that the objectives of breaking up large
concentrations of wealth and of promoting equality of
opportunity in American society are furthered by the exercise
of situs-based jurisdiction. These objectives seem to be
important primarily if the inherited wealth were to remain in
the hands of a U.S. citizen or resident, who may be presumed
to play a larger role in U.S. society and politics than a
Cf. Ascher, supra note 145, at 86-87 (arguing that "society has a
major stake in all accumulated wealth" because '[slociety plays a crucial
role in every individual's acquisitive activities" as it "determines the rules
by which individuals acquire property, ... educates (to one extent or
another) every individual ... [and] enacts and enforces laws that protect
individuals' enjoyment of what they acquire"); A.L.I., supranote 87, at 18-19
("[G]overnmental services and protections" are relevant in determining
16

source of income.); id. at 63 (Secondary dividend rule of I.R.C. § 861(a)(2)(B)
is based upon the view that dividends have their source in the country
under whose "governmental protections.., the income-producing activities"
generating the earnings took place.).
-1"However, as discussed supra notes 134-39, where a holding company

is interposed, such a claim would generally not be recognized by other
countries.
'" As discussed below, the goal of equity was the stated rationale for the
1988 Act's increase in the estate tax rates applicable to nonresident estates.
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foreigner. However, even though the decedent is a nonresident
alien, his beneficiary may be a U.S. citizen or resident, or may,
perhaps as a result of inheriting U.S. assets, become a U.S.
citizen or resident. In addition, a nonresident alien with
substantial U.S. assets may often play an important role in
U.S. society. Examples include Rupert Murdock and the late
Robert Maxwell, two individuals having large U.S. media
holdings.
The possible role of the estate tax in compensating for the
failure to tax unrealized appreciation may also be viewed as
consistent with a situs-based imposition of the estate tax, for
example, on U.S. real estate. However, in the case of holdings
of stock in U.S. corporations, other than real estate holding
companies, the failure of the United States to tax even
realized gains of nonresident aliens may undermine this
argument. This would no longer be true, however, if a tax
were enacted on capital gains of 10%-or-more foreign
shareholders, as under House Bill 5270.
The availability of a holding company structure'" as a
means to avoid a U.S. estate tax does not necessarily
undermine these justifications for the imposition of a situsbased tax on foreigners. First, foreign investors who utilize a
corporate structure to hold U.S. real estate or business assets
may, at least in some cases, incur greater income tax burdens
than if individual ownership or a partnership were used.
Thus, the existence of the estate tax increases the overall U.S.
tax burden of such foreigners even if they do not incur U.S.
estate tax liability. Second, the small number of foreigners
who do not use the corporate structure do incur a U.S. estate
tax. Thus, the continued existence of U.S. estate taxation of
foreigners furthers, rather than detracts from, equity between
U.S. citizens and foreigners, although not achieving equity
among foreign investors. '
Without regard for the practical consequences, repeal of the
estate tax only for foreigners might be perceived by American
voters as inequitable, 1 even though the estate tax in
1

Avoidance can be achieved with a foreign holding company or,
alternatively, with a U.S. holding company where there is treaty protection,
or where an inter vivos gift is made.
16 See 1965 Hearings, supra note 25, at 64 (statement of the Treasury
describing reasons for rejecting the repeal of the estate tax on intangibles
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss4/1
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general does not have great public support." At the same
time, Americans might be expected to view the achievement of
tax equity among wealthy foreign investors as fairly
unimportant."
Therefore, it might be difficult to convince
American voters that using a relatively ineffective tool to
subject foreign investors to a tax burden comparable to that
imposed on U.S. citizens or residents is worse than abandoning
the effort entirely.
A different conclusion might be drawn with respect to the
U.S. estate tax on portfolio stock interests in U.S. companies
held by foreigners. Use of a foreign holding company to avoid
U.S. estate taxation on such investments is apparently simple
and results in no adverse U.S. income tax consequences. Thus,
no quid pro quo is extracted for avoidance of the U.S. estate
tax. Whatever the inequity in not imposing a U.S. estate tax
on such assets held by foreigners, repeal might be accepted as
merely recognizing a fait accompli.'"
After the 1993 Act's change in the income tax rate
structure, the same argument for repeal might be made for the
entire estate tax on foreigners, assuming that the capital gains
held by nonresident estates). The Treasury stated that "[a]lthough we
receive only $5 million in revenue annually from our estate tax on
nonresident aliens, it would appear inequitable to completely relieve
nonresident aliens holding U.S. intangible property from estate tax when
U.S. citizens are subject to an estate tax." Id. Similarly, Stanford Ross
stated that Congress, in failing to exempt foreigners from the U.S. estate
tax in 1966, "was probably concerned that a statutory exemption would look
like it was unduly favoring aliens over United States citizens." Ross, supra
note 25, at 360.
67 Graetz, supra note 145, at 284-85 (commenting that "the American
people do not seem to like heavy taxes on bequests"). Graetz also states
that strengthening of the estate tax is blocked by "objections of owners of

small businesses and farms." Id.
16 Cf Bell & Shoemaker, TAMRA, supra note 1, at 87 (noting that
"[plassage of the across-the-board increase in estate taxation of NRAs was
made all the easier because NRAs in the abstract have no representation in
Washington").

'" However, IRS data shows that corporate stocks and bonds constituted
45% of the total U.S. gross estate shown on returns of nonresident estates
for 1986. See supra note 109. It is not clear whether direct investments in

U.S. corporations are included. The Staff of the Joint Committee uses an

argument similar to that in the text to support complete repeal of the U.S.
estate tax on foreigners. 1990 JCT REPORT, supra note 4, at 84 (described
supra note 28).
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tax on foreign shareholders proposed in House Bill 5270 is not
eventually enacted. Under the 1993 Act, the likelihood that
adverse income tax consequences would result from the use of
a foreign holding company structure for U.S. real estate or
business assets is greatly diminished. Recent history suggests,
however, that the 1993 reversal in the relationship between
individual and corporate tax rates may not last long. At the
same time, it may be difficult in terms of relationships with
our trading partners to reinstate the estate tax on foreigners
once it has been completely repealed. Thus, it may not be wise
to repeal the estate tax on foreigners in response to a possibly
temporary decision by Congress to increase individual rates
over corporate rates.
c. International Acceptance
Repeal by the United States of the estate tax on
nonresident estates may be viewed as an overly generous
unilateral act in light of the wide international acceptance of
such a tax. Many other countries impose a tax on transfers of
7
property at death,"'
although the tax often takes the form
of an inheritance tax imposed on the beneficiary rather than
an estate tax. 1 Under accepted international practice, a
country may assert jurisdiction to impose an estate and gift
tax on the basis of the situs of property within its borders, as
well as on the basis of the residency of the transferor. 2
"" Twenty out of 23 OECD countries reporting in 1986 had "death taxes
and gift taxes at the central or federal level." The three that did not were
Australia, Canada and Switzerland (where "most ... cantons" have such
taxes). OECD NET WEALTH, supra note 144, at 77. Of the 20 countries, 3
have estate taxes, 16 have inheritance taxes and one has a combination of
these taxes. Id, at 77-78. For a more comprehensive survey, see II JEFFREY
A. SCHOENBLUM, MULTISTATE AND MULTINATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING 441-

534, app. H, (1982 & 1990 Supp.). For a discussion of the repeal of death
taxes in Australia and Canada, see Pedrick, supra note 146 (criticizing
repeal in Australia); George E. Carter, FederalAbandonment of the Estate
Tax: The Intergovernmental Fiscal Dimension, 21 CAN. TAX J. 232, 246
(1973) (criticizing the repeal as a "retrograde step").
1
See OECD NET WEALTH, supra note 144, at 79-81 (discussing the
relative merits of estate and inheritance taxes).

171

See OECD NET WEALTH, supranote 144, at 108 ("Generally speaking,

death taxes are charged on all the property of deceased persons who were
resident or domiciled in the country imposing the tax, while in the case of
non-residents the charge is limited to property situated in the taxing
country."); see also OECD Model, supra note 135, arts. 5-7 (permitting a
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However, situs taxation of intangibles is less well-established,
and a look-through rule for foreign entities may have no
precedent.'
To avoid overlapping taxation by residence and
situs countries, the country of residence is expected to provide
relief by exempting the property having its situs in another
country 17or4 by allowing a credit for the tax imposed by the situs
country.

Most countries that impose death taxes, including many of
the major trading partners of the United States, do impose
these taxes on property owned by nonresidents and situated
within their borders .1

5

Thus, U.S. citizens investing abroad

will often be subject to foreign estate or inheritance taxes.
Such foreign taxes are eligible to be credited against U.S.
estate tax liability pursuant to I.R.C. section 2014.171
Given this international practice, there is no barrier to the
United States imposing its estate and gift tax on the basis of
situs as well as residence, although there may be limits to
acceptance of U.S. taxation of intangibles. In fact, this
international practice may suggest that the United States
situs country to tax immovable property and movable property of a

permanent establishment, but not other property); Burnet v. Brooks, 288
U.S. 378 (1933) (upholdinginclusion in a nonresident decedent's gross estate
of stock in a foreign corporation and bonds of foreign governments and
corporations that were physically held in the U.S.). The Supreme Court
explained that the United States, "as a nation with all the attributes of
sovereignty," had jurisdiction to impose the U.S. estate tax "without
violating any established principle of international law." IL at 396.
173 See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
n"See OECD MODEL, supra note 135, arts. 9A & 9B, at 88-90 (choice of
methods).
17 According to the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, "most [member]
States ... tax transfers of all or certain property situated within their
territory," even in the absence of other bases for tax, such as residence of
the donor or donee. OECD MODEL, supra note 135, at 15, 64. These
countries include, for example, Denmark, Luxembourg, and Belgium (all
three countries limit the tax to immovables), Germany (where the tax also
includes business property, an invention registered there, and shares in a
German company in the case of a 25% or more owner), and Sweden (where
immovable property, business property, and all shares in a Swedish
company are taxed), as well as the United Kingdom, and Ireland. OECD
NET WEALTH, supra note 144, at 108.
17 The amount of U.S. tax that may be offset by the credit is limited
by
the ratio of the value of the property includible in the gross estate that is
situated in the foreign country and subjected to the foreign tax to the entire
gross estate (reduced by both the deduction for charitable transfers and the
marital deduction).
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should not forego an opportunity to raise revenue in a manner
utilized by other countries. 7 7
In addition, it may be
undesirable for the United States to permit itself to be used as
a tax haven, where residents of countries that impose an
estate or inheritance tax can shield assets from exposure to
either home country or situs-based taxation.
d. Revenues
For 1986, the IRS collected only about $6.5 million in estate
taxes from nonresident estates. The gift taxes collected from
nonresident alien donors in 1982 amounted to only about
$400,000.
Some have contended that "the current U.S.
estate and gift tax on foreigners" is not "defensible as" a
"significant revenue measur[e]."' 79 These figures may not,
however, fully reflect the large increase in U.S. investments by
foreigners during the 1980s or the higher estate tax rates
imposed by the 1988 Act."s Nor do they reflect the revenues
that could potentially be generated by more vigorous
enforcement of the tax. Even with these adjustments,
however, the revenue generated by estate taxation of
nonresident estates probably would not be a significant
percentage of estate tax revenues from all sources.
These revenue figures may tell an incomplete story. A
significant increase in income tax revenues may have been
generated indirectly by the existence of the estate tax, which
induces foreigners to use holding company structures for
See Ross, supra note 25, at 359 (Congress' decision not to repeal
estate tax on intangibles in 1966 was based in part on "[tihe fact that most
advanced countries of the world do have statutes on their books which seem
to impose some amount of death tax on assets owned by aliens.").
7
" See Long, supra note 29, at 51, 54, 58 (estate tax); FLORIDA BAR,
supra note 12, at 910 n.1 (gift tax). The estate tax collected for 1982 was
"nearly $4 million." Skelly & Hobbs, supra note 29, at 15.
178 1990 Hearings, supra note 1, at 65 (Hudson testimony); see also
FLORIDA BAR, supra note 12, at 910 ("U.S. estate and gift taxes on
nondomiciled aliens are not significant sources of revenues."); Mene, supra
note 7, at 633 ("Nonresident alien tax provisions are not designed as a
revenue measure at all, but are an interplay of politics and foreign
relations.").
180 It is interesting to note that prior to the reduction in rates under the
1966 Act, the estate tax on nonresidents was raising $5 million annually.
1965 Hearings,supranote 25, at 64 (statement of Treasury). This was more
than the $4 million raised in 1982. See supra note 178.
17

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss4/1

19941

NONRESIDENT ALIEN TAXATION

investments. This assumes that a corporate structure is more
expensive than direct ownership from an income tax
standpoint. As noted, this is not always true, particularly for
treaty investors and particularly after the 1993 Act's income
tax rate changes. If, however, a capital gains tax on 10%-ormore foreign shareholders is enacted, the corporate structure
would become more expensive than direct ownership in many
more cases.
This would increase income tax revenues,
assuming that foreigners are not thereby induced to invest
elsewhere.
Attribution of greater income tax revenues to the existence
of the estate tax further assumes that a foreign holding
company would not be utilized by foreigners for other reasons
(e.g., to avoid the need to file a U.S. individual income tax
return or to achieve anonymity or limited liability), even if the
U.S. estate tax on foreigners were repealed." s '
This
assumption is difficult to verify.
In any event, in light of the current prospects for the U.S.
budget deficit, no revenue source, however small, assuming
that revenue exceeds the cost of collection, is readily sacrificed.
e. Effect That Repeal Of Estate Taxation Of Foreigners Would
Have On Estate Taxation Of U.S. Citizens
i. Treaty Benefits For U.S. Citizens
Retention of the estate tax on nonresidents may be
necessary to permit the U.S. Treasury Department to negotiate
new or revised' estate tax treaties with other countries in
which U.S. citizens or U.S. domiciliaries may reside or have

.8.
Robert F. Hudson, Jr. recognized that foreigners may prefer to use the
corporate form in his proposal that the burden imposed on foreigners by
U.S. estate taxation be amelioratedby permitting nonresident aliens to form
S corporations and to exempt the stock in such corporations from U.S. estate
tax. 1990 Hearings, supra note 1, at 65-66 (Hudson testimony).
," Currently, the United States does not appear to be seeking to greatly
expand or modify its estate tax treaty network. Apparently, the only
countries with which the United States currently has active estate tax
treaty negotiations are Germany and France, with whom the United States
already has estate tax treaties. See Fogarasi, supra note 14, at 507-08.
However, income tax treaty negotiations with Canada also include estate tax
issues. See infra note 186.
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assets.' Without such a tax, or perhaps a replacement tax,
such as a tax on gains constructively realized at death," the
United States would have no leverage in such negotiations or
would have to use unrelated tax provisions, such as income tax
provisions, as its bargaining chips." a In fact, the current
estate tax on nonresident estates may help the U.S. Treasury
1 86
to negotiate income tax reductions with other countries.
Of course, the 1993 Act's income tax rate changes, if not
eventually followed by enactment of a capital gains tax on
foreign shareholders, greatly diminish the income tax
disadvantages of a corporate structure and, as a result, the
bargaining leverage of the United States in estate tax treaty
negotiations.
Retention of the estate tax on nonresidents might also be.
necessary to ensure the continuation of existing estate tax
treaties. The U.S.-Canada treaty was eventually terminated
after Canada repealed its estate tax. However, negotiations
are currently underway for a treaty provision coordinating the
U.S. estate tax with the Canadian income tax on constructively
realized gains. 8 7 In addition, the U.S.-Australia treaty has
183

See COMMITTEE ON TAXATION OF INT'L TRANSACTIONS, supra note 74,
at 922 ("[Slince the estate and gift taxes can be avoided by owning United

States assets through a foreign corporation, logical justification for their
retention lies in part on the ability to obtain benefits and information
through treaties with other countries."); cf. 1965 Hearings, supra note 25,
at 64 (statement of Treasury noting that repeal of the estate tax on
intangibles held by foreigners would hamper information exchange under
treaties).
1
' See infra notes 345-69 and accompanying text.
185 Cf. 1966 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 25, at 1001 (Congress was

concerned that "unilateral reduction of estate tax rates ... by statute may
have the effect of making it more difficult to negotiate estate tax treaties.").
18 Concern about the 1988 estate tax rate increase for nonresident
estates was a factor leading to income tax negotiations with Canada, which
include discussion of overlapping death taxation. See Nathan Boidman,
Cross-BorderDeath Taxes: CurrentIssues and Developments (pt.III), 2 TAX

NOTES INT'L 822, 826 (1990) [hereinafter "Boidman III"] (noting that
"controversy stirred up for Canadians by the radical increase in U.S. estate
tax rates in 1988 has been seen as the major reason for treaty
renegotiations that commenced in January of [1990]"); see also Fogarasi,
supra note 14, at 508 (status of treaties); Gary J. Gartner, Canada-United
States Treaty Renegotiations Postponed, 21 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 91, 103
(1992) ("U.S. treaty negotiators undoubtedly have used the opportunity to
seek a reduction in the withholding rates.").
187 See Troxell, supranote 14, at A-16 (discussing termination of treaty);
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not been terminated despite Australia's repeal of its estate tax
in 1979.18

If repeal of the U.S. estate tax on nonresidents hampers
the ability of the United States to negotiate or retain estate
tax treaties with other countries, this may have adverse effects
on the U.S. Treasury or on U.S. citizens and residents. A loss
of treaty provisions limiting source-based taxation might
reduce the revenues of the United States in its capacity as a
residence country because increased foreign taxes imposed on
U.S. persons would result in their claiming increased credits
against U.S. estate taxes pursuant to I.R.C. section 2014. This
loss of U.S. tax revenue would be in addition to the loss of
revenue resulting from the United States' voluntary
relinquishment of jurisdiction to tax foreigners on a source
basis.'
On the other hand, if the increased foreign taxes
were not creditable pursuant to I.R.C. section 2014 (e.g.,
because the United States considers the property taxed by the
foreign country to have a U.S. situs), the loss of treaty benefits
would be borne by the U.S. citizens incurring the foreign taxes.
Of course, the importance of such effects created by a
reduced treaty network depends on certain assumptions. First,
it must be assumed that, in the absence of a treaty, a foreign
country would collect a significant amount of estate or
inheritance tax from U.S. citizens or residents (thus, for
example, it would not be practical for U.S. citizens or residents
to avoid the tax by use of a foreign holding company)." 9 A
supra note 186 and infra note 350.
15 Troxell, supra note 14, at A-16.
i It is not clear that the positive revenue effect for the United States
of existing treaties (i.e., reduction of credits against U.S. estate tax claimed
by U.S. residents) is not partly or fully offset by a negative revenue effect
of such treaties (i.e., reduction of U.S. situs-based taxation of nonresidents,
mandated by the treaties). However, if the choice is between (a) retention
of the status quo and (b) repeal of the U.S. estate tax on nonresidents with
resulting elimination of U.S. estate tax treaties, then the latter course can
be seen as only reducing revenues, because the revenue from nonresidents
that the United States forgoes under treaties would not be reclaimed by it.
19
" See, e.g., Rene de Monseignat, The Estate PlanningEnvironment in
France, in INTERNATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING, supra note 7, at 549, 558-59.
The author suggests that foreigners can avoid French succession taxes upon
French real estate by holding it in a "societe civile," owned individually or
by "non-French limited liability companies." Id. For use of a non-Canadian
holding company to avoid the Canadian income tax on deemed dispositions
at death, see infra note 351.
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second assumption is that a significant portion of the tax
otherwise collected would be eliminated by treaty provisions
(e.g., because the tax was imposed on intangibles). If these
assumptions are true, then it might be useful for the United
States to study the methods used by other countries to enforce
their death taxes.
If the only objective of the United States in imposing its
estate tax on nonresidents is as a bargaining tool for reduction
or elimination of situs-based taxation of U.S. citizens or
residents by other countries, this might be accomplished
without applying the U.S. estate tax so broadly. The objective
is not served by imposing the estate tax on residents of
countries that do not, under domestic law, impose any death
taxes on nonresidents. The U.S. tax would impose an
unnecessary burden on residents of such countries, who would
have little prospect of treaty relief being negotiated for them.
Congress could instead adopt a provision analogous to I.R.C.
section 883 providing for a complete estate tax exemption for
residents of any country that either has no situs-based estate
tax or agrees to exempt U.S. residents from estate tax.' 9 '
This approach, however, ignores ,other functions that an
estate tax treaty might perform, such as providing procedures
for mutual agreement and exchange of information. In
addition, a treaty benefits U.S. citizens and residents by
resolving conflicting claims made by the United States and
another country to impose residence-based taxation, albeit
sometimes to the detriment of the U.S. Treasury.'92

...
An alternative is to extend the approach of I.R.C. § 2108, which
authorizes the President to proclaim that pre-1967 provisions apply to
decedents of any countries imposing more burdensome taxes on U.S. citizens
than the United States applies to residents of such countries. See 1966
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 25, at 1001. That is, the United States would
reduce or eliminate its estate tax on nonresident estates, but give the
Treasury authority to reimpose the tax on residents of countries that do not
reciprocate.
'" If,for example, a treaty classified a particular U.S. citizen or resident
as a resident only in the other country; U.S. jurisdiction to tax would be
limited to U.S. situated assets, and, thus, the United States would lose
revenue. If, on the other hand, the treaty resolved the conflict in favor of
the U.S. claim, the United States would not be gaining anything beyond
what it would have claimed absent the treaty, because the tax on U.S.
assets that the other country would be precluded from imposing would not
have been creditable, in any event, under I.R.C. § 2014.
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ii. Exchange Of Information

As noted above, one function of estate tax treaties is to
provide for an exchange of information that will facilitate the
enforcement of estate taxation. Under these treaty provisions,
information, presumably obtained from estate tax returns, 9 s
regarding decedents who are residents of a treaty country is
provided to that country, either routinely or upon request.'TM
It has been argued that repeal of the estate tax on
nonresidents would prevent the United States from acquiring
information about U.S. assets held by nonresident estates.
Thus, the United States would have little information to swap
with its treaty partners for information about estates of U.S.
citizens who reside in the treaty country or have assets
therein. " 5 Clearly, enforcement of the U.S. estate tax with
respect to foreign assets of U.S. citizens is essential both in
terms of equity vis-a-vis U.S. citizens whose assets are entirely
in the United States and to avoid creating an incentive for
U.S. citizens to invest abroad.
The exchange of information argument for retaining the
estate tax on nonresidents may not be as strong as it first
appears. The small number of nonresident estate tax returns
currently filed, e.g., only 110 for 1986 apart from the 51 filed
for Canadian decedents,' may provide the United States
with very little information about U.S. or foreign assets of
nonresident alien decedents that can be offered to treaty

'" Most exchange of information provisions are not specific about the
information to be provided. An exception is the treaty with Norway, which
requires the United States routinely to provide "information disclosed by
[U.S.] estate tax records relative to estates of deceased persons who were

domiciled in, or citizens of, Norway," as well as "such information as is
available" regarding assets located in Norway of U.S. citizens or residents.
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, June 13, 1949, U.S.-Nor.,
art. 8, para. (1Xa), 2 U.S.T. 2353, 2358.
134 See, eg., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, U.S.-Fr.,

supra note 15, art. 15, para. 4, at 1957 (providing that "[the furnishing of
information shall be either on a routine basis" as agreed by the competent
authorities of the two countries, "or on request with reference to particular
cases"); Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, July 15, 1969,
U.S-Neth., art. 14, para. 3, 22 U.S.T. 247, 265.
'" See 1965 Hearings, supra note 25, at 64 (statement of Treasury);
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION OF INT'L TRANSACTIONS, supra note 74, at 922 &

n.29 (quoted supra note 183).
'" See Long, supra note 29, at 58.
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partners. In addition, the small amount of information
obtained by the IRS regarding U.S. assets of nonresident
estates casts doubt on the ability of our treaty partners to
provide the United States with valuable information about
assets that belong to U.S. citizens or to U.S. residents unless
they are also citizens of the treaty partner.
Even if the estate tax on nonresidents were repealed, the
IRS nevertheless might be able to obtain considerable
information (perhaps as much as it obtains currently) about
U.S. assets of nonresident decedents through its income tax
enforcement mechanisms." With this information obtained
for income tax purposes,' it seems likely that the United
States could enter into an information exchange agreement
under which it would be provided with information pertinent
to collecting estate taxes from U.S. citizens or residents.' 9
Nor is it necessary that an agreement for exchange of
information relating to estate taxes be contained in an estate
tax treaty. In some U.S. income tax treaties, the article on the
exchange of information already applies to the U.S. estate
tax.2 ° Moreover, in 1984, the United States began to enter
For penalties under I.R.C. § 874 for failure to timely file an income
tax return, see supra note 104. For Treasury's authority under I.R.C.
§ 6039C to require information reporting, see supranote 107. A partnership
may be required to withhold income tax with respect to a nonresident alien
partner. See I.R.C. §§ 1441(b), 1445(e)(1), 1446. For filing requirements
prescribed by regulations pursuant to I.R.C. §§ 6038A and 6038C, see supra
note 132. In addition, the IRS obtains information regarding U.S. source
dividends, interest or royalties received by foreign persons through Form
1042S filed by withholding agents. See Richard A. Gordon et al., An
Analysis of Tax Information Agreements Concluded by the U.S., 20 TAX
MGMT. INT'L J. 187, 193 (1991). This information is "automatically"
provided to the residence country pursuant to information exchange
provisions in income tax treaties. Id. at 193.
19 One existing estate tax treaty makes clear that the United States is
required to supply information in its possession even though such
information pertains to assets of nonresidents exempted from U.S. estate tax
by the treaty. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, U.S.-Fr.,
supra note 15, art. 15, para. 2(b); Technical Explanation of the U.S.-Fr.
Convention on Taxes on Estates, Inheritances and Gifts, 1980-2 C.B. 405,
411.
19 The United States might even want to conclude such an agreement
with a country that does not impose its estate tax on U.S. citizens, provided
that such a country (like the United States) has other means of obtaining
information pertinent to assets of U.S. citizen or resident decedents.
2" There are at least 11 such treaties. See Convention on Avoidance of
Double Taxation, Aug. 29, 1989, U.S.-F.R.G., art. 26, para. 6, 2 Tax Treaties
19"
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into tax information exchange agreements separate from
income or estate tax treaties, and these agreements generally
apply to estate taxes. °1 In addition, the United States is a
signatory of the Convention on Mutual Administrative
Assistance in Tax Matters of the Council of Europe and the
OECD. 2 °= Repeal of the U.S. estate tax on nonresidents
would apparently not preclude the United States from
obtaining information under this Convention with respect to
estate taxation of U.S. citizens and residents, if the United
States were willing to provide reasonable assistance in
enforcing other countries' estate taxes. 2 °s
Finally, if repeal of the estate tax would prevent the United
States from negotiating exchange of information agreements
regarding estate taxes owed by U.S. citizens or residents,
Congress could authorize the IRS to impose the estate tax only
on residents of countries with which the IRS has not obtained
a satisfactory agreement. A similar provision was enacted in
connection with the repeal of income taxation of interest
received from portfolio debt, but it has not been invoked by the
2
IRS. 04
In conclusion, retaining an estate tax on nonresident estates
does facilitate receipt by the U.S. Treasury of information from
other countries regarding estates of U.S. citizens and
residents.
However, it is not clear how valuable the
information obtained pursuant to estate tax treaties has been.

(CCH) 3249; Convention on Income Taxes, Sept. 26, 1980, U.S.-Can., art.
27, para. 4(b), T.I.A.S. No. 11,087; Convention on Income Taxes, Mar. 8,
1971, U.S.-Japan, arts. 1(3), 26, T.I.A.S. No. 7,365.
"*'See Gordon, supra note 197, at 187. For a current listing of these
agreements, see Fogarasi, supra note 14, at 510.
02 This was ratified by the United States, with reservations relating to
recovery of tax claims, state and local taxes, and service of documents. See
U.S. Presents Instrument of Ratification to OECD Multilateral Treaty, 91
TNT 41-29, Feb. 21, 1991, available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNT File.

However, the Convention is not yet in force. See Treas. Dept., Treasury
Issues Update of Treaty Talks, 92 TNT 124-90, June 16, 1992, available in

LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNT File.
See Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters,

arts. 2.1(b), 2.2, 30, reprinted in BNA Daily Tax Rep. No. 142 at L-26, L-31
(July 25, 1988) (The Convention covers estate tax if imposed by the Party
and listed in Annex A.); see also Explanatory Report, BNA Daily Tax Rep.
No. 142 at L-33, L-35 to L-36 (July 25, 1988).
2U I.R.C. §§ 871(hX5), 881(cX5); see Gordon, supra note 197, at 189 &
n.8.
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Nor is it clear that repeal of the estate tax on nonresident
estates would leave the United States without adequate
alternatives to obtain such information.
f. Discouragment To Investment In The United States
Situs-based estate taxation has an important disadvantage
not shared by residence-based taxation: it may distort
decisions regarding where to invest.2
The concern that
situs-based taxation had discouraged investment in the United
States figured prominently in decisions to reduce the rates of
the estate tax in 1966. 2 0
Commentators Bell and
Shoemaker argued in 1991 that Congress' 1966 objective of not
discouraging investment in the United States by foreigners
had been "indirectly and inadvertently repealed by Code
changes that have made investment through a foreign
corporation unattractive from an income tax perspective."2 '
Investment in the United States will be discouraged only
with respect to assets other than those eligible for exemption
by statute (e.g., portfolio debt) or by treaty (e.g., intangibles,
such as investments in stock in U.S. corporations). Such
discouragement will occur only if the following assumptions
are correct: (1) tax considerations are a significant factor in a
foreigner's decision to invest in the United States; (2) the U.S.
estate tax would not be fully creditable against an estate or
inheritance tax imposed by the residence country;2 (3) the

2o

See 1990 JCT REPORT, supra note 4, at 84 (noting as a "policy

consideration.., the effect that broad imposition of U.S. estate and gift tax

might have on decisions to invest inside or outside the United States").

2
" See supra notes 20 & 25. During the legislative deliberations, the
Treasury stated that "[i]t is generally believed that high estate taxes on
foreign investors are one of the most important deterrents in our tax laws
to foreign investment in the United States." 1965 Hearings,supranote 25,
at 19. For discussion of the Congressional objective in 1966, see Mene,
supra note 7, at 632-33.
' See Bell & Shoemaker, ForeignInvestment, supranote 6, at 268; Bell
& Shoemaker, TAMRA, supra note 1, at 88.
' See 1965 Hearings,supra note 25, at 19 (The Treasury recommended
lower estate tax rates and an increased exemption as "bringing] U.S.
effective estate tax rates on nonresident aliens to a level ... substantially
below those imposed on resident estates in the United Kingdom, Canada,
and Italy" so that "U.S. investment from these latter countries bears no
higher estate tax than local investment because of foreign tax credits or
exemptions provided in such countries."); Knight & Doernberg, supra note
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foreigner is not willing to use aggressive or fraudulent return
positions as a means to avoid U.S. estate tax; (4) if the
foreigner were to use a holding company to avoid U.S. estate
tax, he would suffer unfavorable U.S. income tax or foreign tax
consequences or considerable inconvenience or expense, and he
would not have used a holding company, e.g., as a device to
achieve anonymity, absent concern about the U.S. estate tax;
and (5) estate taxation is more burdensome in the United
States than in other potential host countries. 2" Thus, for
example, because the U.S. estate tax on foreigners' portfolio
holdings of stock in U.S. companies is easily avoided at little
cost, it provides little disincentive to such investments.
Particularly under the 1993 Act, this may often be true for
investments in U.S. business assets or real estate.
The rapid expansion of foreign investment in the United
2 10
States in the 1980s seems to have slowed in the 1990s,
and the United States must consider whether it desires to take
new steps to attract such investment. In that regard, the
United States must consider whether investment by foreign
individuals (through whatever form) is a major source of
foreign investment in this country. The United States must
also consider whether it could attract such investment merely
by adjusting the level of tax, for example, through the rate
schedule, the unified credit or the marital deduction.2" In

51, at 288-89 (In light of 1988 rate increases, U.S. estate tax incurred by

German investor in U.S. real estate would "in many cases.., far exceed the
German inheritance tax.").
'" In 1965, the Treasury, in supporting an "increase in exemption and
reduced rates" but retention of the estate tax on intangibles for
nonresidents, noted that "[t]he proposed tax treatment... is substantially
similar to the treatment accorded the estates of nonresidents by Canada,
whose rates on the estates of its citizens are comparable to our own." 1965
Hearings,supra note 25, at 64-65 (Treasury statement).
* See James Sterngold, Japanese Shifting Their Investments Back
Toward Home, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1992, at A-i, A-12. But cf. Keith
Bradsher, U.S. Gap In World Investing, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1991, at D1
(Recent Commerce Dept. data, using new measurement techniques, shows

that 'foreign investment in the U.S. still exceeded American investments
overseas by at least $281 billion and possibly $464 billion in 1989.").
211 See 1965 Hearings, supra note 25, at 64 (statement of Treasury)
(recommending an "increase in [specific] exemption and reduced rates"
instead of repeal of the tax as applied to intangibles, in order to avoid
discouragement of investment in the United States by foreigners); see also
Ross, supra note 25, at 358 ("Congress wanted to impose some measure of
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this way, it could seek to insure that the U.S. tax does not
exceed the tax level in other likely host countries or at least in
likely residence countries assuming the U.S. situs-based tax
would be creditable.2 "
4.2.2. Conclusion
Despite the limited effectiveness of the U.S. estate tax with
respect to nonresident estates and its possible discouragement
of foreign investments in the United States, there are
arguments for retaining it if the estate tax for U.S. citizens
and residents is retained. Simple repeal of the estate tax for
foreigners would represent a voluntary relinquishment of the
revenues, however small, collected from the tax to other
countries without any expectation that those countries would
take reciprocal action. Repeal would also mean relinquishment of the additional income tax revenues that may be
generated, although of a lesser amount under the 1993 Act,
when the desire to avoid U.S. estate tax induces foreigners to
utilize a holding company. Moreover, repeal for nonresidents
but not for residents would detract somewhat from equity
between U.S. citizens and foreigners, even though retention of
the tax does not by any means yield complete equality of
treatment, and would likely be viewed by the public as clear
discrimination in favor of foreigners. Limited effectiveness
with resulting unfairness is a defect of the U.S. estate tax even
as applied to U.S. citizens. Thus, it may be inappropriate to
limit repeal to the estate tax on nonresidents.
Repeal for nonresident estates might also disrupt the
network of U.S. estate tax treaties and information exchange
thereunder, although information exchange could probably be
maintained, perhaps with additional effort on the part of the
U.S. Treasury. This might lead to: (1) excessive situs-based
taxation of U.S. citizens or residents who invest abroad or
duplicative claims of residence taxation, resulting in double
taxation; or (2) a loss in U.S. estate tax revenues from U.S.
taxation on aliens with substantial U.S. property, while recognizing that
aliens should not be subject to as high estate tax burdens as citizens."). As
discussed infra notes 352 et seq. and accompanying text, some have proposed
reducing the level of tax by limiting the tax to the element of appreciation
in property passing at death.

212 See supra notes 208, 209.
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1994]

NONRESIDENT ALIEN TAXATION

citizens or residents investing abroad due to increased foreign
death tax credits or lack of information required by the IRS for
enforcement.
These arguments should be sufficient to convince Congress
to retain the tax unless the U.S. estate tax is repealed for U.S.
citizens and residents as well. However, if the tax is to be
retained, its limitations should be taken into account in the
tax's design.
4.3. Design Of An Imperfect Tax
If the U.S. estate tax on nonresidents is to be retained
despite its limited effectiveness, at what level and upon what
base should the tax be imposed? In order to retain a
meaningful role for the estate tax on nonresidents, the base
should not be narrowed further, and uncertainties regarding
application of the tax, which contribute to evasion, should be
resolved."' In addition, enforcement mechanisms should be
strengthened.
At the same time, the United States should not be
overzealous in its application of this necessarily imperfect tax.
In a domestic context, Congress has been very generous in
exempting the small and medium-sized estate (far too
generous, one might argue).21 To deny this generosity to
foreigners undercuts the U.S. claim that it seeks equal
treatment of foreigners and U.S. citizens. Of course, strict
equality is an elusive goal in light of the differing
considerations relevant to the taxation of nonresident
decedents. Fairness to nonresident aliens would seem to
require that where strict equality is unattainable, Congress
should not choose the alternative more burdensome to
nonresident aliens. A heavy-handed approach tends to
undermine international acceptance of the estate tax on
foreigners, which is an important justification for its retention.

213

See Bell & Shoemaker, TAMRA, supra note 1, at 81-82 (treatment of
partnership
interest); supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
1 14
See supra note 151; infra notes 324-25.
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4.3.1. Tax Base
a. Partnership Interests
If the estate tax on nonresidents is to be retained despite
its imperfections, then uncertainties and inconsistencies in the
definition of the tax base should be resolved. Congress should
establish clear rules 15 for- determining the situs of a
partnership interest for estate tax purposes and for classifying
a partnership interest for gift tax purposes.2 16 As noted
above, uncertainty on this issue has probably contributed to
aggressive reporting positions taken by taxpayers, which serve
to anger more responsible taxpayers. 1 7 Since the statute is
silent on this issue, and given that it goes to the heart of the
current estate tax regime for foreigners, Congress should
resolve the uncertainty.
A major criticism of the current estate tax treatment of
foreigners is that the application of the tax is very narrow in
light of the potential for avoidance by use of a.foreign holding
company. As noted, this loophole must be tolerated because a
look-through rule for foreign holding companies would present
difficulties involving enforcement and international
acceptance. In contrast, there is no similar justification for
allowing U.S. real estate or business assets held in a
partnership to escape U.S. estate or gift taxation. Therefore,
a look-through rule218 for partnership interests should be
adopted for estate and gift tax purposes. 1
Enforcement of the estate tax or even the gift tax under a
look-through rule for partnerships should not be difficult in

15

Cf Bell & Shoemaker, TAMRA, supranote 1, at 81 (The look-through

rule should be "incorporated in a clear pronouncement by the IRS.").
216 For a discussion of the uncertainty under the current law, see supra
notes 10, 12-13 and accompanying text.
217

See supra notes 93, 94 and 117.

Cf Rev. Rul. 91-32, 1991-1 C.B. 107, supra note 99 (adopting such a
rule for income taxation of dispositions of partnership interests).
21' See Bell & Shoemaker, ForeignInvestment, supra note 6, at 268-69
(proposing look-through rule be adopted with respect to partnerships for
estate tax purposes); FLORIDA BAR, supra note 12, at 912, 916 (proposing
that "property held by partnership, trust, or estate" be "treated as held
proportionately by its partners or beneficiaries" for gift or estate tax
purposes); see also Bell & Shoemaker, TAMRA, supra note 1, at 81 (stating
that "[firom a policy standpoint," a look-through rule should be used).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss4/1
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the case of a partnership engaged in a U.S. business or holding
U.S. real estate. Such a partnership would already be
required to identify foreign partners for income tax purposes
and to withhold income tax.2 20
As suggested by one
commentator, the partnership could also be required to assist

in withholding the estate or gift tax whenever a donee or
beneficiary was to be admitted as a new partner.22 1 Another
possible enforcement technique for the estate tax would be to
deny the benefits of the I.R.C. section 754 election absent an
IRS waiver.
Congressional action classifying a partnership interest
under a look-through approach would not conflict with wellestablished international rules.2 " For example, the OECD
Commentary on its Model Convention notes the possibility of
divergent characterizations of a partnership interest and
suggests as one solution a treaty provision reserving to the

nondomiciliary state "a right to tax the partnership interest to
, See supra notes 105, 197.
2 See Bell & Shoemaker, TAMRA, supra note 1, at 82. They note the
withholding rules for income tax owed by a nonresident alien partner, under
I.R.C. §§ 1441, 1445, and 1446, and argue that "[i]t would certainly be
possible to collect U.S. estate taxes through some mechanism since the
partnership... will have assets within the United States." Id.; see also Bell
& Shoemaker, ForeignInvestment, supra note 6, at 269.
"' Among the pre-1970 treaties, only that with Australia contains an
explicit situs rule for partnerships (i.e., the place where the partnership
business is carried on). Troxell, supra note 14, at A-30; Convention For the
Avoidance of Double Taxation, U.S.-Austl., supranote 134, art. 3, para. 1(g),
at 96. Among the post-1970 treaties, the treaty with Germany explicitly
adopts a look-through approach. See Troxell, supra note 14, at A-29;
Convention For the Avoidance of Double Taxation, U.S.-F.R.G., supra note
15, art. 8, at 10; see also Bell & Shoemaker, ForeignInvestment, supra note
6, at 268 n.40. The treaties with France and the Netherlands provide only
that U.S. taxation of a partnership interest is permitted to the extent that
the partnership is engaged in a U.S. trade or business through a U.S.
permanent establishment. See Convention For the Avoidance of Double
Taxation, July 15, 1969, U.S.-Neth., supra note 194, art. 7, at 255;
Convention For the Avoidance of Double Taxation, U.S.-Fr., supra note 15,
art. 6, at 1944. The treaties with Sweden and Austria leave the
classification of a partnership interest to the law of the nondomicilary state,
and [t]he U.K. and Danish treaty are silent." See Troxell, supra note 14,
at A-29 n.305; Convention For the Avoidance of Double Taxation, June 13,
1983, U.S.-Swed., art. 7, T.I.A.S. No. 10,826, at 10; Convention For the
Avoidance of Double Taxation, U.S.-Aus., supra note 15, art. 7, para. 2, at
3609; see also MODEL ESTATE AND GIFT TAX TREATY OF NOVEMBER 20, 1980,
art. 7 (Treas. Dep't 1980), reprintedin 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 1 209 (similar
to Swedish provision).
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the extent that" the underlying assets would be taxable under
the Model treaty.2
Adoption of a look-through rule for partnerships would not
be merely an empty gesture. Currently, many foreigners may
utilize a partnership to own U.S. real estate or business assets
without their estates filing a U.S. estate tax return upon
death. This practice would be discontinued. By eliminating
the option of obtaining the income tax treatment associated
with a partnership (i.e., pass-through treatment with a
stepped-up basis) while also avoiding the estate tax, some
revenue would likely be raised.'"
b. Stock In U.S. Corporations
A more difficult question is the proper treatment of stock
in a U.S. corporation. On nonresident estate tax returns filed
for 1986, corporate stocks and bonds represented an average
of 45% of the U.S. gross estate, or a total of about $27.8
million.2"
A thoughtful study of the estate taxation of
nonresidents prepared by the Florida Bar Tax Section in 1988
proposed that stock in a U.S. corporation and other intangibles
be excluded from the scope of the estate tax on nonresidents.
One rationale was that "the estate tax should not foster [the
use of foreign holding companies] unnecessarily." A further
justification226was to bring the gift and estate tax rules into
conformity.
OECD MODEL, supranote 135, at 71; see also id. at 68-70.
224 By contrast, if Congress were to provide clearly that a partnership
interest was an intangible with its situs at the residence of the partner,
many foreigners, more than under current law, would likely take advantage
of this opportunity, thereby decreasing revenues, although to a lesser extent
under the 1993 Act. This new advantage associated with a partnership
might put even greater pressure on the issue of entity classification. See
Troxell, supra note 14, at A-29. Troxell suggests that in applying treaty
provisions that arguably exempt from U.S. tax an interest in non-business
U.S. real estate if held through a partnership, "[t]he existence of a
partnership might be denied either on grounds of sham or failure to engage
in an active business." Id.
25
See Long, supra note 29, at 53, 58. The average percentage was only
223

36% where the U.S. gross estate was in the range of $60,000 to $100,000,

but was 56% where the U.S. gross estate was over $1 million. Id. It was
not indicated whether the corporate stocks and bonds constituted solely
portfolio investments.
226 See FLORIDA BAR, supra note 12, at 911-12. The report proposes a
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss4/1
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The strongest case for exemption would be one for passive
investors in publicly-traded U.S. corporations. As noted above,
the use of a foreign holding company is apparently simple and
results in no adverse income tax consequences so that no quid
pro quo is extracted for avoidance of the U.S. estate tax.2 27
Repeal of the tax would not prevent the United States from
collecting information about the stock to share with the
country of residence; such information would be obtained in
connection with income tax withholding on the dividends. One
favorable side-effect of repeal might be that, for foreigners
making small U.S. investments, U.S. estate tax considerations
would no longer favor investing in mutual funds organized as
foreign entities over investing in mutual funds not catering
specifically to foreigners."
Paradoxically, the ease of
avoiding the tax on such stock investments, and thus the lack
of discouragement to making such investments, reduces the
urgency of providing a statutory exemption.
A similar argument could be made for allowing an
exemption from the estate tax for a foreign investor with a
major stake of 10% or more in a U.S. corporation (even though
investing in U.S. real estate or business assets). The seven
post-1970 estate tax treaties already exempt such stock from
the U.S. estate tax.2 2
Other investors can easily avoid the
tax by placing the stock in a foreign holding company. Since
the corporate form is being used in any event, interposition of
a foreign holding company does not increase the income tax
burdens associated with the investment.
However, it would not seem wise for Congress to grant a
statutory exemption for this case. The granting of such an
estate tax exemption might be followed by calls for repeal of
"comprehensive revision" of the U.S. estate and gift taxation of nonresident
aliens. I& at 910. It "stresses ease of administration, simplification of the
tax, and fairness to nondomiciled aliens through treatment more like that
of U.S. persons." Id. at 912.
" See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text. It is not clear why
such a large percentage of the gross U.S. estate shown on 1986 returns
consisted of corporate stock and bonds. See supra notes 109, 169 and
accompanying text.

"2" See supra note 90 and accompanying text. For the U.S. income tax
treatment of a foreigner's investment in a qualified domestic regulated
investment company, see Rev. Rul. 69-235, 1969-1 C.B. 190; Rev. Rul. 69244, 1969-1 C.B. 215.
"" See supra notes 14, 38 and accompanying text.
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the rule preventing nonresident aliens from being shareholders
in S corporations, 3 0 and Congress might find it difficult at
that point to reinstate the estate tax with respect to S
corporation stock. To allow a combination of S corporation
treatment and the U.S. estate tax exemption would make
avoidance of the U.S. estate tax much less burdensome from a
U.S. income tax standpoint for some investors, and would
likely reduce revenues for the federal Treasury.
There would seem to be no reason for the United States to
make this concession unilaterally. Enforcement of estate or
gift taxes with respect to stock in an S corporation would be
feasible just as in the case of a partnership. While the seven
more recent U.S. estate tax treaties exempt stock from situsbased taxation, it is not unlikely that the U.S. Treasury could
negotiate a provision in an estate tax treaty adopting a lookthrough approach for an S corporation or partnership. If the
United States were to instead agree to exempt S corporation
stock from the estate tax by treaty, it could at least obtain
reciprocals concessions with respect to estate taxation of U.S.
citizens. 21

4.3.2. Improving Compliance
A number of approaches could be used to reduce illegal

avoidance of U.S. estate taxation by foreigners. 32 Voluntary
compliance would be enhanced if uncertainties in the transfer
taxation of foreigners were resolved (e.g., by greater IRS

guidance). In particular, adoption of look-through treatment
for partnership interests and the imposition of a withholding
requirement upon partnerships with respect to donative
transfers of partnership interests by nonresident aliens would
improve compliance."'

20

In 1990, the Chairman of the Florida Bar Tax Section proposed that

a nonresident alien be allowed "to make a direct investment in the United

States through an otherwise qualified S corporation" without subjection to
U.S. estate tax. 1990 Hearings,supra note 1, at 66 (Hudson testimony).
231 See generally A.L.I. TREATIES, supra note 114, at 13 (noting that "a
country may be prepared to modify its domestic law rules only when
satisfied that it is (and its taxpayers are) deriving appropriate reciprocal
concessions from the foreign country concerned").
232 See supra note 129.
" See Bell & Shoemaker, TAMRA, supra note 1, at 81-82.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss4/1
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Congress might prevent some tax evasion by conditioning
the use of a date-of-death basis under I.R.C. section 1014 (or
an I.R.C. section 754 election) upon a showing- that any
U.S. estate tax owed by a nonresident estate has been
paid." 5 In addition, perhaps compliance could be enhanced
by more vigorous enforcement of penalties against a U.S.
corporation that authorized a transfer of its own stock held by
a nonresident alien decedent without first obtaining a transfer
certificate.3 6
Finally, the IRS might devote greater resources to auditing
and enforcing the U.S. estate tax liability of foreigners 3 7
(e.g., by spending more time reviewing probate records or
investigating situations where a stepped-up basis is claimed by
an heir). However, it is not clear that the extra revenue
collected from the use of greater IRS resources would be
sufficient to justify their use. 3 8
4.3.3. MaritalDeduction

Under the 1988 Act, Congress for the first time granted the
estate and gift tax marital deduction with respect to transfers
by nonresident aliens. However, Congress simultaneously
imposed restrictions on the marital deduction allowed to any
transferor with respect to a transfer made to a noncitizen
spouse.39 There is little existing treaty relief from these

lU Alternatively, the heir might be required to make a timely notification
to the IRS that the property was inherited from a nonresident alien
decedent.
2" Cf. COMMITrEE ON TAXATION OF INT'L TRANSACTIONS, supra note 74,

at 918 (noting, as one alternative to the current income and transfer tax
rules regarding expatriates, a new provision that would provide a zero basis
for property inherited from a person who had renounced U.S. citizenship).
23 See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
' See 1990 JCT REPORT, supra note 4, at 84 (stating that some "May
suggest the devotion of more resources to enforcement of the current system
as applied to a broader base").
88
'
See FLORIDA BAR, supra note 12, at 912 (stating that "it is not
believed that increased enforcement efforts would significantly improve
collections in the area"). Instead, they suggest greater "fairness" in the law
as possibly improving compliance. Id
288 See supra notes 17-18. For criticism of these rules, as passed by the
House, and before the addition of the QDT mechanism, see Myron C.
Grauer, Xenophobia, Estate Taxes, and the Miscellaneous Revenue Act of
1988, 40 TAX NOTES 1199 (1988).
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restrictions. " ° Germany2 4 and France242 have negotiated with the United States to obtain further relief through
treaties.
These new rules deny the estate tax marital deduction for
a transfer to a noncitizen spouse unless the property passes at
death to a qualified domestic trust ("QDT"). The gift tax
marital deduction is replaced by a $100,000 annual exclusion
in the case of transfers made to a noncitizen spouse.24
Moreover, if there is a noncitizen surviving spouse, jointly
owned property2 " not passing to a QDT is included in its
entirety in the gross estate of the spouse first to die, except to
the extent of the contribution shown to be made by the

240 See Troxell, supra note 14, at A-17; McCall, supra note 17, at 753-54
(relief under treaties with West Germany, Sweden and France); Convention
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, U.S-Swed., supra note 222, art. 8,
para. 8; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, U.S.-F.R.G.,
supra note 15, art. 10, para. 4; Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation, U.S.-Fr., supra note 15, art. 11, para. 2, at 1951. See Omnibus
Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7815(d)(14), 103 Stat.
2414, 2418 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1433-35 (1989)
[hereinafter 1989 HOUSE REPORT]; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, 101st Cong.,
1st. Sess. 670 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 CONFERENCE REPORT].
241 See Fogarasi, supranote 14, at 508; Letter from Kenneth W. Gideon,
Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), to Kenneth Dam, Vice President, IBM
Corp. (Aug. 24, 1990), 90 TNI 37-49, Sept. 12, 1990, available in LEXIS,
Taxana Library, TNI File; John Turro, German ParliamentRatifies Treaty
with U.S., 49 TAX NOTES 387 (1990); John Turro, Germans Trying To Raise
Ante On Treaty, Treasury Complains, 50 TAX NOTES 1193 (1991); MaryGael
Timberlake, U.S. v. Germany: Estate Taxes Delay Income Tax Treaty, 91
TNI 15-2, Apr. 10, 1991, available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNI File;
John Turro, U.S., German Negotiators Resolve Tax Treaty, Estate
Difficulties, 23 HIGHLIGHTS & DOCUMENTS 747 (1991) ("[N]egotiators ...
worked out German concerns about U.S. marital deduction rules.").
2
" See Fogarasi, supranote 14, at 508; F.R. Nagle, Official Hopeful U.S.France Treaty Disagreements Can Be Resolved, 23 HIGHLIGHTS &
DOCUMENTS 640 (1991); John Turro, France,Italy Distressed by TAMRA
Changes to MaritalDeduction, 23 HIGHLIGHTS & DOCUMENTS 603 (1991).
243 See I.R.C. § 2523(a), (i)(2); see also Jackel, supra note 17, at 113.
2
" In addition, creation of a joint tenancy in personal property with a
noncitizen donee spouse may be considered to involve a gift. See Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(i)-2, 58 Fed. Reg. 321 (1993); Notice of Rulemaking,
supra note 17, at 39; Jackel, supra note 17, at 111-12; see also Plaine &
Siegler, supra note 18, at 383-90 (noting ambiguities in statute and
legislative history); id. at 436-37 (chart). If the donor is a nonresident alien,
only U.S. situs tangible property is potentially subject to gift tax. For
treatment of joint tenancy in real property, see Gilberti I, supra note 92,
and Gilberti II, supra note 92.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss4/1

1994]

NONRESIDENT ALIEN TAXATION

surviving spouse.2'

Distributions of corpus from the QDT to the surviving
spouse and the value of the property remaining in the QDT
when the surviving spouse dies are subject to U.S. estate
taxation at rates determined as if the amounts were includible
in the transferor spouse's estate.""
To avoid double
taxation, the estate tax liability so incurred with respect to the

QDT, or the estate tax liability incurred upon the death of the
first spouse to die where no QDT is created, is creditable
against the estate tax liability incurred upon the inclusion of
the same property in the estate of the surviving spouse.2 4 7
a. Rationale For Restrictions
The rationale for these restrictions was Congress' concern
that the marital deduction should not be a vehicle for
permanent tax avoidance. Congress considered the proper role
of the deduction as "defer[ring] the estate tax on the
24 See I.R.C. § 2056(d)(1XB), which is an exception to the general rule
that only one-half of the jointly-held property held by a married couple is
included in the estate of the first to die. See also I.R.C. § 2040(a)-(b); Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2056A-8(a)(1), 58 Fed. Reg. 318 (1993); Notice of
Rulemaking, supra note 17, at 38; Jackel, supra note 17, at 111 & n.13;
Goldberg, supra note 7, at 54-55; William P. Streng, Estate Planning, 11l1th TAx MGMT. (BNA), at A-91 & n.844. This rule makes it necessary for
"the decedent's executor to trace the consideration provided by each spouse."
Plaine & Siegler, supranote 18, at 337-38; see also id. at 405-06; U.S. Estate
Taxation of Non-Resident Alien Staff of the World Bank and Other
International Organizations, Memorandum prepared by World Bank,
introduced into Congressional Record by Senator Moynihan (Aug. 2, 1991),
91 TNI 34-35, Aug. 21, 1991, availablein LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNI File
[hereinafter World Bank Memo] (tracingrule "places an unrealistic premium
on record-keeping for the ordinary household").
24 I.R.C. § 2056A(b)(1),(2),(3XA),(7).
247 I.R.C. §§ 2056(d)(3), 2013. See Jackel, supra note 17, at 115; Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2056A-7, 58 Fed. Reg. 318 (1993); Notice of Rulemaking,
supra note 17, at 40-41. The statutory langauge may give rise to a technical
argument that the credit is unavailable if the spouse dying first is a
nonresident alien. See Goldberg, supra note 7, at 53 & n. 113; I.R.C.
§§ 2056(aXfirst clause), 2106(aXfirst clause), 2106(a)(3). But this argument
is unconvincing. See Goldberg, supra note 7, at 53 (concluding that "[tihere
does not.., appear to be any reason for depriving such spouses of a credit
and it may, therefore, be possible that the reference to section 2056(a)
includes a reference to section [sic] 2016(aX3)"); Letter from Susan F. Klein
to Monte Jackel, Treasury Dept., (Nov. 2, 1993), 93 TNI 232-6, Dec. 3, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNI File (suggesting that final
regulations make availability of credit clear).
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assumption that the deductible property if not consumed will
ultimately be includible in the surviving spouse's estate."2 '8
If the surviving spouse is not a citizen, this assumption would
often not be correct "since to avoid taxation on the worldwide
estate, the spouse need only give up U.S. residence. " "'
Congress' concern is perhaps most pertinent in the case of
a U.S. citizen transferring property to a resident alien or
nonresident alien spouse. However, the concern is also
relevant where both spouses are nonresident aliens (even
though the marital transfer does not change the nature of the
jurisdiction asserted over the marital property).
If a
nonresident alien decedent were granted the marital deduction
without the QDT limitation, nonresident alien couples could
adopt a strategy of avoiding the U.S. estate tax by holding U.S.
assets until immediately after the first spouse's death; the
surviving spouse could then sell the asset with a new date-ofdeath basis and replace it with a foreign-situs asset. This
strategy for avoiding the U.S. estate tax, as well as the U.S.
income tax on appreciation, would break down only in the rare
case where both spouses died in close proximity (e.g., together
in an accident).
b. Burdens Of The QDT Mechanism
Ostensibly, the QDT regime is merely a mechanism to
insure that the deferral allowed by the marital deduction in a
domestic context does not become an exemption in the case of
an alien surviving spouse. However, this mechanism subjects
the couple to a significant burden not experienced where the
survivor is a citizen.250 This burden, viewed realistically,
has a greater impact on alien decedents than on U.S. citizen
decedents because the former group is much more likely than
the latter to be married to alien spouses. Complaints about

2
248

1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 592.
Id The $100,000 annual gift tax exclusion for transfers to an alien

spouse was intended "to avoid imposing a gift tax upon common financial

arrangements between spouses." Id.
2 ' See, eg., Letter from Richard W. Skillman to Peter Barnes,
Acting
Deputy International Tax Counsel (July 16, 1990), reprinted in 18
HIGHLIGHTS &DOCuMENTS 1174 (July 31, 1990) [hereinafter Skillman]. He
describes the "inequities and practical problems.., created for families of
relatively modest wealth." Id.
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this burden were recently voiced by the World Bank on behalf
of its employees.25
First, there is the inconvenience and expense of setting up
and maintaining the QDT structure, including fees for
sophisticated tax advice and for the trustee.!5" This may be
of particular concern when the amount of assets passing
through the QDT is small. 5" In many cases, this may be an
inconvenient form of ownership for property such as a personal
residence,"
furniture, 55 or a family business to be
managed by the surviving spouse."' While the alien spouse
251 See Letter from Lewis T. Preston, The World Bank, to Nicholas F.
Brady, Secretary of the Treasury (Dec. 18, 1991), 92 TNI 3-33, Jan. 15,
1992, available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNI File (seeking relief from
I.R.C. § 2056(d) and the new estate tax rates for nonresidents); see also
World Bank Memo, supra note 245.
25' See Skillman, supra note 250, at 1175 (stating that "for estates of
moderate size, the administrative burdens and costs ... would be
significant"). He argues that a "friend or relative" would likely not agree to
be trustee, and that "ongoing professional assistance would be needed to
determine the tax liability of the trust." Id- Under the proposed
regulations, if the assets in the QDT exceed $2 million, at least one U.S.
trustee must be a bank or the U.S. trustee must provide a bond in an
amount equal to at least 65% of the assets. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056A2(d)(1)(i), 58 Fed. Reg. 312 (1993). If the assets do not exceed $2 million,
the same requirement must be met or the trust document must require that
35% or less of the trust assets consist of foreign real estate. Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 20.2056A-2(d)(lXii), 58 Fed. Reg. 312 (1993).
" See supra note 252; World Bank Memo, supra note 245 (stating that
QDT's "are cumbersome and expensive for the typical estate of a World
Bank staff member, where the principal assets are illiquid, i.e., the family
residence and the pension").
"" See Bissell, supranote 18, at 81 (stating that "there may be practical
constraints against placing property such as the family home into a QDT").
He suggests the possible loss of benefits under I.R.C. §§ 1034 or 121. See
id.; see also Plaine & Siegler, supra note 18, at 404 (noting that "the portion
of the home held in the [QDT] will have" a new basis at death); Skillman,
supranote 250, at 1175 (lender might restrict transfer). This concern would
be less likely to be relevant if the survivor was a nondomiciliary of the
United States.
See Skillman, supra note 250, at 1175 (arguing that "[tiangible
personal property, such as cars and furniture and other items to be used by
the surviving spouse during her lifetime, presumably could not be
transferred to a QDT").
'" See Plane & Siegler, supra note 18, at 401 ("real estate and business
interests that the noncitizen spouse may wish to retain control over rather
than having to share control with the United States trustee, should be
transferred" outside the QDT); id. at 360 (possibility that if "active business"
is "significant portion of the QDT," classification as association may result).
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can be a trustee of the QDT, there must also be a U.S. citizen
or U.S. corporation as trustee who has the right to withhold
estate tax from any distribution of the corpus."' Assets in
a QDT would not meet a surviving spouse's need for liquid
assets at his immediate disposal."'
Second, the QDT structure may have the effect of
broadening the base of the estate tax. In a fully domestic
context, assets passing under the marital deduction including
appreciation after the death of the first to die will permanently
escape estate taxation to the extent that they are consumed by
the surviving spouse or transferred by gift pursuant to the
$10,000 annual per donee exclusion. 59 By contrast, when
assets are placed in a QDT, withdrawal of the principal
including capital gains2 " for consumption or gifts by the
surviving spouse will trigger the estate tax thereon unless the
withdrawal qualifies for an exemption as a distribution "on
account of hardship."' 1
The effect of the QDT mechanism is particularly harsh for
an estate that is relatively small (taking into account
worldwide assets), where perhaps all or a large part of the

2"7 See I.R.C. § 2056A(a); Adams, supra note 18, at 760 (1989 and 1990
changes insured that surviving spouse "may serve as a co-trustee").
25 See Skillman, supra note 250, at 1175. Skillman states that "the

surviving spouse would want to keep a moderate amount of liquid assets...

under her direct control without intervention of a QDT." Ik
2

" See 1988 HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 592-93. Bissell points out
that a U.S. citizen is "free to 'waste' the principal" on "vacations, day-to-day

living expenses... clothing" or to use it for excludable gifts. Bissell, supra
note 18, at 81; see also Letter from Professor Myron C. Grauer to
Congressman Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman, House Ways and Means
Commmittee, (May 31, 1989), reprinted in 43 TAX NOTES 1538 (1989)
[hereinafter Grauer 1989 Letter] (Estate tax is avoided by spending
principal, except on a "yacht" or other property that will remain in the
estate.).
26 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056A-5(c)(2), 58 Fed. Reg. 316-17 (1993);
1989 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 240, at 1432. Thus, one commentator
suggests that if property in a QDT is expected to appreciate greatly, it might
be worthwhile to withdraw it from the QDT, sell it after it appreciates, and
then "waste" the gain. Bissell, supra note 18, at 84.
261 I.R.C. § 2056A(b)(3)(B). Under proposed regulations, this must be "in
response to an immediate and substantial financial need relating to the
spouse's health, maintenance or support" and does not include cases where
"the amount distributed may be obtained from other sources that are
reasonably available to the surviving spouse." Prop. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056A5(c)(1), 58 Fed. Reg. 316 (1993).
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inheritance received by the surviving spouse may be consumed
during his lifetime.262
One specific example of this
harshness is where a joint and survivor annuity acquired, for
example, as a pension,2 by the first to die is placed in a
QDT or treated itself as a QDT,2 and the annual payments
are made available to the surviving spouse. In that case, each
annuity payment will be treated as made from the corpus to
the extent of the present value of the annuity as of the date of
death, divided by the expected annuity term."' Thus, a
large part of each annuity payment may be subject to the
estate tax in addition to any income tax that may be
owing. 2 By contrast, if the surviving spouse is a citizen, a
2

'

See Plaine & Siegler, supra note 18, at 369. They argue that the
limitation of the exemption for principal distributions to "hardship" "is
clearly unfair to [those] of moderate wealth who are more likely to have to
invade trust corpus for their support than a wealthy noncitizen surviving
spouse whose larger income stream will decrease or eliminate the need for
corpus distributions." Id.; see also Grauer 1989 Letter, supra note 259, at
1538. He states that the QDT "provides equity... only where the income
generated by the QDT property is sufficient to satisfy all of that spouse's
wants and needs; i.e., where an exceedingly wealthy family is involved." Id.
u Apparently, the situs of such retirement benefits is determined under
the rules for debt obligations under I.R.C. § 2104(c). See Goldberg, supra
note 7, at 38 (indicating that survivorship rights under pension and profit
sharing plans would be includible under the debt obligation rule unless the
services were performed abroad); Troxell, supranote 14, at A-26 (indicating
that if a nonresident alien earns a pension from work in the United States,
joint and survivor benefits would be taxable to the alien spouse unless
placed in QDT).
2
" See I.R.C. § 2056A(e) (authorizing regulations treating an annuity as
a QDT); 1989 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 240, at 670; Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 20.2056A-4(c)(1), 58 Fed. Reg. 314 (1993) (applies where annuity
payments are not assignable to the QDT). The surviving spouse must agree
either (1) to pay estate tax on the corpus portion of any annuity payments
received, or (2) to roll over such portion into a QDT. See Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2056A-4(c)(2)-(3), 58 Fed. Reg. 314 (1993).
2" See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056A-4(c)(4),(d) ex.(4), 58 Fed. Reg. 314,
316 (1993). The Ways and Means Committee stated its expectation that,
under the Treasury regulations defining the term "income" (which are
authorized by I.R.C. § 2056A(cX2)), "payments under an annuity would be
treated as corpus to the extent of the value of the annuity when acquired by
the QDT." 1989 HoUSE REPORT, supra note 240, at 1432, cited in Plaine &
Siegler, supra note 18, at 369.
2
" See Plaine & Siegler, supra note 18, at 370 (suggesting that "there
will be very little left for the surviving spouse"); Skillman, supra note 250,
at 1175; see also Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2056A-4(cX3Xv), 20.2056A5(c)(3Xiv), 58 Fed. Reg. 314, 317 (1993) (where spouse avoids deferred tax
by "rolling over" corpus payments into QDT, amounts can be withdrawn tax-
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joint and survivor annuity would often entirely escape an
estate tax.2
Third, under the QDT regime, the tax imposed upon
principal distributions from the QDT occurs earlier than would
be the case if the surviving spouse were a citizen. 2 " In the
latter case, the marital property would not be subject to a
transfer tax until either the death .of the surviving spouse or
an earlier gift outside the annual $10,000 exclusion.
Fourth, the graduated rate brackets and the unified credit,
(only $13,000 absent liberalization by a treaty) of a surviving
nonresident alien spouse will be wasted except to the extent
that he holds, at death, U.S.-situs property not passing
through the QDT.2 ' This is because the property passing
through the QDT will eventually be taxed as if it were
originally included in the estate of the first to die.170 A
similar waste of benefits occurs with a U.S. citizen couple if
the first spouse to die owns all the property and leaves it
entirely to the surviving spouse 27 ' rather than, for example,
creating a bypass trust for part of the estate."72 Whether or
not the surviving spouse is an alien, the waste of benefits

free from QDT to pay income tax on "rolled over" amounts).
" The marital deduction would provide protection on the death of the
first spouse. The annuity would likely be "wasted" before the death of the
survivor. See Plaine & Siegler, supra note 18, at 370; Skillman, supra note
250, at 1175.
268 See Adams, supranote 18, at 769 (noting "acceleration" and also that
the credit allowed pursuant to I.R.C. §§ 2056(d)(3) and 2013 is not
refundable); Grauer 1989 Letter, supra note 259, at 1540 (suggesting the
possibility that I.R.C. § 2013 credit should be enhanced with interest and be
made refundable); see also Grauer, supra note 239, at 1201.
26 See Plaine & Siegler, supra note 18, at 379, 398 n.228.
In a
community property state, however, the surviving spouse would "own onehalf of the community property assets." Id.; see also Adams, supra note 18,
at 757; Bernard L. Karr, New PlanningRequiredfor Surviving Spouses Who
Are Not U.S. Citizens, 70 J. TAX'N 140, 142 (1989); Grauer 1989 Letter,
supra note 259, at 1540. Grauer argues that treatment of QDT distributions
as if included in the estate of the first to die "[i]n many cases... unfairly
generates revenue by removing from the transferee surviving spouse the
benefits of his or her unified credit and fresh start up the tax brackets." Id.
270 See I.R.C. § 2056A(b)(1),(2),(3)(A),(7).
271 See Bissell, supra note 18, at 83. He concludes that the "rules for
noncitizens in theory cannot be said to be discriminatory." Id. But see
Grauer 1989 Letter, supra note 259, at 1540, discussed at supra note 269.
272 See, e.g. Bissell, supra note 18, at 83. However, this planning is
disrupted if the spouse without assets dies first.
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could be avoided by inter vivos gifts that equalize the spouses'
ownership of property potentially subject to the estate tax, for
example, U.S.-situs property in the case of a nonresident alien
couple." " However, in the case of a nonresident alien
couple, these equalizing gifts, if of tangibleU.S.-situs property,
would be subject to the gift tax on the amount in excess of the
$100,000 annual exclusion for marital gifts." 4 Gift-splitting,
which is another means of using the unified credit and low
brackets of a spouse not owning a sufficient amount of his own
property, is unavailable where either spouse is a nonresident
alien.""
Moreover, it is not clear that the statutory purpose
necessitates taxation of the QDT property at the rates of the
first to die, 7 particularly in the case where the first spouse
to die is a nonresident alien. In a case where the first to die
is a U.S. citizen or resident, taxation of QDT property as
though it were includible in the estate of the first to die is
perhaps justifiable under the theory of preserving the
application of progressive rates to the worldwide estate. But
if the first spouse to die is a nonresident alien, his estate is
limited to his U.S-situs assets, as may also be the estate of the
surviving spouse.
c. Conclusion
The QDT device should be retained because it is a
reasonable way to achieve Congress' goal of insuring that
assets passing to an alien surviving spouse under the marital
deduction do not also escape U.S. estate taxation upon transfer
at the surviving spouse's death. 77 However, care should be
2 8

" See Karr, supra note 269, at 142; Plaine & Siegler, supra note 18, at

398.

Moreover, there may be
74 See Bissell, supra note 18, at 83.
"uncertainty" regarding the gift tax consequences of severing a joint
tenancy. See Plaine & Siegler, supra note 18, at 399 (concluding that
"careful planning" is needed).
275 See I.R.C. § 2513(a); Plaine & Siegler, supra note 18, at 400.
271 See Plaine & Siegler, supra note 18, at 379 (concluding that the

legislative goal is merely to insure that U.S. tax jurisdiction is not avoided);
Grauer 1989 Letter, supra note 259, at 1540 (proposing change); see also
Adams, supranote 18, at 773 (recommending change).
27 Alternatively, Congress could impose a tax upon the surviving spouse
if and when giving up residence status, or, if already a nonresident, when
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taken to minimize the added burdens"' s imposed upon alien
spouses by this mechanism.
To be comparable with the treatment of a surviving citizen
spouse,,"9 the QDT mechanism should allow an exemption
for principal distributions that would permit a reasonable
amount of consumption. Thus, for example, Congress should
adopt the 1989 House bill exempting principal distributions up
to an annual amount of $100,000,2" reduced by the amount
of income distributions, and increased by the amount paid for
the surviving spouse's medical care."' To the same end, a

disposing of U.S.-situs assets or shifting their situs. See Adams, supra note
18, at 772-73. He suggests that I.R.C. § 2107 could be expanded to reach
the case "of a resident noncitizen surviving spouse leaving the United
States" with respect to "assets for which the surviving spouse claimed the
marital deduction and which are still in existence when the spouse leaves
the United States." I& at 772; Grauer, supra note 239, at 1201 (proposing
extension of I.R.C. § 2107 "to impose the same tax in the event of a taxmotivated loss of permanent resident status"); see also COMMITTEE ON
TAXATION OF INT'L TRANSACTIONS, supra note 74, at 924-25. The Committee
proposed a comprehensive set of income tax rules "taxing assets when they
went out of residence or doing business jurisdiction, and correspondingly
giving a fair market value basis when assets come into residence or doing
business jurisdiction." Id. at 925. The proposal would also provide "an
exemption," for estate and gift tax purposes, "for the amount of assets
brought into residence jurisdiction." Id. at 925. This is "a logical corollary"
of I.R.C. § 2056(d). See id. at 924.
278 However, in some cases, the QDT rules may be more generous than
the rules applied by a trading partner of the United States to U.S. citizens.
See Boidman III, supra note 186, at 824 (stating that U.S. resident is "not
eligible for a general 'spousal rollover,'" with respect to Canadian tax on
deemed disposition at death); id. at 827 (stating that Canada should
consider a treaty provision "to equalize an advantage now enjoyed by
Canadian investors under the QDT rules in the U[nited] S[tates]").
278 A further proposal has been made that any credit allowed the estate
of the surviving spouse for estate tax imposed upon the marital transfer
property in the estate of the first to die (or deemed to be so imposed under
the QDT rules) be enhanced with interest and be made refundable. See
Grauer 1989 Letter, supra note 259, at 1540; see also Grauer, supra note
239, at 1201. This proposal, however, appears to be directed only at a
surviving spouse who is a U.S. resident at the time of death (so that there
would be assurance that assets received from the other spouse were not
removed from the U.S. taxing jurisdiction). Id.
2' In the case of a nonresident alien decedent, only U.S. situs assets
would need to be placed in a QDT. Thus, one could argue that in the case
of a nonresident alien decedent the $100,000 figure should be multiplied by
the percentage of the worldwide estate with a U.S. situs. However, as
discussed below, this percentage would not often be known.
21 This, however, was replaced with the more limited "hardship"
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marital deduction should be provided for qualified pension
benefits passing to an alien spouse."' 2
Further changes should be made to facilitate full utilization
of the lower rate brackets and the unified credit of each
spouse. At least if the spouse dying first is a nonresident alien
for estate tax purposes, the property remaining in the QDT
upon the survivor's death should be subjected to estate
taxation only oncel" as part of the estate of the surviving
spouse 2 " without regard to the situs of the property even
though the surviving spouse may be a nonresident alien at
death.2" In addition, gift-splitting should be allowed even
though one or both spouses are nonresident aliens, provided
that the gift deemed made by the nonowner spouse is subject

exception in conference. See Plaine & Siegler, supra note 18, at 368-69;
Adams, supra note 18, at 763-64. Adams explains that the figure of
$100,000 was chosen because this amount could have been transferred
annually by interspousal transfer if the death had not intervened; Adams
endorses the House proposal. See id. at 773; Jackel, supra note 17, at 114.
For a similar proposal, see Grauer 1989 Letter, supra note 259, at 1538-39.
Grauer proposed an exemption of "up to $75,000 of principal" paid to
support the survivor "at the level to which he or she had become
accustomed," with a phase-out "for each dollar that the transferee
(surviving) spouse's adjusted gross income exceeds $75,000 for the year of
withdrawal." Id. at 1539. This phase-out rule would seem to be impractical
in the case of a nonresident alien not required to file a U.S. income tax
return.
• See supra notes 263-67 and accompanying text.
28 Thus, no credit under I.R.C. § 2013 would be available. To insure
collection of tax where the surviving spouse holds other U.S. assets at death,
the QDT property would have to be viewed as stacked on top of any other
property in the estate of the surviving spouse. If the QDT property were
stacked on the bottom, the tax on that property might be eliminated by the
unified credit, and the tax on the remaining property would have to be
collected from the survivor's estate, rather than from the U.S. trustee of the
QDT. However, if the QDT property is stacked on top, this would make it
difficult for the U.S. trustee of the QDT to know how much estate tax was
owing on the QDT property. Thus, he should be permitted to withhold the
maximum that might be owing, with the estate of the surviving spouse
having the opportunity to claim a refund for excess tax paid by the trustee.
184 See Plaine & Siegler, supranote 18, at 379; Adams, supra note 18, at
773 (suggesting that tax imposed upon distributions from QDT, or upon
property remaining in QDT at death of survivor, should be determined as
if the property is included in the estate of surviving spouse); Grauer 1989
Letter, supra note 259, at 1540.
188 It might be more difficult to treat principal distributions from the
QDT as if includible in the estate of the surviving spouse, who would still
be alive.
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to the U.S. gift tax apart from the $10,000"s I annual
exclusion." 7 These measures would make the failure to
utilize the lower brackets and unified credits of both spouses
less likely.
It does not seem advisable, however, to repeal the provision
requiring tracing of the consideration paid for jointly held
property, despite the inconvenience associated with tracing.
Such a repeal, along with other ameliorating changes, was
proposed by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan and
Representative Sam Gibbons for application only to noncitizen
employees of an international organization." Repeal of this
tracing rule would in effect reinstate a marital deduction for
50% of the value of property transferred to a noncitizen spouse
without the necessity of utilizing a QDT. While this would
bring consistency with the treatment of community
property,2 it would represent a major retreat from the
objective underlying the QDT rules.
Finally, it might be desirable to provide an alternative to
the QDT regime, particularly for small estates, that would
more simply provide results similar to those available when
the surviving spouse is a citizen."
This is the apparent
objective of a provision of House Bill 5270, which would create
28" The unified credit is not available with respect to inter vivos gifts in
the case of a nonresident alien donor. See I.R.C. § 2505(a).
27 See FLORIDA BAR, supra note 12, at 912, 914 (proposing to "allow
nondomiciled aliens to split taxable gifts"). The proposal states that by
allowing gift-splitting and the marital deduction, "administration of the
estate and gift taxes would be improved and the area would be greatly
simplified." Id. at 912.
288 See H.R. 3087, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (introduced on July 30,
1991 by Rep. Gibbons), 91 TNI 34-42, Aug. 21, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Taxana Library, TNI File; S. 1688, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (introduced
on August 2, 1991, by Senator Moynihan, and described in World Bank
Memo, supra note 245). In the case of such employees, the bill would also:
(1) eliminate the 1988 rate increases for nonresident estates; and (2)
eliminate the QDT restriction for resident estates only.
28, See Adams, supranote 18, at 750-52; Grauer, supranote 239, at 1201;
see also Plaine & Siegler, supra note 18, at 379; see, e.g., Estate of Paul M.
Vandenhoeck v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 125 (1944) (stock in domestic
corporation held by alien decedent domiciled in France was community
property under French law and, thus, only half its value was includable in
gross estate).
2" See Skillman, supra note 250, at 1175-76 (proposing that Congress
permit a "reasonable marital deduction for estates that cannot sensibly or
effectively utilize the QDT mechanism").
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a new "marital transfer credit" for the estate of the first to die
where the surviving spouse is a noncitizen. In the case of a
resident alien's estate, the credit "effectively exempts a second
$600,000, in addition to the amount exempted by the unified
credit" ,"' in the case of a nonresident alien's estate, 92 the
credit "effectively exempts $600,000, but reduces that amount
by the amount exempted by the unified credit" (i.e., by $60,000
absent liberalization of the credit by treaty).9 '
This
provision, however, applies only ii'f"
either spouse is
employed in the United States by an international
organization. 95
Whether such an approach would be
appropriate for all nonresident estates with a noncitizen
"', Cf Grauer, supra note 239, at 1201 (proposing, as an alternative to
QDT approach, that the marital deduction be limited to the "greater of
$600,000 or one-half of the value of the property that would otherwise
qualify for the marital deduction").
In the case of a nonresident alien couple, the first spouse to die could,
for example, transfer $60,000 to her children under the protection of the
unified credit and $540,000 to her spouse under the protection of the marital
transfer credit. The property transferred to the surviving spouse could be
shielded from U.S. estate tax on the death of the surviving spouse to the
extent of the $60,000 exempted by the survivor's unified credit plus any
further amount either consumed by the survivor or removed from U.S. tax
jurisdiction before his death.
'" 1992 JCT REPORT, supra note 70, at 2784-85; see H.R. 5270, supra
note 69, § 404 (providing a "marital transfer credit"). In the case of a
decedent subject to estate tax as a nonresident, and assuming no treaty
benefits improving upon the $13,000 unified credit and no lifetime gifts, the
credit against estate tax is equal to the excess of (i) a tentative tax
computed on the sum of the marital transfer amount plus $60,000 (the
deduction equivalent of the unified credit) over (ii) a tentative tax computed
on $60,000. The marital transfer amount is the amount that would have
been allowed as a marital deduction without the QDT limitation but not to
exceed the lesser of (i) $540,000 or (ii) the excess of the taxable estate over
$60,000. See id. § 404(c), (eX2); 1992 JCT REPORT, supra note 70, at 2785.
1' If the U.S. acknowledges that the current rules impose excessive
burdens on international employees, it is hard to justify limiting the relief
to them. But see Hearingson H.R 5270 Before the Committee on Ways and
Means, 102nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1992) (statement of Fred T. Goldberg, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary, Department of the Treasury) reported at 92 TNT 149164, July 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNT File
(endorsing this provision, based upon 'the United States' special role as host
to ... international organizations"; and noting that "the Articles of
Agreement of the Bretton Woods institutions" prohibited income taxation of
the salary of international employees).
'" The credit is available only if neither spouse is a citizen or a lawful
permanent resident and the benefit of the QDT provisions is waived. See
H.R. 5270, supra note 69, § 404(b), (eXi).
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surviving spouse will be addressed in connection 2with a
discussion of the rate schedule and the unified credit. 6
4.3.4. The Rate Schedule And The Unified Credit
In the 1988 Act, Congress eliminated the separate, lower
rate schedule for estates of nonresident aliens and granted
such estates a unified credit of $13,000 (unless enlarged by
treaty) that offsets the estate tax on the first $60,000 of assets
included in the taxable estate.2 ' Congress' stated goal in
making these 1988 changes was "that nonresident aliens
should be treated more like to [sic] U.S. citizens and resident
aliens."' 8 However, some argue that the 1988 changes
moved the law further away from this goal."' It may not be
possible to achieve perfect equity between citizens and
nonresident aliens because of their differing circumstances.
Failing that, Congress should probably have erred on the side
of greater generosity to nonresident estates.
a. The Rate Schedule
If the effects of the unified credit and the marital deduction
are ignored, requiring nonresident estates to be subject to the
same rate schedule as the estates of U.S. citizens does not
appear to be inequitable; in fact, it might be considered
favorable.'" On the surface, equal treatment would seem to
'"See infra notes 337-43 and accompanying text.
'
See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
See 1988 HOUsE REPORT, supra note 2, at 594.
See Bell & Shoemaker, TAMRA, supra note 1, at 88-89 (referring to
statement in legislative history as "an exercise in unembarrassed
superficiality," because "TAMRA, in fact, places the NRA investor at a
severe disadvantage vis-a-vis his U.S. counterpart"); see also supra note 3.
See generally 1990 Hearings,supra note 1, at 61, 63-64 (Hudson testimony).
For concern on the part of Canada, see supra note 186.
'" See FLORIDA BAR, supra note 12, at 912. Prior to passage of the 1988
Act, the Florida Bar proposed that the special lower rate schedule for
nonresident estates be eliminated, but that nonresident estates be allowed

the same unified credit as estates of U.S. citizens. They noted that the
"higher rates.., would apply only to property situated in the United States
... and the allowance of a greater unified credit should serve the function
of exempting smaller estates from tax." Id- They predicted that "[s]ince

many smaller estates probably would be composed principally of U.S. real
estate, which can so easily be lawfully removed from the U.S. estate tax

base ... any revenue loss from this change would be minimal." Id. They
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require the use of the same rate schedule. However, it might
be appropriate to take into account the overall tax burden
faced by a nonresident estate on its worldwide assets. Under
this view, the United States should arrange its tax rules so
that if the U.S. rules, including the credit under I.R.C. section
2014 for foreign death taxes,30 ' were also adopted by other
countries, the overall tax burden on a nonresident estate
would not vary based upon the location of the estate's assets.
The overall tax burden would be the same as the tax burden
on the estate of a U.S. citizen with the same amount of
worldwide assets. (Equity in this sense is hereinafter referred
to as "worldwide equity.")"°
To achieve this form of equity for a nonresident estate, the
U.S. rate schedule should be applied to the worldwide
estate,303 and the tax so computed should be multiplied 3by4
the fraction of the worldwide estate that has a U.S. situs '
argue that this would be similar to the income tax and gift tax "both of
which apply the same rates to foreigners as to U.S. persons after making
modifications in the tax base." Id.
", Under I.R.C. § 2014, the credit for foreign death taxes is limited to
the average rate of tax imposed by the United States as country of
residence, after subtracting the unified credit. That is, the allowable credit
cannot exceed an amount which bears the same ratio to the tax imposed by
I.R.C. § 2001 (after allowance of the unified credit, credit for gift tax, and
credit for state death taxes) as the value of the property which is situated
within the foreign country and subjected to the foreign country's tax (and
included in the gross estate) bears to the value of the entire gross estate,
reduced by the marital deduction and deduction for charitable contributions.
I.R.C. § 2014(b).
...Cf Daniel J. Frisch, The Economics of InternationalTax Policy: Some
Old and New Approaches, 47 TAx NOTEs 581, 590 (1990) (suggesting a
"'harmonizability standard" for assessing U.S. tax rules). To apply this
standard, policymakers would "consider what would happen if both an
MNC's [multinational corporation] home country and the country hostingits
activities had a tax system exactly like the U.S." Frisch concludes that "[ilf
any of the MNC's income would be taxed twice or would escape taxation
completely, the U.S. tax system would seem to be seriously flawed as a
model for other countries to follow." Id See generally Herman B. Bouma,
The ProperConceptualFoundationfor Allocating Deductions, 19 Tax Mgmt.
Int. J. 307, 308 (1990) (context of applying section 904).
"u See Goldberg, supra note 7, at 49.
Goldberg notes that
"[notwithstanding that the federal taxable estate is limited to assets
situated in the United States, the rate is based only on those assets." He
notes that, in contrast, "New York taxes a nonresident's estate on its
proportionate share of a tax on worldwide assets, i.e., taxation with
progression." Id. at 49 and n.101.
'" For example, if a resident of country X had a worldwide estate of $1.8
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Thus, if only one third of the assets of the worldwide esta~te
are in the United States, only one third of the benefit of the
lower brackets would be available. Because the United States
has not adopted this approach (which would be impractical),
its rate schedule for nonresident estates"' can be considered
more generous than necessary to achieve equity with U.S.
citizens." e
Not only does the United States allow
nonresident estates the full benefit of the graduated rate
schedule, but it also does not begin a phase-out of the benefits
of graduated rates and the unified credit pursuant to I.R.C.
section 2001(c)(3) until U.S. assets exceed the $10 million

million, with 1/3 of the assets situated in the United States, 1/3 in country
Y, and 1/3 in country X, and if X, Y and the United States all adopted the
U.S. rules, modified as described above, the overall tax liability should be
the same as if all the assets had been situated in country X, the country of
residence. This would be achieved if each country computed a tax on the
worldwide estate of $1.8 million. The tax thereon under the U.S. rate
schedule is $690,000; the unified credit of $192,800 reduces the tax to
$498,000. Country Y and the United States as source countries with only
1/3 of the total assets would reduce the tax to 1/3 of $498,000 or $166,000.
X, the residence country, would impose the full tax of $498,000, but would
allow a credit for foreign taxes of $166,000 x 2, or $332,000; thus the net
liability to X would be $166,000. The credit of $332,000 would be the same
as the maximum amount permitted under the rules of I.R.C. § 2014. See
supra note 301. The overall tax liability would be $498,000.
'" Under the income tax, the difficulty of determining worldwide income
is similarly avoided by disregarding the possible existence of foreign-source
noneffectively connected income (or U.S. source noneffectively connected
income taxed under I.R.C. § 871) in the application of the rate schedule to
effectively connected income. Thus, the effectively connected income of a
nonresident alien is allowed the full benefit of the lower brackets of the rate
schedule for citizens and residents. See A.L.I., supra note 87, at 13
(defending this approach). However, only one personal exemption is
generally permitted, the standard deduction is denied, and itemized
deductions are limited to deductions connected with effectively connected
income, a personal casualty loss deduction for property located within the
United States, and the deduction for charitable contributions. See I.R.C.
§§ 63(c)(6), 873(b). Thus, in effect, the benefit of the zero bracket amount
created by personal exemptions for dependents and the standard deduction
is denied.
3" See 1988 HousE REPORT, supranote 2, at 594-95 (explaining that 'the
provision gives [nonresident estates] the benefits of the progressive U.S.
estate tax rates on a basis at least as favorable as estates taxed in the
United States on a world-wide basis"); see also Musher, supranote 3, at 291
n.46. Musher states that under the 1966 Act "[t]he lower exemption [for
nonresident estates] was.., meant to roughly compensate for determining
the applicable progressive marginal rates without regard to a
nondomiciliary's worldwide estate." Id.
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threshold established for the estates of citizens." °
However, the overall effect of the estate tax system on
nonresident aliens depends also on the application of the
marital and other deductions and of the unified credit. It is in
these respects that the U.S. system may be considered
inequitable to foreigners.
b. The Unified Credit
i. Proportional Credit
To achieve "worldwide equity" in the sense described above,
the United States should grant to nonresident estates a
unified credit equal to the $192,800 credit allowed to estates
of U.S. citizens, multiplied by the fraction of the worldwide
estate that has a U.S. situs (a "proportional credit").3 8
Under this approach, the 5% surtax imposed by I.R.C. section
2001(c)(3), which phases out the credit and the benefit of
graduated brackets for very large estates, would apply as soon
as the worldwide estate reaches $10 million, although it would
be applied only to the U.S. estate."° The validity of this
approach was apparently recognized by Congress, when in
1988 both the House and Senate initially approved a
proportional credit for nonresident estates. '
The same

'" Under the "worldwide equity" approach, the phase-out would begin
when the worldwide estate exceeds $10 million; however, since only a
fraction of the benefits of the graduated rates (and unified credit) would
have been allowed, only that same fraction would be recaptured.
'"The result is the same whether the full unified credit is first
subtracted and then the tax, less the unified credit, is multiplied by the
fraction, or whether, alternatively, the tax (without credit) is multiplied by
the fraction and then the result is reduced by the credit multiplied by the
fraction.
'" Assuming that the estate were allowed a proportional unified credit
and only a proportional allowance of the benefit of the graduated brackets
(contrary to current law), this would insure that the amounts recaptured by
the surtax would not exceed the benefits actually granted. Moreover, the
recapture would occur over the same phase-out range (based upon
worldwide estate) as for a U.S. citizen with the same worldwide estate. If
the estate were granted the full benefit of the graduated brackets, the
surtax would have to be adjusted further. See infra text following note 336.
"'=See 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 594-95; 1988 CONFERENCE
REPORT, supra note 18, at 116. The Committee on Ways and Means
explained that "the credit is reduced only in proportion that the estate of a
foreign person is in a different situation than the estate of a U.S. person."
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approach is mandated in U.S. treaties with seven
countries., n
However, the conferees approved the
proportional credit only in cases where required by treaty so
that "the worldwide estate is easily determinable." By
granting only a flat $13,000 credit in other cases, it sought "to
eliminate the need to determine the ...

worldwide estate.""

It is hard to disagree with Congress' conclusion that a
determination of the worldwide assets of a nonresident estate
is not practical, except perhaps where this is facilitated by a
treaty, in light of the difficulties of identifying even the U.S.
assets of a nonresident estate. If a proportional credit were
granted, some nonresident estates might decline to claim the
credit (probably out of concern for the effects disclosure might
have in the home country),"'3 as already happens when the
proportional credit is granted by treaty. 14 Of the 161
nonresident estate tax returns filed for 1986, 89 showed the
worldwide estate. 1l
Insuring that the credit is claimed
would not, however, be the United States' responsibility
provided that the United States had not ,discouraged such
claims by sharing information about worldwide assets with
unscrupulous foreign governments. Much more worrisome for
the United States is the likelihood that some nonresident
estates would claim the proportional credit but make an
incomplete disclosure of their worldwide assets, thereby
inflating the amount of the credit claimed. In this case, the

1988 HoUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 594.
...
These are the treaties with Australia, Finland, Greece, Italy, Japan,

Norway, and Switzerland. Rev. Rul. 90-101, 1990-2 C.B. 315.
31 1988 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 18, at 116; see I.R.C.
§ 2102(c)(1),(3)(A).
313 See FLORIDA BAR, supra note 12, at 910 ("[N]ondomiciliary estates
often must choose to forego otherwise allowable U.S. deductions because of
the requirement that the estate report its worldwide assets and liabilities.");

Krauthamer, supra note 12, at 255 (stating that "[nlonresident aliens (and

their representatives) are usually reluctant" to reveal the worldwide estate
so as to claim prorated deductions under I.R.C. § 2106(a)(1) "because of tax
or exchange control laws in the home country or simply out of fear of
confiscation of those assets").
314

See Troxell, supra note 14, at A-18.

Troxell states that non-

Americans "may not only be willing to forego" the proportional credit "but

are suspicious of U.S. attorneys or accountants who try to elicit the
information necessary to prepare a claim for the larger credit." Id.
r5Long, supra note 29, at 53.
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IRS would have little ability to detect unreported assets
located outside the United States.
ii. Harshness Of The $13,000 Credit
At the same time, limiting the credit to $13,000 has harsh
results. The $13,000 credit would be less than the more
equitable "proportional credit" in every case in which U.S.
assets represent more than 6.7% of the worldwide estate,
although the lower credit may be partially or fully
compensated for by the full allowance of the graduated tax
brackets."' z It seems likely that U.S. assets would often
exceed 6.7% of the worldwide estate.,

The $13,000 credit has a particularly harsh effect on
nonresident estates where the worldwide estate is relatively
small and U.S. assets comprise a relatively large fraction of
the estate. For example, if the worldwide estate is $600,000
or less, then no U.S. estate tax should be owing, based upon
the approach of "worldwide equity." However, if the U.S.
assets represent 100% of a $600,000 worldwide estate, the U.S.
tax liability will be $179,800 (i.e., $192,800 less $13,000); if
the U.S. assets represent one third (or $200,000) of the
worldwide estate, the U.S. estate tax will be $41,800
8 For example, in a case where U.S. situs assets are $200,000 and
comprise only 1/10 of the worldwide estate (totalling $2 million), the $41,800
actual U.S. tax will be less than the $58,800 tax computed under the
"worldwide equity" approach (i.e., the tax on $2 million, or $780,800, less the
full unified credit of $192,800, leaving $588,000, to be multiplied by 1/10).
A favorable outcome is achieved in this case (even though the $13,000 credit
is less than 1/10 of the $192,800 credit allowed U.S. citizens) due to the
generous rule allowing nonresidents full utilization of the graduated rate
brackets.
"' Of the 161 nonresident estate tax returns filed for 1986, only 89
showed the worldwide estate. See Long, supra note 29, at 53. In the case
of these 89, the U.S. gross estate constituted on average 23.3% of the
worldwide gross estate. Id. IRS statistics for nonresident estate tax returns
filed for 1982 show that "[t]hese estates had $148 million of worldwide
assets, of which 32 percent" were U.S. situs. Skelly & Hobbs, supra note 29,
at 15. It is not clear that these figures are representative of all nonresident
estates that are potentially subject to U.S. estate tax. The 6.7% figure
would likely be exceeded by nonresident employees of international
organizations or multinational corporations who are employed in the United
States for a period of years; the bulk of their assets (e.g., a residence,
pension, and modest investments) are likely to be in the United States.
Similarly, the figure may be exceeded by Canadians or Mexicans of
relatively modest wealth who have a U.S. vacation home, e.g., in Florida.
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(i.e.,$54,800 minus $13,000); only if the U.S. assets represent
one-tenth or less of the worldwide assets will U.S. tax liability
be zero.
As the worldwide estate increases, this harsh effect is
somewhat mitigated. Thus, if the worldwide estate is $2
million, the U.S. tax liability exceeds the "theoretically correct"
tax only if U.S. assets are more than 30% of the worldwide
estate. ' If the assets of the worldwide estate are in excess
of $10 million, it becomes more likely that the actual U.S. tax
liability will be less than the tax computed under the
"worldwide equity" approach. 1" This is because, under the
4worldwide equity" approach, the phase-out of the unified
credit and the graduated brackets would begin at $10 million
of worldwide assets, whereas under the Code the phase-out
begins only when U.S. assets exceed $10 million. 20
Moreover, it can be argued that the $13,000 credit is too
small even for cases where a proportional credit would be no
greater than $13,000. The policy behind the unified credit in
a domestic context may support use of the credit to completely
exempt nonresident estates with a small amount of U.S.
assets regardless of the size of the worldwide estate. For
example, a nonresident estate with worldwide assets of $5
million might hold stock, in a U.S. company, valued at
$65,000.
Although the estate would have access to
If U.S. assets are 30% of the worldwide estate, or $600,000, actual
U.S. tax liability is $179,800, and the theoretically correct tax is $176,400.
318

If U.S. assets are 25% of the worldwide estate, or $500,000, the actual U.S.
tax liability is $142,800 and the "theoretically correct" tax is $147,000.
"' For example, if worldwide assets were $20 million and U.S. assets
were $10 million, the actual U.S. tax liability for 1993 would be $5,127,800.
(Applying the rate schedule to the U.S. assets only would yield a tax of
$5,140,800, which would be reduced by the $13,000 credit.) However, the
tax under the "worldwide equity" approach would be $5,474,000. Under this
approach, the tax on the worldwide assets of $20 million would be
$10,948,000, i.e., $10,640,800, increased by the surcharge of $500,000 (on

the $10 million which is in the surtax range of $10 million to $21,040,000),
and then reduced by the unified credit of $192,800. Since the U.S. assets
represent one-half of the total, the U.S. tax would be 50% of $10,948,000, or
$5,474,000. If there was no phase-out requirement, the tax under the
"worldwide equity" approach would be $5,224,000 (i.e., $10,640,800 less
$192,800, multiplied by .5), just slightly more than the actual U.S. tax

liability.
"" The surtax imposed to phase-out the unified credit is of course limited

to the $13,000 credit actually permitted a nontreaty nonresident estate. See
I.R.C. § 2101(b)(last sentence).
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sophisticated legal advice to facilitate the filing of a U.S.
estate tax return, the expense and complexity associated with
filing a U.S. return seems out of proportion to the size of the
investment and the amount of the tax liability (i.e., $1,300).
Requiring a return may require excessive effort from both the
taxpayer and the IRS, which must monitor the return. 2 '
This concern motivated Congress to increase the specific
exemption for nonresident estates from $2,000 to $30,000 in
1966, a level that was one-half of that provided to U.S. citizens
or residents."s
The lack of greater relief for nonresident estates with small
U.S. holdings seems particularly unfair in light of the fact that
foreign investors with large U.S. holdings would generally
utilize a foreign holding company to avoid the U.S. estate tax.
By contrast, a foreign investor with small U.S. holdings often
would not find it worthwhile to incur the expense and
inconvenience of using a foreign holding company. Moreover,
if the holdings consist of personal use assets, such as a
vacation home or car, the holding company structure might not
be feasible. Thus, the current rules may have the perverse
effect of imposing little or no estate tax on nonresident estates
with large U.S. holdings, while generally imposing an estate
tax on nonresident estates with small holdings. The fact that
the average U.S. gross estate shown on the 161 nonresident
estate tax returns filed for 1986 was $385,201 may support
this theory.3"

321

See 1966 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 25, at 999. The committee
explained that the fact that "nonresident aliens ... typically have only a
portion of their estate in the United States... justifies a lesser exemption
for" them. Id. The report concluded, however, that "the minimal ...
exemption presently allowed is so low as to place an unreasonable and
inequitable tax burden on" them, and that $30,000 "is high enough to make
filing of returns unnecessary in the case of relatively small investments
here." Id.
'1 See id.
3' See Long, supra note 29, at 53.
The U.S. gross estate was below
$100,000 on 34 returns, was between $100,000 and $249,999 on 66 returns,

was between $250,000 and $499,999 on 29 returns, was between $500,000

and $999,999 on 25 returns, and was $1 million or more on only 7 returns.

I&. at 58.
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iii. Conclusion
In conclusion, the choice of a $13,000 credit gives too little
weight to the strong domestic policy of "provid[ing] estate and
gift tax relief to small estates."3" Although this policy is
certainly susceptible to criticism, 2 5 it does not seem fair to
abandon it only in the case of nonresident estates.
One might argue in support of the 1988 changes that
Congress' harsh approach has provided the U.S. Treasury with
an effective bargaining tool in treaty negotiations. By offering
a proportional credit only by treaty, the U.S. Treasury may be
in a position to enter into new estate and gift tax treaties, or
to negotiate more favorable provisions in existing estate and
gift or income tax treaties. 2 However, in many cases there
may be no prospect of a treaty solution because many foreign
countries do not have an estate or inheritance tax including
some countries that are not considered tax havens."2 7 More
fundamentally, it seems inappropriate for the United States to
rely on treaty negotiations to remedy statutory provisions that
produce inequitable treatment of foreigners. 28
Taking the treatment of marital transfers into account
reinforces the conclusion that the $13,000 unified credit for
nonresident estates is too meager. A nonresident estate is
324 1981 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 26, at 154 (discussing expansion of
unified credit that increased the amount effectively exempted from $175,000
to $600,000); see also S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 2 at 13 (1976)
[hereinafter 1976 SENATE REPORT] (new unified credit was designed to
"confer more tax savings on small- and medium-sized estates").
"' See Graetz, supranote 145, discussed atsupranotes 151-53; Gutman,
supra note 152, at 253 (stating that "ERTA significantly reduces the scope
and impact of the federal wealth transfer taxes").
..
6 There are a number of important U.S. trading partners that impose
a death or gift tax, with which the United States has no estate or gift tax
treaty, for example: Belgium, Bolivia, China, Egypt, Hungary, India,
Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Spain and Venezuela.
327 Thus, for example, the following countries have no estate or
inheritance tax at the national level: Argentina, Australia, Bahamas,
Bermuda, Brazil, Cayman Islands, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Netherlands
Antilles, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Switzerland (by canton), Thailand and
Uruguay. See Schoenblum, supra note 170, app. H, at 441-541.
328
But cf. A.L.I. TREATIES, supra note 114, at 13. ALI notes that "some
tax administrators have explicitly acknowledged the practice of adopting
domestic law rules designed to be modified by treaty (most frequently by
imposing withholding tax rates higher than deemed appropriate)."

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss4/1

1994]

NONRESIDENT ALIEN TAXATION

entitled to the marital deduction on the same terms as the
estate of a U.S. citizen.329 But, as a practical matter, a
nonresident estate is much more likely than the estate of a
U.S. citizen to be subject to the special restrictions on the
marital deduction applicable to transfers to a noncitizen
spouse. As discussed above, these restrictions, thoughjustified
in theory, can have harsh effects. In particular, even if a QDT
is used, the opportunity for principal to be consumed by the
surviving spouse on a tax-free basis is eliminated except in the
case of hardship. 3 ° Moreover, if a QDT is not used, the tax
on principal is accelerated to the death of the first spouse so
that the income earned during the surviving spouse's lifetime
is reduced. In addition, tax-free inter vivos transfers of U.S.
situs tangible property to an alien spouse are limited to
$100,000 annually. In light of this, the impact of the small
unified credit for nonresident estates may affect not only the
estate's heirs, but also and most directly the surviving spouse
if the estate is relatively modest. By contrast, Congress in the
Tax Reform Act of 1976 sought to insure that "a decedent with
a small- or medium-sized estate should be able to leave
sufficient property directly to the surviving spouse for support
during the lifetime of the spouse without the imposition of an
estate tax."33'

,' The Ways and Means Committee's explanation in 1988 of its

elimination of the separate rate schedule for nonresident estates referred to
the fact that such estates were being granted the marital deduction for the
first time. See 1988 HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 594-95. However, it

did not explicitly draw a connection between elimination ofthe separate rate
schedule and granting of the marital deduction. See id. The separate, lower
rate schedule adopted for nonresident estates in 1966 (with the expanded
specific exemption) was designed to yield a tax "in an amount which is
generally equivalent to the tax imposed on an estate of similar value of a

U.S. citizen with the maximum marital deduction." 1966 HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 25, at 996.
"" This assumes no liberalizing amendment, e.g., permitting $100,000
in annual tax-free distributions from a QDT. See supra notes 279-81.
331

1976 SENATE REPORT, supra note 324, at 14; 1976 HOUSE REPORT,

supra note 25, at 17; see Adams, supra note 18, at 753 n.22; see also 1976
JCT REPORT, supra note 21, at 527, 530-31, 533 (giving an explanation of
provisions). This was the rationale for Congress in 1976 to increase the
allowable marital deduction from one-half of the decedent's adjusted gross
estate to the greater of that amount or $250,000. Id.
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c. Proposals For Liberalization
Some liberalization of the current rules seems warranted.
One commentator has suggested that Congress reinstate the
separate, lower rate schedule for nonresident estates,"8 2
except in the case of investors who under various treaties are
eligible for the proportional credit."'
However, such a
reduction in rates for nontreaty investors is not a precise
substitute for granting a larger credit. In particular, a rate
reduction does not eliminate the need for filing by an estate
with a small amount of U.S. assets, and it may provide greater
benefits to larger estates than to smaller ones. In addition, a
denial of the benefit of the lower rates to treaty investors
entitled to a proportional credit would seem to require either
treaty renegotiation or treaty override.'"
Another proposal is to continue to apply the rate schedule
for resident estates to nonresident estates, but to allow
nonresident estates the full $192,800 unified credit.3 5
See Bell & Shoemaker, ForeignInvestment, supra note 6, at 267-68
& n.38. This proposal was combined with a further proposal that the estate
tax for nonresident estates be limited to appreciation, and was based on the
assumption that the proposed maximum 30% estate tax rate for nonresident
aliens would be "roughly the same as their maximum income tax rate." IcL
at 268. See infra notes 352 et seq. and accompanying text.
...One reason offered in the House report under the 1988 Act for the
new higher rate schedule was concern about court decisions granting treaty
investors the simultaneous benefit ofthe lower rate schedule for nonresident
estates and the proportional credit. See 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2,
at 594 ("differential rates and credit of present law do not achieve" equal
treatment with U.S. citizens "particularly... where a treaty allows aliens
the benefit of both the unified credit and the lower rates"); see also Bell &
Shoemaker, Foreign Investment, supra note 6, at 268 & n.38. Bell &
Shoemaker note that the United States has an income tax treaty with all
the countries (except South Africa) with which it has an estate tax treaty.
Id. Thus, they conclude that treaty investors eligible for the proportional
credit are also beneficiaries of income tax treaties that reduce the income
tax burden of a corporate structure used to avoid U.S. estate tax on U.S.
real estate. Id.
' But see Bell & Shoemaker, ForeignInvestment, supra note 6, at 26768. They suggest that "Congress could repeal the across-the-board increase
in the NRA estate tax rates passed in 1988, and instead target the increase
to the narrow situation that was cited to justify the increase." Id. They
state further that "Congress could easily tailor a provision to this specific
concern." Id. at 268 n.38. They note that the United States currently has
-only 16 estate tax treaties. Id. See also Bell & Shoemaker, TAMRA, supra
note 1, at 89 n.39.
35
m See FLORIDA BAR, supra note 12, at 912, discussed supra note 300.
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Under this proposal, if the U.S. assets represent anything less
than 100% of the worldwide estate, the credit would be more
than the proportional credit. This seems unduly generous,"'6
especially given that worldwide assets are not taken into
account in applying the rate schedule and in determining the
phase-out range.
It might be an appropriate compromise for Congress to
grant a credit of $87,800 (which would effectively exempt
approximately $300,000 of U.S. assets). This credit, which is
about 45% of the unified credit of $192,800 allowed for U.S.
citizens, could be viewed as based upon an implicit assumption
that U.S. assets comprise 45% of the worldwide estate. The
estate of a treaty resident would still be able to claim the
proportional credit if more than 45% of the assets of the estate
were situated in the United States.
As a corollary to this rule, the phase-out of the graduated
rate brackets and the unified credit for nonresident estates
would be determined based upon the same assumption. Thus,
the phase-out would begin with a U.S. taxable estate of $4.5
million (rather than the current $10 million). The surtax rate
would be 5% until the benefit of the $87,800 unified credit was
recaptured (i.e., until the U.S. taxable estate reached
$6,256,000). Thereafter, the surtax rate would be increased to
11.18% in order to recapture the $359,200 benefit of the
graduated brackets (allowed fully to nonresident estates) by
the time the U.S. taxable estate reaches $9,468,000, i.e., 45%
of $21,040,000, the top of the phase-out range for U.S. citizens.
d. The Marital Transfer Credit
A further suggestion is to provide a nonresident alien
decedent having a noncitizen surviving spouse with a means
'" It might be reasonable, however, to provide the full $192,800 credit
by treaty. See Boidman III, supra note 186, at 827 (suggesting that the full

credit should be granted to Canadians by treaty on the theory that
"Canadians are subject to U.S. death taxes on a much wider range of
property than are Americans to Canadian tax"). Boidman notes that this
approach was "supported by the American Bar Association through a formal

resolution." Id. Boidman has also proposed that the United States and
Canada might consider a treaty exemption of up to $750,000 for personaluse property such as homes owned by residents of the other country. This
would "ease burdens now incurred in simply seeking a trouble-free
vacation."
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to achieve results somewhat comparable to those available
when the surviving spouse is a citizen, without the need to
utilize a QDT. When the surviving spouse is a citizen, a
marital transfer results in deferral of the estate tax. This
deferral becomes a permanent tax exemption to the extent that
the transferred property is consumed by the surviving spouse
or such property absorbs any part of the unified credit of the
surviving spouse that would not otherwise be utilized. Thus,
to achieve somewhat comparable results for the nonresident
estate with a noncitizen spouse, an exemption could be granted
for marital transfers up to the amount that would be protected
by the unified credit of the surviving spouse."3 7
Thus, under this proposal, a nonresident estate that
waives the privilege of forming a QDT would be granted a
marital transfer credit. In effect, this would exempt from
taxation an additional $300,000 of property (which is
transferred to the surviving spouse) beyond the amount
exempted by the estate's unified credit."3 ' The $300,000 is
intended to be the exemption equivalent of the unified credit
of the surviving spouse,"3 " based upon the assumption that
" This exemption would be overly generous to the extent that the
surviving spouse had his own U.S. situs property which would have served
to utilize his unified credit. On the other hand, the amount of this
exemption would not explicitly take account of the fact that a citizen spouse
could avoid tax on transferred property by consuming it.
" Compare H.R. 5270, supra note 69, § 404(a), adding I.R.C.
§ 2210(c)(1)(B)(i),(c)(2)(A) (marital transfer amount for nonresident estates
may not exceed $600,000 less the deduction equivalent of the unified credit
allowed to the estate); John Turro, Germans Trying to Raise Ante on Treaty,
Treasury Complains, 50 TAX NOTES 1193, 1194 (1991) (The Treasury, in
January, 1991, proposed to German negotiators "an additional" unified
credit, so as to assist "those persons who are over the $600,000 unified
credit but for whom making a [QDT] would be administratively too costly.").
The effect of this provision of H.R. 5270 is to permit a total of $600,000 to
be shielded from tax by a combination of the unified credit of the first
spouse to die (which would shield $60,000 absent enlargement by treaty)
and the marital transfer credit. See supra notes 290-95 and accompanying
text. The proposal in the text would have the same overall effect if the
unified credit of the first to die is not enlarged by treaty: $300,000 of
property would be exempted by the unified credit of the first to die and
$300,000 by the marital transfer credit.
"' Somewhat similarly, under H.R. 5270, the marital transfer credit for
a resident estate would, in effect, exempt an amount equal to the unified
credit of the surviving spouse if he is also a residentalien at death. In the
case of a nonresident estate, however, the amount of property in effect
exempted by the marital transfer credit is not based upon the amount of the
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss4/1
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the surviving spouse will also be a nonresident alien at
death and that treaty benefits
will not be available to enlarge
3 41
the survivor's unified credit.

The marital transfer credit would provide a tax deferral,
but would not in itself protect the transferred property from
estate taxation upon the death of the surviving spouse, any
more than does the marital deduction. However, assuming
that the spouse first to die places $300,000 of property in a
credit shelter trust, another $300,000 of property could be
permanently shielded from the estate tax by first using the
marital transfer credit for the estate of the first to die and
then using the unified credit in the estate of the surviving
spouse."s
This assumes that the unified credit of the
surviving spouse would not have been utilized in any event to
offset estate tax liability with respect to separately-held, U.S.
situs property of the surviving spouse, including property
received from the spouse first to die by inter vivos transfer. At
the same time, either separately-held property or the property
received from the spouse first to die, which would have a new
basis under I.R.C. section 1014," could be consumed by the
surviving spouse or withdrawn from U.S. tax jurisdiction

unified credit of the surviving spouse (or of the spouse first to die). See
supra notes 338, 291-95 and accompanying text.
'" This assumption has to be made because even if the surviving spouse

is a resident when the first spouse dies, such residence might later be
abandoned.
341 This assumption has to be made because even if the surviving spouse
is a resident of a treaty country, the amount of the proportional credit could
not be predicted in advance.

" The surviving spouse would also be entitled to a credit under I.R.C.
§ 2013 for estate tax paid by the estate of the first to die (after allowance of
the unified credit and marital transfer credit) with respect to property
transferred to the surviving spouse. The surviving spouse's credit would be
limited to an amount which bears the same ratio to the estate tax paid by
the estate of the first to die as the value of the property transferred and not
shielded by the marital transfer credit bears to the taxable estate. Cf I.R.C.
§ 2013(b).

" One might argue that, to the extent of the marital transfer credit
claimed by the first to die, the surviving spouse's unified credit should be
available for use only against the property received from the spouse first to
die. However, such a limitation would involve complicated tracing rules,
and its effect would be merely to encourage the surviving spouse to retain
the property received from the first to die and to consume or withdraw from
the United States, instead, other U.S. property held by the surviving spouse
(although this property would not have a stepped-up basis).
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assuming the spouse is a nonresident alien. As a result, in
many cases, the eventual estate tax liability of the survivor's
estate would not be increased by the receipt of property under
the protection of the marital transfer credit. Given such
circumstances, the use of the marital transfer credit would
achieve a permanent tax reduction.
Use of the marital transfer credit would likely be preferred
by estates with small U.S. holdings, for which the QDT
mechanism may be expensive and cumbersome. If the estate
of the first to die does not exceed $600,000, the marital
transfer credit would insure that there would be no estate tax
liability on the death of the first to die, so that at the very
least, the tax would be deferred. As described above, there
often would be no tax on the death of the survivor either.
By contrast, the estate of a nonresident alien which passes
sizeable U.S. assets to a surviving alien spouse with a
considerable life expectancy might find it more advantageous
to forego the marital transfer credit and to utilize a QDT. A
QDT would permit deferral of estate tax liability on unlimited
amounts transferred to the QDT until the death of the
surviving spouse. Moreover, assuming the adoption of the
proposal to tax QDT property in the estate of the surviving
spouse, $600,000 of property of the first to die could be
permanently exempted from the estate tax, as under the
marital transfer credit strategy. Thus, the first to die could
place $300,000 in a credit shelter trust and the rest in the
QDT. $300,000 of QDT property could be shielded from estate
tax on the death of the surviving spouse by use of his unified
credit.
Separately-held assets of the surviving spouse,
including assets received from the first to die by inter vivos
transfer, could be consumed or withdrawn from U.S. tax
jurisdiction prior to the death of the surviving spouse.
The proposed expansion of the unified credit and the
proposed marital transfer credit, combined with the proposed
exemption for survivorship rights under a pension plan and
the existing exemption for life insurance proceeds on the life
of a nonresident alien, would largely remove the burden of the
U.S. estate tax for nonresident alien decedents with small U.S.
estates without seriously compromising the goal of equity
between U.S. and foreign investors. As noted, nonresident
estates with small U.S. holdings are the ones particularly
burdened by the current rules because the use of QDT's and
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss4/1
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foreign holding companies may be impractical for them. The
above proposal would in many cases remove the need for the

use of such devices by estates with small U.S. holdings.!"
At the same time, estates with larger U.S. holdings would not
unfairly benefit. These estates might not find the marital
transfer credit to be beneficial, nor would they receive greater
benefits than smaller estates from the enlarged unified credit.
Moreover, the proposal would also provide for a phase-out of
the unified credit and graduated rate brackets to begin at
lower levels than under current law.
4.4. Limiting The Estate Taxation Of Foreigners To Asset
Appreciation
If, as has been proposed,'

the United States were to

'" If a QDT were used, the proposed exemption for QDT distributions of
up to $100,000 annually would assist surviving spouses who found it
necessary to invade the QDT principal.
' Beginning in 1972, Canada replaced its estate tax with a rule
imposing income tax on gains deemed realized from disposition of assets by
gift or at death, but allowing deferral with respect to spousal transfers. See
Boidman I, supra note 1, at 579-80. Professor Galvin has recently proposed
repeal of the U.S. estate tax entirely and its replacement with a
requirement that gains be constructively realized at death for income tax
purposes (possibly combined with repeal of section 102). See Galvin, supra
note 30, at 1418-19; Charles 0. Galvin, Burying the Estate Tax: Keeping
Ghouls out of the Cemetery: A Reply to ProfessorSmith, 56 TAX NOTES 951
(1992) [hereinafter Galvin II] (suggesting that "gifttime and death time
recognition of gain, standing alone, would probably make up the lost
revenue"). Cf. COMMITTEE ON TAXATION OF INT'L TRANSACTIONS, supra note
74, at 918 (suggesting that the special income, gift, and estate tax provisions
appliable to expatriates could be replaced with a rule providing a zero basis
for heirs or by repeal of section 102). But cf. Robert B. Smith, Burying the
Estate Tax Without ResurrectingIts Problems, 55 TAX NOTES 1799 (1992)
(criticizing Galvin's proposal for constructive realization at death); Lawrence
Zelenak, Taxing Gains at Death, 46 VAND. L. REV. 361, 374-75 (1993)
("[Alssuming revenue neutrality," the Galvin proposal would be
"regressiv[e]" because the exemption amount would have to be "much lower
... than the $600,000 transfer tax exemption created by the unified
credit."). Zelenak suggests that in lieu of eliminating the estate tax, "the
revenue raised from the new capital gains tax" could be used to "reduce the
transfer tax burden" and that Congress could "ke[y] the exemption to the
new capital gains tax to the transfer tax exemption." Zelenak, supra, at
375. For earlier proposals recommending constructive realization of gains
at death, see President's 1963 Tax Message: Hearings on the Tax
Recommendations of the PresidentContainedin his Message Transmitted t6
the Congress January24, 1963 Before the House Comm. on Ways andMeans,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 54-56, 128-40 (1963) (statement of C. Douglas
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replace its transfer tax system with an income tax on gains

constructively realized at death, equity considerations would
strongly suggest extending that approach to nonresident
estates as well. A more difficult question is whether it would
be appropriate to replace the estate tax in this way for
nonresidentestates only.
Under such a system, constructive realization would
presumably apply to gains from the same type of property that
is currently subject to the U.S. estate tax for nonresident
estates, and the constructively realized gains would be taxable
as effectively connected gains under I.R.C. section 871(b). An

exemption level might be established similar to that under the
current estate tax for nonresident estates (i.e., $60,000).84"
A carryover basis might be provided for spousal transfers.""'
The potential advantage of such an approach would be to
reduce the burden of U.S. death taxation on directly-owned
U.S. investments of nonresidents by a reduction of the tax
base
and of the tax rates 4 9 for death taxation.

Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury) [hereinafter Dillon Statement]; MARTIN
DAviD, ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION 145-63
(1968); RICHARD GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCoME TAX 209-10 (1976);
Richard B. Covey, Possible Changes in the Basis Rule for Property
T-ansferredby Gift or at Death, 50 TAXEs 831, 837-43 (1972) (discussing the
Treasury proposal); David Westfall, The Taxation of UnrealizedAppreciation
at Death, Tax Notes (May 3, 1976), reprinted in THE CAPITAL GAINS
CONTROVERSY: A TAX READER at 433-36 (J. Andrew Hoerner ed., 1992).
'" See Dillon Statement, supra note 345, at 129-30, 132 ($15,000 lifetime
exclusion so as to permanently exempt relatively small estates); Zelenak,
supra note 345, at 416-20 (proposing use of "minimum basis method" and
that the exemption be the same as under the estate tax); Galvin II, supra
note 345, at 953 (suggesting a $600,000 exemption level for U.S. citizens);
see also Dillon Statement, supra note 345, at 129-30 (discussing exclusion
for personal and household effects, not including jewelry, antique furniture
or furs of unusual value); Zelenak, supra note 345, at 428 (suggesting either
"$5,000 ... as an asset-by-asset exemption" or "$100,000 as an aggregate
exemption").
' See Dillon Statement, supra note 345, at 130-31 (marital exclusion
from constructive realization for up to one half of appreciation in decedent's
property); Galvin, supra note 30, at 1419; supra notes 278 & 345 (Canadian
system); see also Zelenak, supra note 345, at 395-401 (suggestingways to
make this "workable").
s The base would be limited to the appreciation in assets.
s The applicable tax rates would be the individual income tax rates,
including the maximum capital gains tax rate of 28%. Under the 1993 Act,
the maximum rate applicable to ordinary gain is 39.6%. This still compares
favorably with the top estate tax rate of 55% (reinstated by the 1993 Act).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss4/1
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However, constructive realization would involve three
disadvantages not present under the current system. First,
foreign countries that prevent double death taxation of their
residents by allowing a credit for estate or inheritance taxes
imposed by other countries would not likely credit the new
U.S. income tax on gains constructively realized at death,
absent negotiation of new treaty provisions."' Second, the
replacement of the estate tax for nonresidents with an income
tax at death might lead to the termination of existing estate
tax treaties and might complicate the negotiation of new
treaties. Third, the adoption of any system of taxation for
nonresidents that is different than that for U.S. citizens and
residents would be viewed by foreigners with suspicion and
might be criticized as discriminatory even though the system
would be less burdensome than the current law. In addition,
a system of constructive realization at death for nonresidents
would appear to be no easier to enforce than the current estate
tax for nonresidents. s1

See supra notes 23-24 & 55.
3" For U.S. denial of an I.R.C. § 2014 credit for the Canadian income tax
on deemed disposition of assets at death, see Estate of Ballard v. Comm'r,
85 T.C. 300 (1985); Rev. Rul. 82-82, 1982-1 C.B. 127; see also Boidman III,
supra note 186, at 825. In Ballard,the court stated that '[t]he nature and
character of an estate tax is that of an excise tax upon the privilege of
transferring property of the decedent at death," whereas in the case of the
Canadian tax the "focus ... is the recognition of gain or loss." 85 T.C. at
304, 306 (citation omitted). The IRS stated that [the common element in
estate, inheritance, legacy, and succession taxes is that they are all taxes
imposed on the value of the property transferred from a decedent to an
heir." Rev. Rul. 82-82, supra, at 127. Boidman calculates that the
maximum combined rate of U.S. and Canadian tax that could apply to
appreciation in Canadian assets transferred at death by a U.S. citizen is
70%. Boidman III, supra note 186, at 825. The current negotiations
between the United States and Canada may result in provisions
ameliorating this problem. See id. at 827.
"' Imposing a withholding requirement upon the transferee of the
property from the decedent would add little to the obligations of the donee,
executor, and heirs under the current transfer tax system. Foreigners could
avoid constructive realization at death, just as they currently avoid the U.S.
estate tax, by interposing a foreign holding company between themselves
and the U.S. asset. See Boidman III, supra note 186, at 825 (footnote
omitted) (noting that, for Americans, "[tihe single most effective method of
avoiding exposure to Canadian death taxes is ownership of Canadian
investments through a U.S. or other non-Canadian resident corporation").
Any attempt to look-through those foreign companies would face the same
obstacles (e.g., enforceability and treaty conflicts) as a look-through rule
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Commentators Bell and Shoemaker have proposed instead
that the United States revise the current estate tax for
nonresidents so that it resembles a system of constructive
realization at death."' Under this proposal, the estate tax
on nonresidents would apply only to unrealized appreciation,"'3 and the pre-1988 Act rate schedule, which ranges
from 6% to

3 0%s"

for estates in excess of $2 million, would

be reinstated, but not for investors entitled by treaty to use
the proportional unified credit. This proposal would be even
more favorable to foreign investors than constructive
realization, particularly under the 1993 income tax rates,
because the pre-1988 estate tax rates are "extremely
graduated and [do] not reach 30% until the taxable estate [is]
in excess of $2 million."'55 In addition, the above described

under the estate tax. However, under a system of constructive realization,
there may be less incentive for foreigners to avoid U.S. death taxation by
use of a foreign holding company, provided that constructively realized gains
would be eligible for capital gains treatment.
" See Bell & Shoemaker, ForeignInvestment, supra note 6, at 267-68
& n. 38.
" Somewhat similarly, some have proposed that the estate tax be
adjusted for all taxpayers so as to impose a heavier burden on unrealized
appreciation. See ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 28, exhibit G at 446-48
(suggesting "equaliz[ing] the tax treatment of those who sell during life and
those who hold until death" by providing "a 10-point credit against the
estate tax" with respect to the portion of property transferred at death not
representing unrealized appreciation); Galvin, supra note 30, at 1417 &
n.29; Zelenak, supranote 345, at 407 (criticizing ABA TASK FORCE's Exhibit
G as "us[ing] the credit proposal as a disguised way of reducing death tax
rates"); see also Graetz, supra note 145, at 262 & n.24 (referring to "the
quite simple and fair proposal for an additional estate tax on appreciation,
which had been developed in the 1970s by the Trust Division of the
American Bankers Association" (citing Covey, supra note 345, at 843-49)).
"" See Bell & Shoemaker, Foreign Investment, supra note 6, at 268.
They note (prior to the passage of the 1993 Act) that the maximum rate of
30% would be "roughly the same as their maximum income tax rate," and
suggest that their proposal "would again properly integrate the income and
the estate tax." Icd They explain that "[o]wingto the basis step-up provided
by [I.R.C.] § 1014, an NRA would pay either a maximum 30 percent
marginal estate tax rate or a maximum 31 percent (28 percent on capital
gains) marginal income tax rate on the appreciation in U.S. real property
investments, but not both." Id. at n.39.
"' See Bell & Shoemaker, TAMRA, supranote 1, at 87 n.33. If, as under
the pre-1988 law, the unified credit was sufficient to eliminate the tax on
the first $60,000, amounts between $60,000 and $100,000 would be taxed at
a rate of 6%. By contrast, there is much less graduation in the individual
income tax rates. See id. at 86-87 (describing pre-1990 rates). Bell &
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss4/1
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problems associated with constructive realization would be
avoided, provided that the proposed "hybrid" estate tax"56
were 5not
viewed by our trading partners as a disguised income
7
tax.
Bell and Shoemaker have argued that because the current
estate tax is not limited to appreciation, it creates "an almost
insurmountable disincentive to foreign direct investment in
U.S. real estate," at least by nontreaty investors."5 ' The
objective of their proposal is to mitigate the burden of the U.S.
estate tax on nonresidents so that the estate tax (or the costs
associated with avoiding it through a foreign holding company)
would not deter them from making U.S. investments. 59
Thus, the proposal seeks to make direct ownership of U.S.
assets a more attractive alternative than the use of a foreign
holding company, which has been rendered "unattractive from

Shoemaker note that prior to the 1988 increase in estate tax rates, it was
not necessarily disadvantageous for a nonresident alien to invest in U.S.
real estate through a partnership and incur estate tax (at graduated rates
that only reached the maximum of 30% for estates in excess of $2 million)
while achieving a step-up in basis that avoided income tax at a maximum
rate of 28% (with very little income eligible for the lower bracket). Id. at
87.
'" The current estate and gift taxes are constitutional as excise taxes.
See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 7, 1 120.1.2, at 120-3 to 120-6 (citing
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900) (legacy tax) and New York Trust Co.
v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921)); Dodge, supra note 32, at 252 & n.42; id. at
249 & n.32 (noting that by contrast, an annual wealth tax "would probably
be unconstitutional" due to U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4, which "prohibits an
unapportioned direct tax that is not an income tax" permitted by the 16th
Amendment). It appears that the proposed tax described in the text would
be constitutional.
s See supra note 350; of. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2 (as ammended in 1991).
, Bell & Shoemaker, ForeignInvestment, supra note 6, at 268; see also
id. at 267 ("To individual investors from nontreaty countries ... U.S.
policymakers have hung out a giant 'Not Welcome' sign."); Musher, supra
note 3, at 290 (stating that "[firom the foreign investor's perspective the
U.S. estate tax is confiscatory"). Musher notes that "in its nature as a
transfer tax the U.S. estate tax where applicable is imposed without regard
to whether an investment has appreciated, and is imposed on the base of
value rather than simply gain."
Id. at 291.
He concludes:
"[u]nderstandably, a nondormiciliary, who unlike a U.S. domiciliary is not
automatically within the U.S. estate tax net, is very hesitant to make an
economic decision to invest in U.S. real property; if that decision involves
a significant risk of being caught in that net." Id. (footnote omitted).
"" See Bell & Shoemaker, ForeignInvestment, supra note 6, at 267-69.
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an income tax perspective."' 6 This would have further
salutary effects of (1) eliminating the complications,
inefficiency, and disrespect for the law associated with the use
of a foreign holding company to avoid U.S. estate tax,
(2) eliminating unfairness to foreigners for whom use of a
foreign holding company is impractical, and (3) possibly
reducing the incentive for tax evasion."' 1
The proposal would, in fact, provide more favorable overall
U.S. tax consequences for direct ownership than for corporate
ownership apart from the higher rates of tax on ordinary
income of individuals under the 1993 Act. In a foreign holding
company, the corporate tax would eventually be applicable to
all appreciation in corporate assets since there would be no
step-up in basis at death. In addition, there would be the
potential for a second level of tax on corporate income from
appreciation or operations, particularly if the tax on the
capital gains of foreign shareholders proposed in House Bill
5270 is enacted.
Under direct ownership, the tax on
unrealized appreciation would be accelerated to the date of
death, but it would likely be at rates significantly below the
corporate rate (particularly because the pre-1988 estate tax
rate schedule is very "graduated"),3 ' and there would be
only one level of tax. However, the top individual income tax
rate of 39.6%under the 1993 Act for operating income or gains
that are not capital gains would be a disadvantage of
individual ownership.
Bell and Shoemaker acknowledge that to make direct
ownership of U.S. real estate an attractive option, foreigners'
desire for anonymity. 3 would also have to be
considered."' They suggest that the IRS could address this
s See id. at 268; see also supra note 207.

See Bell & Shoemaker, Foreign Investment, supra note 6, at 267.
They note the "morass of complexity, economic inefficiency, and
noncompliance" generated by the current rules. Id. They further note that
361

"[tihe ignorant and the unethical simply avoid U.S. estate taxation
altogether by not filing a return," while "[tihose who are able to afford (and
willing to put up with) tiered corporate structures dedicate otherwise
productive resources to multiple layers of accountants, lawyers, and foreign
governments." Id (footnote omitted).
8 See supra note 355.
See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
See Bell & Shoemaker, ForeignInvestment, supra note 6, at 269-70.
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concern for many residents of developing countries by
"affirmatively publiciz[ing] to [nonresident aliens]" that tax
return information will be disclosed only pursuant to a "tax
treaty or information exchange agreement," and by avoiding
such agreements with foreign governments that have
"restrictive investment policies and exchange controls."3
On the other hand, there is no intrinsic logic to limiting the
base of the estate tax to appreciation for nonresident estates
only, nor to providing a separate, lower rate schedule for
nonresident estates. These proposals would be a step away
from equality in the tax treatment of U.S. citizens and
nonresident aliens." ' Any inequity toward foreigners in the
current rules does not stem from the rate schedule or from the
taxation of amounts not representing appreciation, but rather
from the rules for the unified credit and marital deduction,
which could be rectified, as discussed above. In fact, Bell and
Shoemaker appear to acknowledge that treaty investors
entitled to the proportional credit should not also benefit from
the pre-1988 rate schedule. 3 6
Equality in the treatment of U.S. citizens and nonresident
aliens would be achieved most completely by retaining the
current estate tax on foreigners (but liberalizing the unified
credit and marital transfer rules, as described above), while
adding a look-through requirement with respect to foreign
holding companies. Since this is impractical, the next most
"equitable" system is the current one, with liberalized unified
credit and marital transfer rules. This system requires
foreigners to choose between (1) utilizing a direct form of
ownership, with the same tax consequences as for U.S.

3, Id.at 270 & n.44.
3
" But cf. Musher, supra note 3, at 294 (noting that U.S. persons are
"subject to estate tax risk under both corporate and individual ownership
structures"). However, he argues that "[slince U.S. individuals for better or
worse are within the U.S. worldwide estate tax net, that tax is not a
marginal cost which they must consider in making their choice of
investment vehicle," and thus they typically... select individual ownership
structures" for real estate investments "and thereby achieve single income
taxation of their real estate gains." Id. He argues that "[b]y contrast, for
foreign investors the U.S. estate tax may frequently constitute a very real
and drastic marginal cost," making use of a foreign holding company "a
necessity." I&.
36' See Bell & Shoemaker, ForeignInvestment, supra note 6, at 267-68
& n.38. See supra notes 352-55 and accompanying text.
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citizens, i.e., a single level of income tax at individual rates
and an estate tax at rates of up to 55%, or (2) utilizing a
foreign holding company structure, thereby avoiding the U.S.
estate tax but in some cases (much fewer under the 1993
Act)"~ incurring less favorable income tax consequences,
which U.S. citizens would ordinarily avoid by utilizing direct
ownership.
The fact that U.S. citizens have many
opportunities to avoid U.S. transfer taxation does not justify
liberalizing the estate tax treatment of foreigners who own
U.S. assets by direct ownership. Foreigners' opportunities for
avoidance are generally the same or greater."s
It is quite possible that the Bell and Shoemaker proposal
could result in some loss of revenues, particularly if a tax on
the capital gains of foreign shareholders had already been
enacted. Whether there would be such a revenue loss might
depend upon how many new U.S. investments were made by
foreigners who previously would be deterred by the U.S. estate
tax. Any shift on the part of existing foreign investors in the
United States from corporate ownership to direct ownership
would presumably lose more income tax revenues than the
new estate tax revenues thereby gained or else the shift would
not be made. Moreover, there would be some decline in estate
tax revenues from foreigners who have made direct
investments in the United States and who would have paid
estate tax under current law.

368 If the capital gains tax on foreign shareholders in H.R. 5270, supra
note 69, is enacted, then the income tax consequences of the foreign holding
company structure will more often be unfavorable. Thus, the holding
company structure would be less of a refuge from the tax burden ordinarily
imposed on U.S. citizen decedents.
36 See supra notes 30-44 and accompanying text. Thus, foreigners are
entitled to an exclusion for life insurance proceeds (even if retaining the
incidents of ownership at death) and for portfolio debt. In addition, they can

make tax-free lifetime gifts of intangible property in unlimited amounts or
of tangible property to the extent of the annual $10,000 per donee exclusion.
Foreigners, like citizens, can utilize favorable valuation techniques and can
sell property for a private annuity. There are, however, some exceptions,
even apart from the restrictions on the estate and gift tax marital deduction
and the lesser amount of the unified credit. Thus, nonresident aliens cannot
use gift-splitting or use the unified credit to offset gift tax. For the
generation-skipping transfer tax exemption under I.R.C. § 2631 in the case
of a nonresident alien transferor, see Prop. Treas. Reg. § 26.2663-2(f), 57
Fed. Reg. 61356 (1992); Harry F. Lee, GST and the Nonresident Alien, 57

TAX NOTES 265, 270-71 (1992).
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Thus, Congress, in assessing the Bell and Shoemaker
proposal, must consider, on the one hand, whether the current
system, even with liberalized rules for the unified credit and
marital transfers, is too discouraging to investment in the
United States by nonresident alien individuals (or would be
too discouraging if House Bill 5270 is enacted). Congress must
also consider the distastefulness and inefficiency in the current
use of the holding company structure as a tax avoidance
device, and the inequality among foreign investors stemming
from the unsuitability of that device for some foreign investors.
Congress should adopt the Bell and Shoemaker proposal only
if these concerns are important enough to depart from the goal
of equal treatment of U.S. citizens and nonresident aliens by
easing the estate tax rules for nonresident aliens only (and
even for treaty investors who also obtain the benefit of the
proportional credit). Moreover, the United States should act
unilaterally to reduce its estate tax jurisdiction only if it seems
unrealistic that the U.S. Treasury could broaden its network
of estate tax treaties and thereby achieve a quid pro quo for
estate tax relief offered to nonresident aliens.
5. CONCLUSION

Major unclosable loopholes in the U.S. estate tax on
nonresident estates narrowly limit its application in practice.
This has led to suggestions that the tax should be repealed.
The arguments favoring its retention should, however, prevail.
The United States should do what it can to broaden
application of the tax by clearly asserting jurisdiction over
assets held through partnerships, resolving other
uncertainties, and tightening compliance measures. The
United States should also provide more equitable treatment of
nonresident estates by liberalizing the unified credit and
marital transfer rules. Further liberalizations, which would
provide more favorable treatment for nonresident estates than
for estates of U.S. citizens, can be justified only by a pressing
need to promote investment in the United States by foreign
individuals.
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